LECTURES  DELIVERED  TO 
CIVILIAN  VOLUNTEERS 


NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE 
FOR  CIVILIANS:  1916 


NAVY  DEPARTMENT 
BUREAU  OF  NAVIGATION 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


LECTURES  DELIVERED  TO 
CIVILIAN  VOLUNTEERS 


NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE 
FOR  CIVILIANS:  1916 


NAVY  DEPARTMENT 
\\   <         BUREAU  OF  NAVIGATION 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


\ 


TORPEDO  CRAFT. 


By  Lieut.  F.  H.  ROBERTS,  United  States  Navy. 


The  science  of  warfare  is  as  old  as  the  history  of  man,  yet  that 
part  of  it  which  deals  with  the  construction  and  working  of  tor- 
pedoes wTas  only  originated  some  50  years  ago.  And  as  it  is  the  most 
modern  form  of  fighting,  so  is  it  the  most  powerful  and  destructive. 
There  is  no  half  measure  about  the  torpedo.  Either  the  object  of 
its  attack  escapes  entirely  or  is  utterly  and  completely  destroyed, 
for  it  strikes  at  its  victim's  most  vital  part,  namely,  that  twixt  wind 
and  water,  or  well  below  the  armor  belt. 

The  adoption  of  the  torpedo  as  a  naval  weapon  has  had  one  espe- 
cial and  beneficial  effect  on  the  sea  service  of  the  present  day.  It 
has  been  the  means  of  supplying  the  younger  officers  of  the  Navy 
with  a  fresh  outlet  for  display  of  dash  and  enterprise.  Twenty- 
five  years  ago  there  was  every  prospect  that  the  introduction  of 
mastless  ships  would  turn  the  life  of  an  ordinary  junior  executive 
officer  into  the  most  uneventful  and  humdrum  of  existences.  It 
looked  as  if  watch  keeping  and  dock  drills  were  to  be  the  sum  total 
of  his  career  in  peace  times  unless  he  were  fortunate  enough  to  ob- 
tain the  independent  command  of  a  small  gunboat,  and  even  in  that 
case  he  would  hardly  be  better  off  than  before.  The  same  conditions 
confronted  the  men.  The  advent  of  the  torpedo  and  the  new  class 
of  vessels  which  followed  in  its  wake  has  changed  all  that,  however. 
As  the  torpedo  has  gradually  developed  from  its  crude  initial  state, 
likewise  has  the  ship  which  carries  it  as  the  main  weapon  of  offense. 
With  a  flotilla  of  torpedo  boats  and  a  host  of  destroyers  there  stand 
at  hand  many  opportunities  of  displaying  individual  ability,  and,  in 
war  time,  many  roads  to  fame  and  honor.  In  battle  the  greatest 
prizes  may  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  youngest  officers  and  their 
gallant  crews. 

I.  EARLY  HISTORY. 

HISTORICAL   NOTES. 

The  earliest  "infernal  machine"  on  record  dates  from  the  siege 
of  Antwerp  in  1585,  where  an  Italian  engineer,  Zambelli,  destroyed 
an  important  bridge  laid  by  the  enemy  over  the  Scheldt,  by  setting 
adrift  against  it  four  scows,  each  carrying  a  masonry  mine  heavily 

349127  3 


4  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

charged  with  gunpowder.  Ignition  was  to  be  effected  either  by  a 
slow  match,  or  by  a  gunlock  discharged  by  clockwork  after  the  lapse 
of  a  certain  time.  One  of  these  floating  mines  exploded  against  the 
bridge  with  tremendous  effect,  and  thus  stimulated  investigation 
in  a  new  field  of  warfare.  Other  similar  attempts  were  made  during 
the  next  two  centuries  by  the  French,  British,  and  Russians,  but, 
like  the  fiasco  before  Fort  Fisher,  in  our  Civil  War,  they  usually 
proved  to  be  failures.  The  condition  that  the  charge  shall  be  sub- 
merged, which  is  essential  in  attacks  directed  against  shipping,  was 
totally  ignored.  To  an  American  engineer  officer  of  the  Revolution, 
Capt.  David  Bushnell,  the  credit  is  due  not  only  of  experimentally 
developing  this  principle,  but  also  of  devising  a  submarine  boat,  by 
which  the  first  attempt  to  apply  it  to  the  destruction  of  an  enemy 
was  ever  made.  By  his  fertility  of  invention  and  persevering  efforts 
to  perfect  the  new  weapon  he  justly  won  the  right  to  be  considered 
the  originator  of  submarine  mining  as  practiced  at  the  present  time. 
His  first  practical  trial  was  made  in  1776,  use  being  made  of  his  sub- 
marine boat,  navigated  by  Sergt.  Ezra  Lee.  The  attack  was  directed 
against  the  Eagle,  the  flagship  of  Lord  Howe,  lying  in  New  York 
Harbor,  and  the  vessel  narrowly  escaped  destruction.  In  1777 
Bushnell  caused  the  blowing  up  of  a  prize  schooner,  lying  at  anchor 
astern  of  the  British  frigate  Cerberus  off  New  London,  by  means  of 
a  drifting  torpedo  which  he  had  directed  against  the  latter,  and 
which  was  ignorantly  taken  on  board  the  schooner.  In  the  following 
winter  he  set  adrift  many  torpedoes  to  annoy  the  British  fleet  in  the 
Delaware,  thus  giving  occasion  to  the  so-called  "battle  of  kegs," 
which  was  commemorated  in  a  humorous  song  by  Hopkinson,  the 
author  of  Hail  Columbia.  Twenty  years  later  Robert  Fulton  revived 
the  general  ideas  of  Bushnell,  and  attempted  to  introduce  submarine 
warfare  in  the  French  Navy.  He  made  a  submarine  boat  named  the 
Nautilus,  by  which  in  August,  1801,  he  blew  up  a  launch  in  the 
harbor  of  Brest,  the  first  instance  on  record  of  a  vessel  destroyed  by 
a  submerged  charge  of  gunpowder.  Rejected  by  France,  he  next 
induced  Great  Britain  to  organize  an  abortive  "catamaran"  expe- 
dition against  the  French  fleet  lying  at  Boulogne.  Although  sup- 
ported by  Pitt,  and  successful  in  experimentally  destroying  the  brig 
Dorolhea  by  a  drifting  torpedo,  his  projects  were  finally  rejected  by 
the  British  Government  as  unsuited  to  the  interests  of  a  nation  that 
enjoyed  the  sovereignty  of  the  sea,  which  recalls  to  mind  the  now 
obsolete  expression  of  Mr.  Arnold  Foster  that  the  submarine  is  the 
weapon  of  the  weaker  power.  Fulton  returned  disappointed  to  the 
United  States.  He  ultimately  abandoned  his  efforts  in  submarine 
mining,  as  his  attention  became  absorbed  in  steam  navigation. 

Although  Fulton  began  his  experiments  by  employing  a  submarine 
boat,  experience  led  him  to  abandon  this  device.    As  finally  rejected 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS.  5 

by  the  United  States  Government,  his  system  included  four  classes 
of  torpedoes:  (1)  Buoyant  mines,  anchored  in  the  channel  to  be 
defended,  and  exploded  by  a  mechanical  device  set  in  action  by 
contact  with  the  enemy's  hull;  (2)  line  torpedoes,  designed  to  be  set 
adrift  and  fouled  by  the  cables  of  the  hostile  fleet  at  anchor;  (3) 
harpoon  torpedoes,  to  be  discharged  from  a  gun,  and  thus  attached 
to  a  vessel  and  fired  by  clockwork;  (4)  block  ship  torpedoes,  to  be 
carried  on  booms  projecting  from  vessels  of  peculiar  type,  and  ex- 
ploded by  contact  with  the  enemy.-  The  modern  system  includes  all 
these  devices  in  a  modified  form,  except  the  third — a  fact  which 
sufficiently  shows  how  far  Fulton  was  in  advance  of  his  age  in 
appreciating  the  capabilities  of  submarine  warfare. 

In  the  fall  of  1810  Fulton  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  trial  of  his 
torpedo  by  the  Navy  Department,  and  a  board,  of  which  Commodore 
Rodgers  was  president,  was  appointed  to  conduct  them.  Capt.  James 
Lawrence,  of  Chesapeake  fame,  was  directed  to  prepare  his  vessel, 
the  ArguS)  to  receive  the  attack.  The  defense  which  he  devised  is 
identical  in  principle  to  the  modern  defense  against  the  automobile 
torpedo.  Lawrence  hung  a  splinter  net  which  he  borrowed  from  the 
President  around  the  Argus  at  the  end  of  his  spare  spars,  which  were 
rigged  out  from  the  ship's  side.  The  net  was  weighted  with  grapnels 
and  pigs  of  kentledge.  When  Fulton  saw  this  he  acknowledged  that 
his  torpedo  could  not  get  through  and  asked  for  time  to  prepare  a 
scheme  for  overcoming  the  net.  Thereupon,  he  proceeded  to  invent 
what  he  called  "  a  combination  of  knives  calculated  to  be  fired  from 
a  gun  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  a  hole  through  the  net,  which  being 
effective,  a  trough  one-half  the  size  of  the  body  of  a  cart  (containing 
the  torpedoes)  was  to  be  introduced  into  said  hole  and  the  torpedoes 
emptied  in  the  same  manner  that  potatoes  are  commonly  emptied 
in  the  body  of  a  cart."  You  will  recognize  in  this  combination  of 
knives  a  curious  resemblance  to  the  net  cutters  of  the  modern  torpedo. 

In  the  War  of  1812  several  abortive  attempts  were  made  by  indi- 
viduals to  employ  Fulton's  system  against  British  shipping  in  United 
States  waters,  but  the  Government  took  little  interest  in  the  opera- 
tions, and  no  success  was  achieved,  although  considerable  alarm  was 
excited  in  the  fleet  of  the  enemy. 

It  was  reserved  for  American  engineers  to  demonstrate  upon  a 
grand  scale  the  important  part  which  the  modern  torpedo  can  be 
made  to  play  in  maritime  warfare.  The  Civil  War  of  1861-1865 
offered  conditions  peculiarly  favorable  to  its  development.  The 
Southern  Confederacy  \vas  possessed  of  no  fleet  worthy  of  the  name, 
while  a  long  line  of  seacoast  and  many  navigable  rivers  exposed  its 
territory  to  easy  assault  by  water.  It  could,  therefore,  well  afford  to 
sacrifice  most  of  those  routes  of  communication,  provided  they  could 
be  closed  to  the  war  vessels  of  the  Union.  Every  variety  of  torpedo 


6  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

became,  therefore,  admissible.  After  some  preliminary  trials,  the 
service  was  formally  legalized  in  October,  1862,  and  an  efficient 
bureau  was  established  at  Richmond,  which  continually  extended  the 
scope  of  its  operations  until  the  end  of  the  war.  Seven  United  States 
ironclads,  13  wrooden  war  vessels,  and  7  Army  transports  were  de- 
stroyed by  torpedoes,  and  8  more  vessels  were  more  or  less  injured. 
The  Confederates  lost  four  vessels  by  their  own  mines,  and  a  fine 
ironclad,  the  Albemarle,  by  the  counteroperations  of  the  United 
States  fleet.  This  wholesale  destruction  occurred  chiefly  during  the 
last  two  years  of  the  war,  and  if  at  its  beginning  the  system  had 
been  as  well  organized  as  at  its  close  the  influence  which  might  have 
been  exerted  upon  the  naval  operations  of  the  Union  forces  can 
hardly  be  estimated. 

The  details  of  the  Confederate  system  were  published  to  the  world 
soon  after  the  end  of  the  war  and  formed  the  basis  for  further  in- 
vestigation and  development  in  many  nations.  The  several  devices 
may  be  grouped  in  five  distinct  classes — stationary  torpedoes  or  sub- 
marine mines,  automatic  drifting  torpedoes,  infernal  machines,  offen- 
sive spar  torpedoes,  and  submarine  boats. 

The  most  interesting  of  these  is,  perhaps,  the  spar  torpedo.  This 
form  of  weapon  afforded  the  best  opportunity  for  the  display  of 
personal  gallantry,  and  several  officers  won  distinction  in  its  use.  It 
consisted,  as  you  all  well  know,  of  an  explosive  charge  secured  to 
the  end  of  a  spar  or  outrigger  and  designed  to  be  brought  in  contact 
with  the  enemy's  hull  and  exploded  in  hand-to-hand  conflict.  In 
fact,  the  guiding  principle  of  its  construction  and  design  rendered 
it  necessary  that  wherever  the  torpedo  went  the  operator  had  to  go, 
too.  When  it  was  exploded  against  a  ship's  bottom  the  people  oper- 
ating it  were  only  a  few  fee,t  off  and  consequently  placed  in  a  most 
dangerous  position. 

The  Federal  Navy  rigged  spar  torpedoes  on  ordinary  steam 
launches.  The  Confederate  ironclad  Albemarle  was  sunk  by  Gush- 
ing at  her  moorings  by  this  mode  of  attack.  The  exceptional  gal- 
lantry displayed  merits  special  description.  The  boat  of  an  ordinary 
steam  launch  was  equipped  with  a  spar  torpedo  and  a  brass  howitzer. 
The  torpedo  was  provided  with  an  air  chamber  and  at  the  proper 
moment  was  to  be  detached  from  its  boom  and  allowed  to  rise  under 
the  enemy.  Lieut.  Cushing,  with  a  crew  of  13  officers  and  men,  ad- 
vanced 8  miles  up  the  Roanoke  River,  passing  the  Confederate 
pickets  unobserved.  On  approaching  the  Albermarle,  moored  to 
the  wharf  and  protected  by  a  boom  of  logs  about  30  feet  from  her 
side,  steaming  ahead  full  speed  he  jumped  the  launch  over  the  boom, 
and  under  a  heavy  fire  exploded  his  torpedo  against  her  bottom.  Most 
of  his  party  were  captured  and  some  were  drowned ;  Lieut.  Cushing 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CEU1SE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  7 

himself,  and  one  man,  escaped  by  swimming  and  threading  the 
swamps  to  the  Union  lines.  The  feat  immortalized  Gushing.  One 
of  our  newest  and  most  up-to-date  destroyers  bears  his  name.  An 
anecdote  of  Gushing  may  here  be  related.  Some  years  after  the  war, 
when  Gushing  was  in  command  of  a  ship  in  the  West  Indies,  his  gig 
was  jostled  at  the  landing  by  a  foreign  man-of-war's  boat.  Gushing 
remonstrated  with  the  officer,  who  angrily  handed  him  his  card. 
Gushing  gave  him  his,  and  remarked  that  he  was  at  his  service. 
When  the  foreigner  read  the  name  and  realized  what  he  had  drawn, 
his  spirit  quickly  cooled,  and  an  apology  was  promptly  made. 

The  Confederate  Navy  adopted  the  spar  torpedo  to  an  entirely 
different  type  of  vessel.  These  were  called  into  existence  in  an  at- 
tempt to  break  the  Union  Blockade  of  southern  ports  in  1863.  They 
were  operated  at  Charleston,  S.  C.  As  the  boats  were  designed  to 
blow  up  the  Goliaths  of  the  blockade  they  appropriately  went  under 
the  biblical  name  of  Davids.  They  represent  the  striking  ingenuity 
and  fertility  in  resources  of  the  beleagured  Confederates. 

The  Davids  were  mostly  steam,  though  some  were  operated  by 
hand.  These  steam  Davids  were  not  constructed  to  dive,  but  took  in 
water  ballast  for  running  on  the  surface  in  an  awash  condition.  The 
first  boat  was  successfully  launched  and  manned  by  a  volunteer  crew 
under  Lieut.  Paine.  In  one  of  the  first  trials  a  passing  steamer 
caused  a  heavy  swell  to  break  over  the  boat  when  the  hatch  was 
opened.  This  swirled  down  the  opening  and  swamped  the  boat. 
The  officer  was  the  only  one  of  the  crew  saved.  Notwithstanding  this 
mishap  the  boat  was  raised  and  a  second  volunteer  crew,  under  Lieut. 
Douglass  Glassell,  after  a  few  trial  trips,  essayed  an  attack  at  9.15 
p.  m.  on  the  5th  of  October,  1863,  against  the  Federal  ships  off 
Charleston.  He  fell  in  with  the  Ironsides,  a  ship  dreaded  on  ac- 
count of  her  heavy  attacks  on  the  forts.  All  these  ships  had  been 
specially  warned  to  look  out  for  submarine  attacks;  and  after  dark 
the  Ironsides  shifted  her  anchorage  every  night. 

The  officer  of  the  watch  on  this  particular  occasion  saw  what  ap- 
peared to  be  a  plank  with  a  cylindrical  pole  on  it  coming  toward 
his  ship.  The  quartermaster  hailed  the  object.  The  reply  was  a 
volley  of  musketry  from  the  open  hatch  of  the  submarine,  which 
killed  an  officer  on  board  the  Housatonic.  The  object  came  closer  to 
the  ship.  Shortly  afterwards  a  heavy  explosion  occurred  which 
shook  the  vessel  severely,  threw  a  column  of  water  on  the  spar  deck, 
flooded  the  engine  room,  broke  one  man's  leg,  and  started  many  leaks, 
with  some  external  damage  above  the  water  line. 

A  spar  torpedo  was  used  in  this  attack,  but,  being  exploded  too 
near  the  surface,  the  damage  was  not  so  great  as  might  have  occurred 
had  the  charge  been  more  submersed. 


8  NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE  FOR  CIVILIANS. 

In  the  explosion  the  submarine  swamped;  the  lieutenant  and  two 
others  managed  to  save  themselves  by  swimming  clear  of  the  boat 
and  were  picked  up  by  a  coaling  schooner. 

The  following  is  an  account  of  this  attack  by  Hobart  Pasha : 

I  remember  on  one  occasion  during  the  war,  when  I  was  at  Charleston, 
meeting  in  a  coffee  room  at  that  place  a  young  naval  officer  (a  southerner), 
with  whom  I  got  into  conversation.  He  told  me  that  that  night  he  was  going 
to  sink  a  northern  man-of-war  which  was  blockading  the  port,  and  invited 
me  to  see  him  off.  I  accompanied  him  down  to  his  cigar  box,  as  he  called  it, 
and  found  that  she  was  a  vessel  about  40  feet  long,  shaped  like  a  cigar  on 
the  bow  of  which  was  placed  a  torpedo.  On  his  stepping  on  board,  with  his 
crew  of  four  men,  his  boat  was  immersed  till  nothing  but  a  small  piece  of 
funnel  was  visible.  He  moved  off  into  the  darkness  at  no  great  speed,  say  at 
about  5  miles  an  hour.  The  next  evening,  on  visiting  the  coffee  house,  I  found 
my  friend  sitting  quietly  smoking  his  pipe.  He  told  me  that  he  had  succeeded 
in  making  a  hole  in  the  frigate  which  he  had  attacked,  which  vessel  could,  in 
fact,  be  seen  lying  in«shallow  water  some  7  miles  off,  careened  over  to  repair 
damages.  But  he  said  that  on  the  concussion  made  by  firing  the  torpedo  the 
water  had  rushed  in  through  the  hatches  of  the  boat  and  she  had  sunk  to  the 
bottom.  All  his  men  were  dro\vned.  He  said  he  didn't  know  how  he  escaped 
himself,  but  he  fancied  that  he  came  up  through  the  hatches,  as  he  found 
himself  floating  about,  and  swam  to  shore.  This  affair  was  officially  reported 
by  the  American  blockading  squadron,  corroborating  the  fact  of  the  injury  done 
to  the  frigate,  and  stating  that  the  torpedo  boat  was  got  up,  with  four  dead 
bodies  in  her  hold.  Here  is  one  system  which  might  be  utilized  in  naval 
warfare,  if  perfected ;  and  I  am  given  to  understand  that  a  submarine  torpedo 
boat  is  already  invented  by  Mr.  Nordenfelt. 

Early  in  the  year  1864  Admiral  Dahlgren,  commanding  the  South 
Atlantic  blockading  squadron,  was  warned  by  spies  that  an  im- 
proved submarine  had  been  launched  of  a  slightly  different  type 
from  that  which  attacked  the  Ironsides.  He  ordered  extra  look- 
out precautions  to  be  taken  in  the  ships,  but  few  of  his  officers 
thought  the  submarine  would  be  able  to  reach  the  outer  anchorage 
of  Charleston  Harbor. 

The  southerners  were  quite  aware  of  this  opinion  and  determined 
at  all  hazards  to  make  an  attempt  to  reach  the  ships  and  blow  up 
as  many  as  they  could  with  their  new  weapon. 

On  the  night  of  February  17  they  succeeded  in  getting  the  boat 
over  the  bar  and  directed  her  toward  the  nearest  vessel.  This  turned 
out  to  be  the  Housatonic.  The  officers  of  the  watch  and  lookouts, 
soon  after  8  p.  m.,  saw,  a  few  hundred  yards  off,  what  they  thought 
was  a  small  boat  making  toward  them.  On  nearing  the  ship  the  craft 
was  hailed,  but  no  answer  came.  The  crew  were  at  once  sent  to 
.quarters;  but  it  was  then  ascertained  the  pivot  guns  could  not  be 
depressed  sufficiently  to  hit  the  object  if  they  had  been  fired. 

The  order  was  next  given  to  slip  the  chain.  The  stranger  came  on 
and  touched  the  side.  As  the  propellers  of  the  big  ship  moved,  a 
loud  explosion  followed  the  grazing  and  cracking  sound  of  the 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  9 

breaking  spar,  which  carried  the  torpedo  from  the  bow  of  the  sub- 
marine. The  Housatonic  had  a  large  hole  driven  in  her  starboard 
side  abreast  the  mainmast  and  sank  until  the  hammock  nettings 
were  just  awash  when  the  keel  was  on  the  bottom.  Many  of  the 
crew  were  saved  by  the  boats  of  the  Canandaigua,  which  was 
anchored  near  by,  but  an  ensign  and  several  men  were  drowned. 

Nothing  more  was  seen  of  the  David,  and  it  was  generally  sup- 
posed she  escaped  until,  some  years  later,  when  divers  were  sent  down 
to  examine  the  wreck  of  the  Housatonic,  they  found  the  gallant  little 
David  lying  alongside  the  big  ship  with  the  remains  of  her  nine 
heroes  on  board. 

This  boat  was  propelled  by  hand  power  and  not  steam,  as  in  the 
early  boats.  The  crew  of  eight  men  worked  on  a  sort  of  pump 
handle  for  turning  the  propeller.  The  air  supply  was  sufficient  to 
last  the  crew  two  to  three  hours;  Tind  we  notice  in  connection  with 
this  boat  that  hydroplanes  were  fitted  externally  at  the  foremost  end 
to  assist  in  keeping  the  boat  low  in  the  water  and  for  making  small 
dives. 

The  U.  S.  S.  Minnesota  was  attacked  by  a  steam  David  when 
anchored  off  Newport  News,  Va.,  April  9,  1864.  The  officer  of  the 
watch  on  board  the  Minnesota  saw  a  boat  adrift  on  his  port  beam, 
hailed  her,  and  she  replied  Roanoke. 

A  tug  acting  as  a  guard  boat  was  directed  to  examine  the  boat. 
The  stranger  neared  the  large  ship ;  she  was  very  low  in  the  water, 
almost  awash,  with  no  sign  of  oars,  but  the  quartermaster  heard 
her  puff.  The  tug  was  ordered  to  run  her  down  if  no  further  re- 
plies were  received,  and  the  sentries  on  the  forecastle  fired  several 
volleys  at  her;  then  a  loud  explosion  occurred.  The  crew  went  to 
quarters,  and  in  the  confusion  the  David  escaped.  A  considerable 
amount  of  damage  was  done  structurally  to  the  steamer,  and  large 
quantities  of  stores  were  destroyed  by  water  through  leakage,  etc. 

The  following  dispatch  was  captured  in  a  telegraph  station  on 
James  Eiver  a  few  weeks  later : 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  April  11,  1864. 
Hon.  S.  R.  MALLOKY, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Navy  Department: 

Passed  through  the  Federal  fleet  off  Newport  News  and  exploded  53  pounds 
of  powder  against  the  side  of  the  flagship  Minnesota  at  2  a.  m.,  9th  instant. 
She  has  not  sunk,  and  I  have  no  means  of  telling  the  injury  done.  My  boat 
and  party  escaped  without  loss  under  the  fire  of  her  heavy  guns  and  musketry 
and  that  of  a  gunboat  lying  to  her  stern. 

HUNTER  DAVIDSON. 

The  David  differed  slightly  from  the  Davids  of  Charleston,  as 
she  was  a  steam  pinnace  into  which  water-ballast  tanks  were  built 
and  the  whole  upper  works  plated  over  with  armor.  With  the  tanks 


10  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

full,  only  a  small  turtle  back  was  visible,  with  a  manhole  and  aper- 
ture for  funnel,  which  was  capable  of  being  lowered. 

Another  David  attacked  the  steamer  Memphis  at  1  a.  m.  on  March 
6,  1864,  in  the  North  Edisto  River,  and  succeeded  in  getting  under 
her  quarter.  The  ship's  engines  were  moved,  and  it  is  believed  one 
of  the  blades  of  her  propeller  struck  the  torpedo  spar  of  the  David 
and  broke  it,  consequently  the  attack  failed. 

II.  DEVELOPMENTS  UP  TO  1890. 

As  the  naval  ordnance  improved,  quick-firing  and  machine  guns 
became  so  effective  that  the  spar  torpedo  went  into  the  discard. 
In  its  place  came  the  auotmobile  torpedo,  an  invention  of  an  Austrian 
naval  officer,  Capt.  Luppis.  Its  early  development  was  given  into 
the  hands  of  an  able  engineer  named  Mr.  Robert  Whitehead,  and 
the  well-known  Whitehead  torpedo  of  to-day  is  the  result  of  his 
efforts.  This  torpedo  during  the  period  of  our  Spanish  War  was 
supposed  to  automatically  maintain  a  set  depth  and  steer  a  course 
while  making  a  run  of  about  400  yards  at  a  20-knot  speed.  Its 
early  performances  were,  however,  erratic.  Other  types  of  torpe- 
does began  to  make  their  appearance  about  this  time,  notably  among 
them  the  Howell,  the  invention  of  Rear  Admiral  John  Adams 
Howell,  United  States  Navy.  With  the  advent  of  the  automobile 
torpedo  came  also  the  first  really  successful  attempts  at  submarine 
building,  each  having  the  same  basic  principles  of  design,  and  the 
development  of  one  materially  assisting  the  progress  of  both. 

A  Mr.  Holland,  an  American,  taking  the  Whitehead  torpedo  as 
his  model,  perfected  the  first  successful  submarine  boat.  Mr.  Hol- 
land stated: 

The  submarine  boat  is  a  small  ship  on  the  model  of  the  Whitehead  torpedo, 
subject  to  none  of  its  limitations,  improving  on  all  its  special  qualities  except- 
ing speed,  for  which  it  substitutes  incomparably  greater  endurance.  It  is  not, 
like  other  small  vessels,  compelled  to  select  for  its  antagonist  a  vessel  of  about 
its  own  or  inferior  power;  the  larger  and  more  powerful  its  mark  the  better 
its  opportunity. 

Soon  Mr.  Simon  Lake,  also  an  American,  developed  a  submarine. 

Both  the  Holland  and  the  Lake  types  are  now  in  use  in  our  service. 

The  science  of  submarine  construction  has  advanced  from  the 
original  Davids  to  large  seagoing  types,  which  are  now  capable  of 
crossing  the  Atlantic  under  their  own  power. 

With  each  development  of  the  torpedo  there  also  came  a  corre- 
sponding development  in  surface  torpedo-boat  construction. 

At  first,  with  a  400-yard-range  torpedo,  the  torpedo  boat  was  small 
and  designed  with  the  idea  of  sneaking  upon  its  prey  unobserved.  It 
was  necessarily  confined  to  harbor  and  the  waters  close  to  the  coast. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CETJISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  11 

With  the  advent  of  long-range  torpedoes — they  are  now  being  built 
capable  of  running  over  12,000  yards,  or  6  nautical  miles — the  type 
of  surface  craft  carrying  them  was  increased  in  size,  until  we  now 
have  all  our  destroyers  displacing  over  1,100  tons  and  capable  of  ac- 
companying the  fleet  into  any  waters. 

You  will  probably  see  some  of  them  during  your  present  cruise. 
Their  appearance  will  give  each  one  of  you  certain  impressions  of 
their  latent  power  to  do  good  for  our  own  forces  and  destruction  to 
those  of  our  enemies. 

You  may  depend  upon  it,  such  impressions  that  you  may  so  receive 
are  well  founded. 

III.  LIFE  AFLOAT. 

I  have  given  you,  briefly,  the  general  trend  of  development  up  to 
the  present.  The  navies  of  the  world,  step  by  step,  have  gradually 
passed  from  the  age  of  sail  to  the  age  of  steam,  and  during  this 
transition  the  torpedo,  the  surface  torpedo  boat,  and  the  under- 
water torpedo  boat,  or  submarine,  as  it  is  now  called,  have  come  into 
existence. 

The  question  asked  many  years  ago,  "  Who  can  say  that  coal  whips 
will  outlast  tacks  and  sheets  ?  "  has  been  answered.  And,  more  than 
this,  coal  whips  in  their  turn  have  given  place  to  oil  pumps. 

These  are  now  powerful  units  of  our  country's  right  arm  of  de- 
fense, the  Navy,  in  which  so  many  of  you  earnest  men  are  now  taking 
an  active  part.  You  have  had  your  first  real  insight  into  life  in  the 
Navy  during  the  past  few  weeks.  You  have  been  introduced  to  a 
pair  of  hammock  hooks  and  find  it  possible  to  use  them  for  quarters. 
You  are  learning  how  to  keep  yourself  and  your  ship  and  your  guns. 

You  are  becoming  well  acquainted  with  the  Navy  ration.  This, 
while  often  slandered,  is  nevertheless  the  crew's  most  faithful  friend ; 
as  long  as  you  serve  your  country  aboard  ship — in  peace  or  in  war — 
that  faithful  friend  will  serve  you  regularly  three  times  per  day.  In 
war  time  the  ration  and  that  insignificant  pair  of  hammock  hooks 
give  the  man-of-warsman  a  distinct  advantage  over  his  brother  in 
the  Army.  You  are  never  more  than  600  feet  from  your  bed.  This 
is  worth  remembering. 

ACCOMMODATIONS    ON     A     DESTROYER BERTHS — FOOD COAL    AND     OIL 

BURNING. 

I  do  not  believe  any  of  you  have  yet  become  so  used  to  the  Navy 
Cookbook  but  that  you  can  appreciate  an  occurrence  which  happened 
on  board  the  torpedo-boat  destroyer  Duncan  a  short  time  ago.  This 
destroyer  was  placed  in  commission  at  the  navy  yard,  Boston.  At 


12  NAVAL   TRAINING   CEUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

the  end  of  a  month  it  was  found  that  the  ration  allowance  had  not 
been  completely  expended,  the  saving  to  the  general  mess  fund  being 
about  $50.  The  commanding  officer  summoned  his  commissary 
steward,  a  man  serving  in  his  fourth  enlistment  and  well  versed  in 
the  science  of  balancing  the  daily  35-cent  ration  allowance  with  the 
appetites  of  the  men.  He  was  also  familiar  with  the  contract  prices 
of  food  prevailing  at  the  seaports  along  our  coast  and  in  the  West 
Indies.  The  ccmmanding  officer  informed  him  that  he  wanted  the 
men  to  receive  the  benefits  of  the  total  money  allowance,  that  he 
did  not  approve  saving  money  at  the  expense  of  the  men's  stomachs. 
The  steward  protested,  stating  that  the  prices  at  Boston  were  much 
cheaper  than  those  farther  south,  especially  in  the  West  Indies, 
where  the  Duncan  was  soon  to  join  the  destroyer  force  for  the  winter 
maneuvers  with  the  fleet.  Money  saved  up  north  could  therefore 
be  spent  later,  thus  insuring  a  uniformly  good  bill  of  fare  at  all 
ports;  besides,  the  steward  informed  the  captain  that  the  crew  was 
being  fed  with  the  best  food,  and  plenty  of  it;  to  prove  which  state- 
ment the  steward  produced  his  contracts  and  menus.  The  com- 
manding officer,  after  carefully  perusing  both,  noticed  that  the  crew 
was  being  furnished  a  standard  allowance  of  condensed  milk,  and 
not  fresh  milk.  So  he  asked  the  steward,  "Why  not  .give  the  crew 
fresh  milk  while  lying  here  alongside  the  dock?"  "That  would 
never  do,"  said  the  steward,  "  for  you  would  have  all  the  men  coming 
to  the  mast  wanting  to  know  what  was  the  matter  with  their 
coffee." 

The  comforts  to  be  found  at  sea  upon  torpedo  crafts  are  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  size  of  the  craft.  They  roll,  they  yaw,  they  pitch, 
they  take  seas  aboard,  and  are  most  uncomfortable,  while  the  larger 
craft,  such  as  those  upon  which  you  are  now  making  your  cruise, 
are  as  steady  as  castles.  This  life  makes  the  torpedo-boat  sailor  a 
rough-and-ready  man  of  the  sea,  hardened  by  daily  incidents  of  ex- 
posure and  peril. 

The  crew  of  the  destroyer  become  self-reliant ;  upon  each  is  placed 
certain  responsibilities,  and  with  the  acceptance  of  these  responsibili- 
ties the  men  in  turn  grow  ready  to  meet  emergencies.  Daring  be- 
comes second  nature,  hardship  becomes  routine,  self-reliance  the 
principal  asset. 

Associated  with  this  life  which  so  many  men  are  living,  there 
are  incidents  which,  in  the  future,  when  told,  will  gladden  the  hearts 
of  the  coming  generation.  Kipling,  in  one  of  his  poems,  said  of 
Admiral  Robley  D.  Evans,  "  He  has  lived  more  stories  than  Zogbaum 
or  I  could  invent."  The  same  observation  is  true  of  the  men  of  the 
destroyer  service. 

No  especial  attempt  is  made  in  selecting  the  men  to  serve  in  tor- 
pedo crafts — whether  they  be  fat  men  or  lean  men,  short  men  or 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  13 

tall  men.  The  character  and  spirit  is  developed  by  association  after 
their  arrival.  As  a  rule  they  are  older  than  the  men  (or  boys)  on 
the  battleships. 

You  all  know  that  one  of  the  characteristics  of  a  destroyer  is 
ability  to  make  high  speed.  To  this  end  it  has  always  been  the 
policy  of  the  naval  constructors  to  keep  the  fittings  of  the  vessel 
strong,  but  of  light  weight.  No  chances  were  ever  lost  by  the 
naval  constructors  in  lightening  the  destroyers  by  removal  of  any 
fittings  that  they  considered  unnecessary.  In  1904  a  flotilla  of  these 
destroyers  sailed  from  the  Atlantic  coast  to  the  Philippines  via  San 
Juan,  the  Azores,  the  Mediterranean,  the  Suez  Canal,  Indian  Ocean, 
and  the  West  Indies.  It  so  happened  that  on  one  of  these  destroyers 
the  commanding  officer  was  a  man  weighing  about  230  ponnds. 
His  two  assistants,  both  then  ensigns,  each  weighed  well  over  200 
pounds.  Out  of  a  half  dozen  chief  petty  officers,  three  of  them 
were  heavyweights,  and  in  the  remainder  of  the  crew  were  two 
others  of  the  same  avoirdupois.  Upon  arrival  in  the  Philippines  the 
weather  was  hot  and  sultry,  and  the  sun  kept  the  steel  decks  of  the 
vessel  warm.  In  fact  another  torment  had  been  added  to  the  lot 
of  these  God-fearing  men.  The  vessel's  original  allowance  list  had 
included  one  electric  fan,  so  the  commanding  officer  immediately 
submitted  a  requisition  requesting  that  a  fan  be  furnished  for  the 
wardroom  and  one  in  each  compartment  in  which  the  crew  were 
quartered,  a  total  of  five  fans.  The  request  in  due  time  reached 
Washington,  and  some  three  months  later  was  returned  disapproved, 
as  the  bureau  did  not  wish  to  add  any  unnecessary  weight  to  the 
vessel  for  fear  of  reducing  its  speed.  Nothing  daunted,  the  com- 
manding officer  then  returned  the  requisition  with  a  statement  there- 
on of  the  weights  of  himself,  his  two  commissioned  assistants,  and 
other  members  of  the  crew,  and  requested  that  one  of  these  heavy- 
weights be  transferred,  and  that  a  man  weighing  about  150  pounds 
be  sent  in  his  place,  and  further  requested  that  the  disapproval  of 
his  requisition  be  reconsidered.  Needless  to  say,  the  fans  were 
forthcoming  and  nobody  was  transferred,  not  even  the  commanding 
officer.  Since  that  time  electric  fans  are  one  of  the  few  comforts 
found  on  destroyers. 

USES — CARRYING  WASH — WAR  GAMES. 

When  torepdo  boats  made  their  first  appearance  in  our  Navy, 
ranking  officers  were  all  of  the  old  school ;  that  is,  they  were  brought 
up  and  were  firm  believers  in  sails  and  wooden  vessels.  They  looked 
askance  at  anything  new,  so  it  was  many  years  before  torpedo  boats 
were  given  any  other  than  lowly  jobs,  such  as  carrying  mail,  pro- 
visions and  laundry.  As  the  older  generation  passed  by,  the  peace- 


14  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

time  uses  to  which  these  vessels  were  put  were  changed  greatly,  to 
that  which  you  now  find  them  doing — preparing  with  the  fleet  and 
keeping  in  readiness  for  war.  This  preparation  has  been  progressive 
from  year  to  year,  for  instance,  in  the  strategic  maneuvers  next  week 
the  destroyers  will  scout  out  over  the  ocean  as  the  eyes  of  the  defend- 
ers, locate  and  report  the  enemy's  position  and  strength  to  the  end 
that  our  forces,  the  fleet  to  which  you  are  attached,  will  be  properly 
informed  of  the  disposition  and  intentions  of  the  enemy. 

In  contrast,  ten  years  ago  the  yearly  maneuvers  held  by  the 
torpedo  boats  and  torpedo-boat  destroyers  consisted  of  a  block- 
ade by  the  destroyers  of  the  harbor  of  •  Newport,  within  which 
were  six  torpedo  boats.  The  problem  extended  throughout  a 
week.  The  torpedo  boats  were  to  attempt  to  run  the  blockade  es- 
tablished by  the  destroyers.  As  a  defensive  measure  for  our  coast, 
it  was  valueless.  As  an  exercise  at  general  quarters  it  was  very  suc- 
cessful, as  the  men  were  required  to  stand  watch  and  watch,  sleep- 
ing at  their  guns  throughout  the  week.  One  night  the  destroyer 
Hopkins  sighted  what  was  apparently  a  torpedo  boat  sneaking  out 
of  the  harbor.  The  Hopkins  put  on  full  speed,  turned  her  searchlight 
on  her  enemy,  and  blazed  away  with  blank  charges.  The  enemy  made 
frantic  efforts  to  escape,  but  was  hotly  pursued  by  the  Hopkins. 
After  half  an  hour's  chase  the  Hopkins  came  close  enough  aboard  her 
enemy  to  discover  several  distressed  females  who,  to  judge  from  their 
costumes,  had  evidently  been  awakened  from  sound  slumbers  by  the 
Hopkins  guns,  and  a  terrified  darkey  steward  wildly  waving  an  un- 
lighted  lantern.  The  enemy  turned  out  to  be  a  black  painted  turbine 
driven  steam  yacht,  which  could  readily  be  mistaken  at  nighttime 
for  one  of  our  torpedo  boats.  When  next  seen,  this  yacht  was  painted 
white. 

OIL    BURNING. 

I  have  spoken  in  a  general  way  of  the  discomforts  of  life  aboard  a 
destroyer.  There  is  one  discomfort,  however,  that  we  do  not  have, 
but  that  you  of  the  battleships  do  have;  that  is  periodic  "coaling 
ship."  Since  1909  the  destroyers  have  been  fitted  for  burning  fuel 
oil  instead  of  coal.  Our  latest  dreadnaughts  are  also  being  equipped 
with  this  installation.  In  putting  fuel  aboard,  all  a  destroyer  needs 
is  a  hose  and  a  pump.  Likewise,  when  burning  fuel,  all  that  is 
needed  is  a  pipe  line  and  a  pump.  With  coal  it  is  different,  as  you 
probably  already  know,  especially  if  you  have  had  the  opportunity 
to  coal  ship.  On  coal-burning  ships,  the  faster  a  vessel  steams  the 
greater  the  manual  labor  in  supplying  coal  to  the  furnaces.  On  an 
oil-burning  ship  it  takes  no  more  manual  labor  to  steam  at  full  power 
than  at  any  other  speed.  In  1910  the  Cramp  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Phil- 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  15 

adelphia,  were  constructing  two  new  oil-burning  destroyers  for  our 
Navy,  the  Warrington  and  Mayrant.  These  were  among  the  first  oil 
burners  built,  and  the  installations  were  new,  both  to  the  shipbuild- 
ing experts  as  well  as  to  the  men  of  the  Navy  ordered  to  the  vessels 
prior  to  their  commissioning.  Among  the  Navy  men  were  two  chief 
water  tenders,  both  past  masters  of  the  art  of  getting  power  from 
boilers  with  coal  as  the  fuel.  When  the  builders  made  their  first 
trial  runs  on  the  Warrington^  Duffy,  one  of  the  chief  water  tenders 
slated  on  her  detail,  was  allowed  by  the  shipbuilders  to  accompany 
her  so  that  he  might  observe  the  workings  of  the  fuel-oil-burning 
installation.  On  the  return  of  the  ship  Duffy  was  met  at  the  dock 
by  the  other  chief  water  tender,  who  anxiously  inquired,  "  How  did 
she  go,  Duffy  ?  "  to  which  Duffy  replied,  "Am  disgusted  with  the 
whole  blessed  thing."  "  Why  is  that?  "  asked  his  friend.  "  Because," 
said  Duffy,  "  the  faster  they  went  the  more  that  coal  heaver  sat  on  a 
soap  box  and  read  his  paper." 


MILITARY  CHARACTER. 


By  Capt.  WILLIAM  S.  SIMS,  United  States  Navy. 


In  assigning  me  the  task  of  delivering  a  lecture  upon  military 
character  before  the  civilian  naval  volunteers,  the  Navy  Department 
directed  that  the  lecture  be  informal  and  nontechnical  in  character, 
and  enlivened,  where  practicable,  by  ample  illustration  and  anecdote. 

The  requirement  that  it  be  informal  and  nontechnical  is  not  diffi- 
cult of  fulfillment,  but  I  am  afraid  it  is  a  subject  that  does  not  lend 
itself  to  enlivening  anecdote.  Character  is  a  moral  attribute,  and 
consequently  an  analysis  of  its  elements,  with  the  inevitable  enumera- 
tion of  our  own  deficiencies,  must  necessarily  partake  somewhat  of 
the  nature  of  one  of  those  uncomfortable  sermons  which  expose  our 
many  moral  weaknesses — and  if  any  of  you  have  been  to  church 
recently  and  have  heard  one  of  those  sermons  you  know  just  about 
how  enlivening  they  are. 

In  reality  such  sermons  are  unavoidably  depressing,  and  so  neces- 
sarily is  a  lecture  upon  character,  either  civil  or  military.  The 
parson  reminds  us  that  we  have  left  undone  those  things  that  we 
ought  to  have  done,  etc.,  and  the  lecturer  on  character  presents  such 
a  formidable  array  of  essential  virtues  that  not  even  the  most  self- 
satisfied  among  us  can  claim  to  possess  and  practice  all  of  them. 

For  example,  to  mention  at  random  a  few  of  the  qualities  that  the 
various  authoritative  writers  on  the  subject  specify  as  essential  to 
the  successful  training  and  leading  of  men  in  war,  we  have :  Ardor, 
bravery,  zeal,  endurance,  courage,  fortitude,  attainment,  experience, 
knowledge,  self-restraint,  decision,  combativeness,  energy,  caution, 
initiative,  compliance,  loyalty,  fidelity,  industry,  studiousness,  will, 
activity,  self-confidence,  responsibility,  patience,  resolution,  imper- 
turbability, cheerfulness,  imagination,  memory,  circumspection,  bold- 
ness, enterprise,  foresight,  discernment,  perseverance,  tact,  good 
manners,  system,  thoroughness,  etc. ;  and,  finally,  we  find  the  official 
expression  of  the  military  ideal  in  our  service  in  the  first  of  the 
Articles  for  the  Government  of  the  Navy  of  the  United  States. 

The  commanders  of  all  fleets,  squadrons,  naval  stations,  and  vessels  belong- 
ing to  the  Navy  are  required  to  show  in  themselves  a  good  example  of  virtue, 
honor,  patriotism,  and  subordination. 

67325—16 2  17 


18  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

From  this  you  will  see  that  the  moral  qualifications  necessary  for 
a  good  military  character  are  much  the  same  as  those  found  in  what 
we  usually  call  a  strong  character  in  civil  life. 

Needless  to  say,  a  discussion  of  each  one  of  the  qualities  enumer- 
ated, and  their  bearing  upon  the  character  required  for  successful 
leadership,  would  require  a  volume.  Many  volumes  have  been 
devoted  to  this  subject.  Almost  all  of  the  writers  have  confined  their 
studies  to  the  traits  of  character  found  in  great  leaders,  but  the 
literature  concerning  the  character  of  the  great  body  of  subordinates 
is  very  scant.  I  will  confine  my  remarks  principally  to  the  latter, 
because  the  character  of  the  great  body  of  officers  and  men  is  of  more 
importance  to  us  than  is  the  character  of  that  rarely  attained  ideal— 
a  great  leader  of  men. 

During  the  summer  of  1913  a  conference  upon  this  subject  was 
held  at  the  Naval  War  College.  This  conference  was  based  upon  the 
following  question : 

Discuss  the  qualities  of  military  character,  the  means  of  their  development, 
and  the  method  of  their  employment. 

Discuss  the  relation  of  loyalty,  initiative,  and  the  spirit  of  cooperation  to 
naval  efficiency. 

Explain  in  detail  your  view  of,  and  suggest  methods  for,  improving  the 
present  military  character  of  our  service. 

In  reply  to  this  question,  six  papers  were  submitted  by  members  of 
the  conference.  Three  of  them  are  included  in  a  mimeograph  volume 
issued  by  the  college.  They  are  by  Col.  Henry  C.  Davis,  United 
States  Army,  Commander  R.  E.  Belknap,  United  States  Navy,  and 
Commander  Frank  H.  Schofield,  United  States  Navy.  I  wish  that 
you  could  all  read  these  very  able  and  interesting  discussions.  Un- 
fortunately they  are  much  too  long  for  quotation  or  for  much  of 
their  contents  to  be  included  in  such  a  brief  paper  as  this  necessarily 
must  be. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  the  volume  referred  to  contains  extracts 
from  100  short  papers  submitted  by  officers  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet — by 
ensigns,  lieutenants,  lieutenant  commanders,  and  commanders — who 
took  an  elementary  course  at  the  college.  These  were  submitted  in 
compliance  with  the  following  order: 

Each  officer  will  submit  to  the  president  of  the  War  College,  on  Wednesday 
of  the  second  week  of  the  course,  a  brief  thesis  on  "  Loyalty,  initiative,  and 
decision  of  character,"  written  from  the  standpoint  of  his  own  experience. 

To  anyone  who  is  studying  this  subject  these  papers  are  of  singular 
interest  as  showing  the  degree  tp  which  our  service  is  beginning  to 
grasp  these  essentials.  In  commenting  upon  them,  the  college  stated 
that  they  "  are  worthy  of  the  closest  attention  by  officers  of  all  grades 
and  corps." 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS.  19 

Of  course  I  realize  that  upon  an  occasion  of  this  kind  I  must  be 
brief,  on  pain  of  being  as  much  disliked  as  is  the  parson  who 
preaches  a  long  moral  sermon  in  the  middle  of  August.  I  will  there- 
fore refer  but  briefly  to  the  essential  qualities  of  the  great  leaders, 
and  confine  my  remarks,  as  above  indicated,  principally  to  the  mili- 
tary character  of  the  subordinate,  to  his  relation  to  his  superior,  to 
the  conduct  of  the  superior  toward  the  subordinate,  and  to  the  duty 
of  the  superior  in  training  his  subordinates  in  such  manner  as  to  in- 
spire their  loyalty,  develop  their  initiative,  and  thus  secure  their 
effective  cooperation. 

We  all  know,  in  a  general  way,  that  a  man  upon  whom  is  placed  a 
great  responsibility  in  a  great  war,  a  Joffre  or  a  Jellicoe,  should  not 
only  be  a  model  of  virtue,  honor,  patriotism,  and  subordination,  but 
that  he  should  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  his  profession,  and  the 
self-confidence  which  this  renders"  possible.  Also  a  strong  will, 
great  decision  of  character,  resolution,  energy,  loyalty  to  his  govern- 
ment, his  cause,  and  his  subordinates,  willingness  to  acept  and  ability 
to  bear  responsibility,  fortitude  in  adversity,  boldness  in  conception, 
caution  in  execution,  imperturbability  in  council,  thoroughness  in 
preparation,  besides  personal  courage,  physical  vigor,  and  many 
other  secondary  though  essential  qualities. 

Each  of  these  have  been  the  subject  of  exhaustive  analysis  by  the 
masters  of  war,  and  they  make  very  interesting  and  instructive  read- 
ing; but  these  writers  have  told  us  comparatively  little  of  how  we, 
the  subordinates,  are  to  conduct  ourselves  so  as  to  inspire  the  maxi- 
mum effort  on  the  part  of  our  subordinates,  to  the  end  that  we  in  turn 
may  render  the  maximum  service  to  our  superiors,  and  thus  promote 
the  maximum  efficiency  of  the  whole  organization.  This  is  the  fea- 
ture of  military  training  that  has  been  least  understood  in  the  past 
and  is  making  its  way  so  slowly  in  some  services  even  at  present. 

It  involves  the  two  wholly  essential  twin  qualities  of  loyalty  and 
initiative,  and  all  those  qualities  that  are  necessary  to  inspire  and 
develop  them,  as  well  as  all  those  that  flow  from  their  combination. 
Loyalty  in  itself  is  always  indispensable,  but  initiative  without  loy- 
alty is  dangerous.  It  is  their  intelligent  and  trained  cooperation 
which  is  the  vital  characteristics  of  modern  armies. 

They  of  course  involve  the  most  complete  subordination  to  the  will 
and  plans  of  higher  authority,  the  development  of  the  feeling  of 
proper  responsibility,  the  exercise  of  reasoned  decision ;  and  they  op- 
erate in  conjunction  with  the  manly  and  moral  virtues  heretofore 
enumerated,  such  as  zeal,  courage,  energy,  activity,  fidelity,  etc. 

The  most  desirable  material  for  military  service  is  a  man  who  pos- 
sesses all  the  qualities  which  are  usually  associated  with  good  civil 
character ;  but  the  point  that  it  is  wished  to  particularly  to  accentuate 


20  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

is  that  the  possession  of  these  individual  qualities  will  not  render  the 
man  efficient  in  a  military  sense  unless  they  are  employed  in  such 
manner  as  to  promote  the  efficiency  of  the  whole  organization  to 
which  he  belongs. 

This  may  best  be  brought  out  by  a  comparison  between  the  methods 
of  military  control  in  former,  though  comparatively  recent,  times 
and  those  practiced  at  present  in  the  most  efficient  modern  armies,  or 
nations,  in  arms. 

Briefly,  the  former  system  was  rigid  in  requiring  unquestioning 
obedience  to  explicit  orders  from  superior  authority.  No  initiative 
was  allowed  on  the  part  of  the  subordinate.  The  latter  were  not 
informed  of  the  mission  or  general  plan  of  the  leader.  Orders  were 
given  in  detail  and  were  to  be  obeyed  to  the  letter.  The  one  idea  of 
command  of  the  soldiers  of  those  days  was  "  I  order,  you  obey,"  for 
in  their  eyes  unqualified  and  unthinking  obedience  was  the  first  of 
military  virtues.  In  operations  of  a  certain  magnitude  this  method 
of  command  frequently  resulted  in  notable  success  through  the  sol- 
dierly qualities  of  the  personnel  and  its  loyalty  to  the  cause,  its  lead- 
ers, and  its  system,  but  it  broke  down  completely  when  opposed  by 
a  system  that  combined  loyalty  with  the  use  of  intelligent  and 
trained  initiative. 

I  am  insisting  upon  this  combination  of  loyalty  and  initiative 
because  I  expect  to  show  that  a  system  of  military  education  based 
upon  it  applied  from  the  leader  down  to  the  last  recruit  is  the  best 
possible  school  for  training  in  military  character  and  in  the  art  of 
war. 

In  order  to  illustrate  the  tremendous  force  of  these  two  qualities 
when  successfully  combined  I  will  quote  a  few  paragraphs  from  the 
Science  of  War,  by  Henderson : 

The  study  of  war  had  done  far  more  for  Prussia  than  educating  its  soldiers 
and  producing  a  sound  system  of  command,  and  this  system  proved  a  mar- 
velous instrument  in  the  hands  of  a  great  leader.  It  was  based  on  the  recogni- 
tion of  three  facts:  First,  that  any  army  can  not  be  effectively  controlled  by 
direct  orders  from  headquarters;  second,  that  the  man  on  the  spot  is  the  best 
judge  of  the  situation;  and,  third,  that  intelligent  cooperation  is  of  infinitely 
more  value  than  mechanical  obedience. 

If  those  portions  of  the  army  unseen  by  the  commander  and  not  in  direct 
communication  with  him  were  to  await  his  orders  before  acting,  not  only 
would  opportunities  be  allowed  to  pass,  but  other  portions  of  the  army  at 
critical  moments  might  be  left  without  support.  It  was  understood,  therefore, 
in  the  Prussian  armies  of  1866  and  1870  that  no  order  was  to  be  blindly  obeyed 
unless  the  superior  who  issued  it  was  actually  present,  and  therefore  cognizant 
of  the  situation  at  the  time  it  was  received.  If  this  was  not  the  case,  the 
recipient  was  to  use  his  own  judgment  and  act  as  he  believed  his  superior 
would  have  directed  him  to  do  had  he  been  aware  how  matters  stood.  Again, 
officers  not  in  direct  communication  with  headquarters  were  expected  not  only 
to  watch  for  and  utilize  on  their  own  initiative  all  opportunities  of  furthering 
the  plan  of  campaign  or  battle,  but  without  waiting  for  instructions  to  march 


NAVAL   TRAINING  CRUISE  FOR  CIVILIANS.  21 

to  the  thunder  of  the  cannon  and  render  prompt  assistance  wherever  it  might 
be  required.  It  was  long  before  the  system  was  cordially  accepted,  even  in 
Germany  itself,  and  it  had  been  fiercely  criticized. 

The  first  step  was  to  make  a  clear  distinction  between  "  orders  "  and  "  in- 
structions." An  "  order  "  was  to  be  obeyed  instantly  and  to  the  letter.  "  In- 
structions "  were  an  expression  of  the  commander's  wishes,  not  to  be  carried 
out  unless  they  were  manifestly  practicable.  But  "orders,"  in  the  technical 
sense,  were  not  to  be  issued  except  by  an  officer  actually  present  with  the  body 
of  troops  concerned  and  fully  aware  of  the  situation ;  otherwise,  "  instruc- 
tions "  only  would  be  sent.  The  second  step  was  to  train  all  officers  to  arrive 
at  correct  decisions,  and  so  to  make  certain,  so  far  as  possible,  that  subordinates 
when  left  to  themselves  would  act  as  their  superiors  would  wish  them  to  do* 
The  third  step  was  to  discourage  to  the  utmost  the  spirit  of  rash  and  selfish 
enterprise. 

In  the  German  Army  of  to-day  the  means  employed  to  insure  so  far  as 
possible  correct  decisions  are,  first,  a  uniform  training  in  handling  troops. 
Every  German  officer,  practically  speaking,  is  educated  in  the  same  school  andi 
taught  to  adapt  his  action  to  the  same  "principles.  The  school  is  that  of  the 
general  staff.  The  principles — few,  but  comprehensive — are  those  laid  down 
by  the  chief  of  staff,  and  they  are  disseminated  through  the  army  by  his  assist- 
ants, the  officers  of  the  general  staff,  whom  he  himself  has  educated.  Each 
army  corps  and  each  division  has  its  own  chief  of  the  staff,  all  of  them  replicas 
of  their  teacher;  and  no  general,  so  far  as  possible,  is  appointed  even  to  the 
command  of  a  brigade  unless  he  is  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  official 
principles. 

The  second  means  is  a  systematic  encouragement  from  the  first  moment  an 
officer  joins  his  regiment  of  the  spirit  of  initiative,  of  independent  judgment, 
and  self-reliance.  Each  has  his  definite  responsibilities,  and  superiors  are  for- 
bidden in  the  most  stringent  terms  to  entrench  upon  the  prerogatives  of  their 
subordinates.  The  third  means  is  the  enforcement  of  the  strictest  discipline 
and  the  development  of  camaraderie  in  the  highest  sense.  Despite  the  latitude 
that  is  accorded  him,  absolute  and  punctual  obedience  to  the  most  trifling 
"  order  "  is  exacted  from  the  German  officer,  while  devotion  to  duty  and  self- 
sacrifice,  exalted  to  the  same  level  as  personal  honor  and  inculcated  as  the 
loftiest  sentiment  by  which  the  soldier  can  be  inspired,  are  trusted  to  counter- 
act the  tendencies  of  personal  ambition. 

The  benefit  to  the  state  was  enormous.  It  is  true  that  the  initiative  of  sub- 
ordinates sometimes  degenerated  into  reckless  audacity;  and  critics  have 
dilated  on  these  rare  instances  with  ludicrous  persistence,  forgetting  the  hun- 
dreds of  others  where  it  was  exercised  to  the  best  purpose,  forgetting  the  spirit 
of  mutual  confidence  that  permeated  the  whole  army,  and  forgetting  at  the 
same  time  the  deplorable  results  of  centralization  in  the  armies  they  overthrew. 
It  is  inconceivable  that  any  student  of  war  comparing  the  conduct  of  the  Ger- 
man, the  French,  and  the  Austrian  generals  should  retain  even  the  shadow  of 
a  prejudice  in  favor  of  blind  obedience  and  limited  responsibility. 

"To  what,"  asks  the  ablest  commentator  on  the  Franco-German  War,  "did 
the  Germans  owe  their  uninterrupted  triumph?  What  was  the  cause  of  the 
constant  disasters  of  the  French?  What  new  system  did  the  Germans  put  in 
practice,  and  what  are  the  elements  of  success  of  which  the  French  were 
bereft?"  The  system  is,  so  to  speak,  official  and  authoritative  amongst  the 
Germans.  It  is  the  initiative  of  the  subordinate  leaders.  This  quality,  which 
multiplies  the  strength  of  an  army,  the  Germans  have  succeeded  in  bringing 
to  something  near  perfection.  It  is  owing  to  this  quality  that,  in  the  midst  of 
varying  events,  the  supreme  command  pursued  its  uninterrupted  career  of 


22  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

victory,  and  succeeded  in  controlling,  almost  without  a  check,  the  intricate 
machinery  of  the  most  powerful  army  that  the  nineteenth  century  produced. 
In  executing  the  orders  of  the  supreme  command,  the  subordinate  leaders 
not  only  did  over  and  over  again  more  than  was  demanded  of  them,  but  sur- 
passed the  highest  expectations  of  their  superiors,  notably  at  Sedan.  It  often 
happened  that  the  faults,  more  or  less  inevitable,  of  the  higher  authorities 
were  repaired  by  their  subordinates,  who  thus  won  for  them  victories  which 
they  had-  not  always  deserved.  In  a  word,  the  Germans  were  indebted  to  the 
subordinate  leaders  that  not  a  single  favorable  occasion  throughout  the  whole 
campaign  was  allowed  to  escape  unutilized.  The  French,  on  the  other  hand, 
never  even  suspected  the  existence  of  so  powerful  a  factor;  and  it  is  for  tliis 
reason  thai  they  met  with  disasters,  even  when  victory,  so  to  speak,  be- 
longed to  them  by  every  rule  of  war.  The  faults  and  omissions  of  the  French 
subordinate  leaders  are  to  be  attributed  to  the  false  conception  of  the  rights 
and  functions  of  command,  to  the  ingrained  habit  of  blind  and  inert  obedience, 
based  on  a  principle  which  allowed  no  exception,  and  acting  as  a  law,  absolute 
and  immutable,  in  all  degrees  of  the  military  hierarchy.  To  the  virile  energy 
of  the  Germans  they  could  oppose  nothing  but  impetuous  courage.  Compensa-  • 
tion  for  the  more  powerful  fire  of  the  German  artillery  was  found  in  the 
superior  weapon  of  the  French  infantry.  But  to  the  intelligent,  hardy,  and 
even  at  times  somewhat  reckless  initiative  of  the  German  subordinate  leaner^ 
the  French  had  nothing  to  oppose  in  the  grand  as  in  the  minor  operations  but 
a  deliberate  inactivity,  always  awaiting  an  impulse  from  above.  These  were 
the  real  causes  of  the  numerous  reverses  and  the  swift  destruction  of  the 
valiant  French  Army,  and  therein  lies  the  true  secret  of  German  strength. 
Her  foes  of  days  to  come  will  have  to  reckon  seriously  with  this  force,  almost 
elementary  in  its  manipulation,  and  prepare  themselves  in  time  to  meet  it. 
No  well-organized  army  can  afford  to  dispense  with  the  initiative  of  the 
subordinate  leaders,  for  it  is  the  determining  factor  in  modern  war,  and  up 
to  the  present  it  has  been  monopolized  by  Germany. 

I  would  apologize  for  the  length  of  this  quotation  were  it  not  that 
nothing  but  authoritative  testimony  can  eradicate  erroneous  infor- 
mation and  false  ideas  from  the  minds  of  those  who  do  no  profes- 
sional reading.  Many  civilians  who  have  read  amateur  press  ac- 
counts of  the  machine-like  precision  of  the  German  general  staff 
assume  that  all  operations  are  ordered  in  minutest  detail  by  higher 
authority  and  that  no  initiative  is  ever  allowed  the  subordinate. 
This  is  a  very  natural  assumption  for  those  whose  business  does  not 
involve  the  study  of  war;  but  to  my  utter  astonishment  I  ran  across 
a  lieutenant  commander  of  nearly  20  years'  service  in  our  Navy 
who  did  not  know  that  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  German 
military  system  is  reliance  upon  the  trained  initiative  of  subordi- 
nates, and  that  our  Naval  War  College  training  is  based  upon  the 
same  principle. 

Practically  all  armies  have  adopted  the  German  method  of  de- 
veloping the  initiative  of  subordinates,  combined  with  a  doctrine 
of  war. 

Several  years  ago  the  Naval  War  College  began  to  apply  the 
same  system  to  our  naval  training.  The  order  form  in  use  in  the 
German  Army  was  modified  and  adapted  to  naval  needs.  These 


NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE  FOR  CIVILIANS.  23 

orders  are  invariable  in  form.  They  consist  essentially  of  three  par- 
agraphs. The  first  gives  the  subordinate  all  the  available  informa- 
tion that  would  be  of  use  to  him  in  the  execution  of  the  order.  The 
second  gives  the  general  plan  of  the  superior — the  object  he  wishes 
to  accomplish.  The  third  gives  the  forces  assigned  for  the  opera- 
tion. He  is  told  what  he  is  to  accomplish,  but  not  how  he  is  to  ac- 
complish it.  Thus  he  must  do  his  own  thinking  and  must  exercise 
his  initiative  to  suceced ;  and  as  all  orders  for  all  operations,  even  of 
the  most  ordinary  kind,  are  issued  in  this  form,  it  affords  continuous 
training  in  initiative,  judgment,  and  decision. 

The  ability  to  reach  a  correct  decision  without  delay  is  not  an 
inherited  characteristic  as  many  suppose.  It  is  a  habit  of  mind 
that  is  the  result  of  systematic  self -training  in  decisions  applied  to 
all  situations,  both  great  and  small,  as  they  arise  in  our  daily  occu- 
pations. A  correct  decision  necessarily  involves  a  logical  considera- 
tion of  all  available  information  and  experience.  But  many  men 
who  have  both  this  knowledge  and  experience  are  comparatively 
unable  to  decide  their  line  of  action,  simply  because  they  have  not 
trained  their  minds  to  do  so.  This  training  is  essential  to  the  de- 
velopment of  this  faculty.  It  is  of  great  importance  in  all  walks  of 
life,  but  it  is  wholly  essential  in  military  life. 

There  is  this  difference,  however,  between  decisions  made  in  civil 
life  and  those  required  in  military  life.  The  civilian  has  usually  a 
reasonable  time  in  which  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion,  whereas  a  mili- 
tary decision  must  often  be  made  at  once  to  be  of  any  use.  The 
enemy  "will  not  wait  for  you  to  make  up  your  mind.  Similarly, 
the  power  to  exercise  prompt  initiative  in  large  affairs  can  be  ac- 
quired only  by  the  habitual  exercise  of  initiative  in  small  ones. 

Both  initiative  and  decision  flow  from  practice  in  logical  think- 
ing, combined  with  knowledge  and  experience.  When  Napoleon  was 
a  young  student  he  was  asked  by  a  companion  how  he  always  man- 
aged to  decide  so  quickly  in  certain  matters.  He  replied  "  En  y 
pensant  ton  jours,"  by  thinking  of  them  always. 

Do  not  assume  that  the  ability  to  make  prompt  decisions  is  not  of 
great  importance  to  men  engaged  in  any  occupation,  for  the  lack  of 
this  power  is  as  fatal  to  success  in  civil  life  as  it  is  in  military  life. 
In  this  connection  I  am  reminded  of  a  cartoon  I  saw  very  many  years 
ago  in  the  French  paper  Le  Eire.  It  depicted  a  man  standing  on  the 
banks  of  the  Seine  looking  down  into  the  water.  He  was  ragged, 
dirty,  and  emaciated,  and  his  dejected  appearance  and  attitude 
clearly  indicated  that  he  was  seriously  contemplating  suicide.  Under 
the  picture  was  this  caption :  "All  my  misfortunes  have  been  due  to 
never  having  been  able  to  reach  a  decision." 

There  have,  of  course,  been  isolated  cases  in  the  past  where  naval 
leaders  have  trained  their  subordinates  in  the  exercise  of  initiative. 


24  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

The  most  notable  case  was  that  of  Nelson.  His  methods  and  their 
success  are  perhaps  better  known  in  all  navies  than  those  of  any 
other  of  the  great  naval  commanders.  His  method  was  that  of  the 
conference.  He  discussed  his  principles,  methods,  and  plans  with  all 
of  his  captains  so  frequently  that  all  were  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  them.  These  principles  and  plans  thus  became  those  of  the 
captains  as  well  as  of  the  admiral.  They  were  the  plans  of  the  fleet— 
of  their  organization.  This  fleet  was  a  team  trained  to  work  together 
with  perfect  loyalty  to  the  fleet  and  to  its  leader.  There  was  conse- 
quently no  possible  ground  for  criticism  except  that  which  was  in- 
vited and  fully  considered  in  general  conference.  Moreover,  Nelson 
never  spoke  ill  of  his  subordinates,  but  frequently  praised  them.  He 
was  the  friend  and  protector  of  his  officers  and  others  who  were  in 
trouble.  When  a  certain  captain  complained  that  the  Admiralty  had 
sent  him  several  useless  officers,  Nelson  said,  "  Send  them  to  my  ship. 
I  can  make  a  good  officer  of  any  decent  man."  When  a  young  middy 
of  his  ship  got  a  panic  on  his  first  attempt  to  go  aloft,  Nelson  sprang 
into  the  rigging  after  him,  said  how  sorry  he  would  be  for  a  middy 
who  was  afraid  to  go  aloft,  and  encouraged  him  until  he  was  over 
his  fright.  Upon  another  occasion  he  came  on  deck  and  found  the 
ship  in  "  irons  " — that  is,  caught  head  to  wind  and  sailing  backward — 
but  instead  of  abusing  the  officer  of  the  deck  and  telling  him  he  didn't 
understand  his  business,  he  asked  him  what  he  though  he  would 
better  do.  The  officer  said  that  he  did  not  know,  and  Nelson  replied, 
"  Neither  do  I,"  and  went  below. 

Under  such  conditions  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  disaffection,  dis- 
loyalty, or  failure  to  do  his  utmost  on  the  part  of  any  officer  who 
served  under  this  wise  leader.  Moreover,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
how  successfully  his  captains  could  fight  a  battle  without  his  per- 
sonal guidance.  The  completeness  of  his  victory  over  the  French 
fleet  at  Aboukir  was  the  result  of  dispositions  due  to  the  initiative 
of  his  captains,  the  dispositions  they  made  before  his  flagship  arrived 
on  the  field. 

Though  his  methods  and  the  reasons  for  their  success  are  better 
known  to  all  naval  officers  than  those  of  any  other  of  the  great  com- 
manders, yet  the  astonishing  thing  is  that  they  have  been  so  seldom 
imitated.  I  have  given  them  somewhat  in  detail  in  order  to  bring 
out  the  great  importance  of  the  methods,  the  judgment,  the  justice, 
and  the  tact  of  a  leader  in  training  his  command  in  loyalty  and  in 
the  exercise  of  prompt  initiative. 

You  are  doubtless  familiar  with  the  sea  classic,  Two  Years  Before 
the  Mast,  and  similar  accounts  of  life  on  board  ship  in  the  days  of 
hemp  and  oak.  Discipline  was  maintained  through  fear  and  physical 
force,  and  many  sailors  accepted  their  treatment  without  particular 
resentment  as  all  in  the  day's  work. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOB  CIVILIANS.  25 

When  a  classmate  of  mine  was  a  young  lad  he  was  taken  for  a  trip 
on  a  Lake  Michigan  schooner.  One  day  he  saw  the  captain  step  up 
behind  the  man  at  the  wheel,  glance  over  his  shoulder  at  the  compass, 
step  back  and  knock  him  senseless  and  take  the  wheel  himself.  When 
the  man  recovered  consciousness  he  got  up  and  took  the  wheel  again, 
and  the  captain  walked  away  about  other  business.  No  word  was 
spoken.  The  man  understood  that  he  was  punished  for  being  off 
his  course. 

Many  officers  conscientiously  believed  that  it  was  their  duty  to  keep 
a  vigilant  lookout  for  all  violations  of  their  numerous  regulations, 
the  majority  of  which  concerned  the  minutia  of  appearances  and  cere- 
monious forms  rather  than  military  efficiency.  An  amusing  yarn  is 
told  of  a  captain  possessed  of  this  obsession  who  used  to  come  on  deck 
each  morning,  find  all  the  fault  he  could,  then  go  down  to  breakfast 
and  easy  digestion  in  the  happy  ffame  of  mind  that  is  the  reward 
of  duty  well  performed.  One  morning  he  could  find  not  the  slightest 
fault,  as  the  entire  crew  and  all  the  officers  concerned,  having  deter- 
mined to  satisfy  him  for  once,  had  left  nothing  whatever  undone. 
All  brass  work  shone  like  gold,  all  sails  were  trimmed  to  a  nicety, 
all  gear  coiled  down,  the  decks  as  clean  as  a  Dutch  kitchen,  and  even 
the  last  grain  of  sand  blown  out  of  the  seams  of  the  deck.  The  "  old 
man"  got  "madder  and  madder"  as  he  paced  the  quarter-deck 
searching  for  a  flaw  and  found  none.  Finally  he  hailed  the  lookout 
in  the  topsail  yard,  and  in  reply  to  a  prompt  "  Sir  ?  "  shouted,  "  I'm 
a  lookin'  at  ye,  dad  gast  ye !  "  and  went  below  in  a  towering  rage. 

There  still  exists  officers  of  this  type,  though  the  necessity  of 
achieving  military  efficiency,  even  at  the  expense  of  yacht-like  appear- 
ance, is  rapidly  passing  them  into  the  discard. 

As  an  example  of  treatment  not  calculated  to  inspire  a  very  high 
degree  of  loyalty  the  following  was  related  by  a  foreign  officer.  A 
lieutenant  reported  for  duty  on  a  certain  ship.  The  captain's  greet- 
ing was,  "  Why  did  you  come  to  this  ship  ?  I  didn't  ask  for  you.  I 
don't  want  you.  What  are  your  habits,  any  way?"  The  officer  very 
unwisely  replied:  "I  usually  get  up  at  3  a.  m.,  shave,  and  report 
for  duty,"  whereupon  the  captain  ordered  that  he  do  so  every  morn- 
ing thereafter. 

Shortly  after  I  reported  on  my  first  ship  I  learned  that  if  I  made 
out  an  official  application  for  leave  and  the  captain  approved  it  I 
would  be  free  to  do  as  I  pleased  until  my  leave  expired.  So,  having 
prepared  the  document  in  due  form,  I  requested  the  marine  orderly 
at  the  cabin  door  to  hand  it  to  the  captain.  This  orderly  was  an  old 
man  who  had  had  extensive  experience  with  the  temperamental 
idiosyncrasies  of  commanding  officers.  He  glanced  at  the  paper  and 
at  once  handed  it  back  to  me  with  the  following  wise  admonition: 
"  If  you'd  be  a  takin'  of  my  advice,  now,  Mr.  Sims,  you'd  hand  this 


26  NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

here  request  in  after  the  old  man's  had  his  lunch ;  he's  in  a  h — 1  of  a 
humor  this  mornin'."  I  followed  this  advice  and  my  leave  was 
granted,  and  since  that  time  I  have  seldom  if  ever  made  any  request 
of  a  superior  officer  until  after  he  had  his  lunch.  I  have  related  this 
incident  to  you  gentlemen  because  I  believe  that  a  systematic  avoid- 
ance of  contact  with  the  empty  stomach  will  be  found  as  advantageous 
in  civil  as  in  military  life. 

It  would  appear  that  in  former  times  there  was  too  often  excessive 
severity  in  the  exercise  of  authority,  little  or  no  attempt  to  control 
bad  tempers,  not  much  respect  for  higher  authority,  and  excessive 
solicitude  for  personal  dignity. 

Here  is  a  yarn  which,  though  a  very  ancient  "  chestnut "  in  the 

Navy,  nevertheless  will  serve  to  illustrate,  by  contrast  with  present 

ideas,  the  great  change  which  has  taken  place  in  the  importance 

•which  officers  attach  to  the  ceremonious  consideration  shown  their 

persons  and  positions. 

One  Sunday  morning  a  pompous  admiral  in  command  of  a  navy 
yard  was  a  trifle  late  at  chapel.  The  chaplain  was  "just  caught" — 
that  is,  a  young  man  whose  conception  of  the  relative  importance  of 
an  officiating  divine  in  full  regalia  and  his  commanding  officer  was 
still  so  defective  that  he  began  the  service  before  the  arrival  of  the 
admiral,  who,  entering  just  in  time  to  hear  the  announcement  that 
"the  Lord  is  in  his  holy  temple,  let  all  the  earth  keep  silence  before 
Him,"  promptly  replied :  "  Sir,  I  would  have  you  understand  that  the 
Lord  is  not  in  his  holy  temple  until  I  have  taken  my  seat."  The  ad- 
miral dozed  comfortably  through  the  remainder  of  the  service  until 
the  chaplain  announced  that  communion  service  would  be  held  in 
the  chapel  on  the  following  Sunday  "  by  order  of  the  bishop  of  the 
diocese."  The  words  "  by  order  "  brought  the  admiral  bolt  upright 
in  his  chair  to  demand  "by  whose  order  did  yon  say,  sir?"  The 
chaplain  with  grave  dignity  replied,  "  by  the  order  of  the  bishop  of 
the  diocese."  "  Well,  sir,"  replied  the  admiral,  "  let  me  inform  you 
that  I'm  the  bishop  of  this  diocese,  and  there'll  be  no  communion 
service  here  next  Sunday." 

Though  incidents  such  as  the  above  refer  chiefly  to  the  manners 
and  methods  that  pertained  before  the  humane  ideas  of  our  times 
rendered  them  impossible,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  there  still  exist 
in  all  military  services  some  officers  whose  methods  of  discipline  are 
based  upon  equally  mistaken  ideas,  and  are  "productive  of  equally 
deplorable  results. 

For  example,  there  are  those  who  conscientiously  practice  such  pre- 
cepts as  the  following: 

Never  fail  to  punish  all  faults,  including  those  of  omission,  if  you  want  to 
have  an  efficient  ship. 


NAVAL   TRAILING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  27 

Always  put  at  least  two  officers  under  suspension  to  insure  a  general  order 
being  carried  out  properly. 

An  executive  officer  should  not  be  on  speaking  terms  with  any  of  the  watch 
officers. 

Never  consult  a  subordinate.  Give  him  an  order  and  insist  that  he  carry  it 
out  in  detail  as  directed.  He  is  not  paid  to  think. 

Nothing  "brings  a  man  to  time"  so  quickly  as  solitary  confinement  in  the 
brig  on  bread  and  water. 

Such  uncliscriminating  severity  invariably  leads  to  trouble,  and 
when  combined  with  disrespectful  or  contemptuous  treatment  some- 
times causes  such  complete  disaffection  and  resentment  as  to  result 
in  very  serious  failures  of  discipline.  A  single  officer  of  the  character 
indicated  may  cause  this  deplorable  condition.  I  have  in  mind  a  suc- 
cessful and  happy  ship  of  the  old  Navy,  which,  shortly  after  the  re- 
porting of  a  new  executive  officer  who  treated  the  crew  with  great 
severity  and  positive  injustice,  became  mutinous  to  such  a  degree 
that  gun  gear  was  thrown  overboard,  gear  was  cut,  etc.  Also  a  ves- 
sel where  similar  conditions  resulted  in  a  combination  among  the 
gun  pointers  not  to  hit  the  target.  One  pointer  who  in  his  enthu- 
siasm forgot  the  agreement  and  made  a  good  score  was  taken  on  the 
forecastle  and  soundly  beaten  by  the  crew.  Cases  have  been  known 
where  it  was  not  safe  for  certain  officers  to  go  forward  at  night,  and 
where  attempts  have  been  made  to  kill  the  master-at-arms  or  other 
petty  officers. 

In  contrast  with  such  cases  is  the  happy  and  successful  ship — for 
the  happy 'ship  is  almost  invariably  successful.  Both  officers  and  men 
brag  about  "their  ship."  They  will  not  allow  her  to  be  beaten  in 
anything  if  they  can  help  it.  Every  man  loyally  does  his  best  to  help 
along,  and  is  encouraged  to  exercise  his  initiative  in  so  doing.  Such 
a  ship  is  a  practical  school  in  the  development  of  the  two  primary 
essentials  of  military  character;  that  is,  loyalty  and  initiative. 

Let  me  disclaim  again  aiw  idea  of  implying  that  these  cases  are 
typical.  They  are  wholly  exceptional  at  the  present  time,  though 
they  were  all  too  prevalent  within  the  period  of  service  of  men  still 
living.  Nevertheless  men  of  the  type  described  above,  and  their  mis- 
taken methods  of  discipline,  still  exist,  though  in  a  somewhat  more 
civilized  form;  in  the  same  way  that  there  still  exists  side  by  side 
the  present  enlightened  treatment  of  prisoners  at  Sing  Sing  and 
the  horrors  recently  exposed  in  some  New  York  county  prisons. 

I  refer  to  these  cases  because  it  seems  to  me  that  an  understanding 
of  the  evil  consequences  of  mistaken  methods  and  defective  character 
give  a  much  more  impressive  idea  of  the  value  of  the  opposite  quali- 
ties than  any  academic  analysis  could  possibly  give. 

It  seems  almost  incredible  that  there  should  be  men  of  marked 
intellectual  capacity,  extensive  professional  knowledge  and  experi- 


28  NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE  FOR  CIVILIANS. 

ence,  energy  and  professional  enthusiasm,  who  have  been  a  detriment 
to  the  service  in  every  position  they  have  occupied.  They  are 
the  so-called  "  impossible "  men  who  have  left  throughout  their 
careers  a  trail  of  discontent  and  insubordination,  all  because  of  their 
ignorance  of,  or  neglect  of,  one  or  many  of  the  essential  attributes 
of  military  character. 

I  knew  one  such  officer  who  was  a  polished  gentleman  in  all  re- 
spects, except  that  he  failed  to  treat  his  enlisted  subordinates  with 
respect.  His  habitual  manner  to  them  was  calmly  sarcastic  and 
mildly  contemptuous,  and  sometimes  quite  insulting,  and  in  conse- 
quence he  failed  utterly  to  inspire  their  loyalty  to  the  organization. 

A  very  distinguished  officer  said  after  reaching  the  retired  list: 
"  The  mistake  of  my  career  was  that  I  did  not  treat  young  officers 
with  respect,  and  subsequently  they  were  the  means  of  defeating  my 
dearest  ambitions." 

The  services  of  this  officer,  in  spite  of  this  defect,  and  by  reason  of 
his  great  ability,  energy,  and  professional  attainment  and  devotion 
to  the  service,  were  nevertheless  of  great  value. 

Both  qualities  and  defects  of  course  exist  in  varying  degrees. 
These  sometimes  counterbalance  each  other,  and  sometimes  the  value 
of  certain  qualities  makes  up  for  the  absence  of  others. 

Some  officers  of  ordinary  capacity  and  attainments  have  always 
been  successful  because  of  their  ability  to  inspire  the  complete  and 
enthusiastic  loyalty  of  all  serving  with  them,  and  thus  command 
their  best  endeavors;  but  no  matter  what  other  qualities  an  officer 
may  possess,  such  success  can  never  be  achieved  if  he  fails  in  justice^ 
consideration,  sympathy,  and  tact  in  his  relations  with  his  subordi- 
nates. 

Such  men  are  invaluable  in  the  training  of  the  personnel  of  a 
military  organization  in  cheerful  obedience,  loyalty,  and  initiative; 
and  when  these  qualities  are  combined  in  a  man  of  naturally  strong 
character  and  intellectual  capacity,  he  has  the  very  foundation 
stones  upon  which  to  build  the  military  character. 

The  pity  of  it  is  that  so  many  men  of  great  potential  power  should 
not  only  have  ruined  their  own  careers,  but  have  actually  inflicted 
continuous  injury  upon  their  service,  through  neglecting  to  make  an 
estimate  of  the  situation  as  regards  their  characters  and  through 
neglecting  to  use  their  brains  to  determine  the  qualities  and  line  of 
conduct  essential  to  success  in  handling  their  men,  and  thus  failing 
to  reach  a  decision  which  their  force  of  character  would  have 
enabled  them  to  adhere  to. 

Such  a  reasoned  process  applied  to  the  most  important  attribute  of 
an  officer,  namely,  his  military  character,  would  have  saved  many 
from  partial  or  complete  failure  through  the  unreasoned,  though 
conscientious,  conviction  that  it  was  actually  their  duty  to  maintain 


NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE  FOR  CIVILIANS.  29 

an  inflexible  rigidity  of  manner  toward  their  subordinates,  to  avoid 
any  display  of  personal  sympathy,  to  rule  them  exclusively  by  the 
fear  of  undiscriminating  severity  in  the  application  of  maximum 
punishments,  and  such  like  obsessions. 

It  would  appear  that  such  officers  go  through  their  whole  career 
actually  guided  by  a  snap  judgment,  or  a  phrase,  borrowed  from 
some  older  officer,  such  as  the  precepts  quoted  above.  Though  they 
have  plenty  of  brains  and  mean  well,  their  mistake  is  that  they  never 
have  subjected  themselves  and  their  official  conduct  to  any  logical 
analysis.  Moreover,  they  are  usually  entirely  self-satisfied,  and  fre- 
quently boastful  of  their  unreasoned  methods  of  discipline ;  and 
they  usually  explain  this  lack  of  success  by  inveighing  against  the 
quality  of  the  personnel  committed  to  their  charge. 

All  this  to  eccentuate  the  conclusion  of  the  war-college  conference 
that: 

We  believe  it  is  the  duty  of  every  officer  to  study  his  own  character  that  he 
may  improve  it,  and  to  study  the  characters  of  his  associates  that  he  may  act 
more  efficiently  in  his  relation  with  them. 

This,  then,  is  the  lesson  for  all  members  of  our  military  services. 
Let  us  consider  seriously  this  matter  of  military  character,  especially 
our  own.  Let  us  not  allow  anybody  to  persuade  us  that  it  is  a 
"  high-brow "  subject,  for,  though  military  writers  confine  their 
analysis  almost  exclusively  to  the  question  of  the  great  leaders,  the 
principles  apply  equally  to  all  individuals  of  an  organization  from 
the  newest  recruit  up. 

Above  all  things,  let  us  not  regard  loyalty  as  a  personal  matter. 
It  is  due  to  our  organization  and  our  country  under  all  circumstances 
and  under  all  possible  conditions.  No  faults  on  the  part  of  superiors 
can  excuse  any  failure  in  loyalty  upon  our  part.  This  is  easy  to 
say  but  sometimes  very  difficult  to  live  up  to.  As  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance,  let  me  illustrate  it  by  an  example. 

Suppose  that  upon  the  outbreak  of  war  you  gentlemen  enlist  in 
the  Navy  and  are  assigned  to  what  is  termed  a  "  happy  ship,"  where 
you  are  treated  with  courtesy,  consideration,  and  helpfulness.  Your 
officers  and  petty  officers  assist  and  encourage  you  in  learning  your 
duties  and  the  ways  of  the  Navy.  You  find  loyalty  and  obedience  not 
only  easy  but  an  actual  pleasure.  You  begin  to  think  you  are  a 
disciplined  man  until  one  day  you  are  accosted  by  a  boatswain's  mate, 
who  has  a  voice  like  a  bull,  a  scowl  like  a  thundercloud,  and  a  jaw 
like  the  corner  of  a  box.  He  asks  with  a  sneer  why  in  the  hell  you 
did  such  a  blankety  blank  thing  as  so  and  so. 

You  begin  to  explain  that  you  thought — when  he  interrupts  to 
inform  you  that  of  all  the  blank-blank  idiots  you  are  the  limit,  that 
you  have  no  business  to  think,  etc.,  but  must  get  busy  and  do  so  and 
so,  and  be  damn  quick  about  it. 


30  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

You  are  naturally  shocked  and  indignant,  and  feel  a  strong  resent- 
ment against  the  treatment  of  such  a  beast  (there  are  a  few  of  them 
left).  You  feel  that  it  is  impossible  to  be  loyal  to  him.  But  the 
point  is  that  your  loyalty  is  not  due  to  him  alone  or  to  any  other 
person,  but  to  your  organization,  your  ship,  your  "team."  Disa- 
greeable though  he  may  be,  he  represents,  as  far  as  concerns  you  at 
the  time,  the  Commander  in  Chief,  the  President  of  the  United 
States. 

Once  you  have  grasped  this  it  will  be  clear  to  you  what  your  atti- 
tude and  conduct  should  be ;  but  could  you  bear  such  insulting  treat- 
ment without  open  resentment?  Could  you  obey  such  an  order 
with  a  cheerful  aye,  aye,  and  without  even  showing  by  your  expres- 
sion that  you  resent  it? 

If  you  could  do  so,  and  by  reason  of  that  and  similar  experiences 
you  should  acquire  an  attitude  toward  your  subordinates  that  would 
inspire  them  with  loyalty  to  the  team  as  well  as  to  yourself,  you 
would  become  a  very  useful  servant  of  Uncle  Sam,  and  you  would 
be  pointed  in  the  right  direction  to  accomplish  as  much  as  your 
natural  ability  would  permit. 

Of  course  no  such  affront  to  personal  dignity  should  ever  be  in- 
flicted upon  any  subordinate,  but  do  not  imagine  for  a  moment 
that  submission  involves  any  loss  of  personal  dignity  and  self-re- 
spect. Quite  the  contrary,  for  not  only  can  you  congratulate  your- 
self that  you  have  won  a  victory  in  self-control,  that  you  have 
sustained  the  rights  and  functions  of  command,  but  that  you  have 
received  an  impressive  illustration  of  the  evil  influence  of  abuse  of 
authority,  of  injustice,  of  disrespect,  or  even  of  bad  manners  to- 
ward a  subordinate. 

Not  infrequently  the  extent  of  this  evil  influence  is  underestimated. 
It  is  hardly  possible  to  exaggerate  it.  It  is  always  dangerous  if  not 
checked  in  time.  I  have  in  mind  the  case  of  a  large  body  of  men 
under  one  command,  but  divided  into,  say,  10  groups,  each  under  its 
own  officers.  In  one  group  the  serious  offenses  committed  within  a 
short  period  were  twenty  times  as  great  as  in  the  other  nine.  The 
cause  was  found  to  be  the  manner  and  methods  of  a  leading  petty 
officer  that  were  similar  to  those  of  the  boatswain's  mate  described 
above,  though  less  in  degree.  The  defect  was  corrected  and  the 
trouble  disappeared.  If  it  had  been  allowed  to  continue,  it  might 
have  spread  through  imitation,  and  might  possibly  have  turned  the 
organization  into  a  "madhouse"  of  the  kind  heretofore  described. 

A  petty  officer  of  this  kind  is  a  greater  menace  to  discipline  and  loy- 
alty than  many  "  bad  "  men,  and  his  conduct  should  therefore  be  cor- 
rected, or  the  man  at  once  disrated  or  dismissed.  In  the  case  of  an 
officer  the  evil  influence  is  of  course  much  greater. 


NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE  FOR  CIVILIANS.  31 

The  point  is  that  all  those  who  exercise  authority  should  remember 
that,  in  their  daily  contact  with  their  subordinates,  every  order,  as 
well  as  the  manner,  bearing,  and  attitude  of  mind  with  which  it  is 
given,  has  its  influence  in  promoting  or  retarding  the  mission  of  the 
whole  organization ;  that  is,  its  maximum  efficiency  in  preparation  for 
war. 

The  responsibility  rests  of  course  with  him  who  is  in  chief  com- 
mand. He  has  the  power  to  eliminate  all  detrimental  subordinates, 
and  if  through  kindness  of  heart  or  personal  consideration  he  fails 
to  do  so,  he  must  take  the  consequences.  He  is  also  responsible  for 
the  amount  of  initiative  and  loyalty  displayed  by  his  subordinates, 
it  being  one  of  his  most  important  duties  to  see  that  they  are  trained 
in  these  invaluable  qualities. 

The  methods  of  this  training  are,  therefore,  all  important.  They 
must  be  provided  for  in  the  organization,  which  should  be  such  as  to 
insure  that  responsibility  is  passed  down  the  line,  each  subordinate 
being  assigned  the  full  share  that  properly  belongs  to  his  rank  or 
station;  and  all  should  be  brought  thoroughly  to  understand  what  are 
the  influences,  whether  of  method  or  of  conduct,  which  tend  to  pro- 
mote loyalty  or  to  discourage  it. 

In  a  military  organization  "  good  enough  "  is  no  good.  War  is  a 
vitally  important  game  of  one  great  team  against  another,  and  if 
your  team  is  not  adequately  trained  it  will  suffer  defeat.  In  civil  life 
the  law  holds  you  blameless  if  you  can  prove  that  you  have  exercised 
reasonable  diligence  in  carrying  out  a  contract ;  but  by  military  law 
a  court-martial  will  hold  you  to  account  unless  you  have  done  your 
"  utmost." 

This  utmost  can  not  be  achieved  unless  there  is  loyalty  throughout 
the  organization.  It  is  the  one  wholly  indispensable  quality.  All 
officers  desire  it  from  their  subordinates,  and  wish  to  accord  it  to 
their  superiors,  but,  unfortunately,  through  failure  to  study  the  im- 
portant subject  of  military  character,  and  particularly  through  fail- 
ure to  estimate  the  influence  of  their  own  characters,  methods,  bear- 
ing, and  conduct  upon  their  subordinates,  they  often  conscientiously 
pursue  a  mistaken  course. 

Let  me  therefore,  in  conclusion,  briefly  enumerate  a  few  of  the 
most  important  things  that  should  always  be  done  and  a  few  of  those 
that  should  always  be  avoided  in  the  effort  to  promote  loyalty  and 
initiative  in  those  for  whose  training  we  are  responsible. 

1.  Always  let  your  general  mission  be  understood.    The  American 
is  willing  to  cooperate  when  his  intelligence  is  enlisted. 

2.  Invite  suggestions  and  consider  them  carefully. 

3.  Hold  conferences  for  this  purpose.     I  have  known  valuable 
improvements  in  seamanship,  gunnery,  radio,  etc.,  to  result  from 
such  suggestions  from  junior  officers  and  enlisted  men.     Moreover, 


32  NAVAL   TRAINING  CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

consulting  subordinates  greatly  increases  their  self-respect  and  tends 
strongly  to  promote  initiative  and  inspire  the  "team  spirit."  which 
is  another  name  for  loyalty. 

4.  Make  use  of  competitions  where  practicable.     It  promotes  in- 
terest in  even  the  most  strenuous  drills. 

5.  Explain  the  necessity  for  constant  drill.     This  imperative  ne- 
cessity is  so  very  generally  misunderstood  by  new  men,  and  all  too 
frequently  even  by  old  officers,  that  it  is  worthy  of  special  explana- 
tion.   Usually  the  recruit  does  not  understand  why  he  is  subjected 
to  daily  drills  after  he  has  thoroughly  learned  his  duties.     For 
example,  most  of  the  operations  of  loading  and  firing  a  modern  gun 
are  very  simple.    The  beginner  learns  his  own  duties  in  a  few  lessons, 
and  learns  in  a  few  days  those  of  the  other  members  of  the  crew. 
He  therefore  very  naturally  questions  the  wisdom  of  expending  a 
considerable  amount  of  perspiration  each  day  in  performing  these 
arduous  duties  over  and  over  again,  and  not  understanding  becomes 
dissatisfied.    This  is  a  natural  result  of  the  intelligence  of  our  men. 
They  are  accustomed  to  understand  what  they  are  doing  and  why 
they  are  doing  it,  and  experience  has  shown  that  when  they  do  un- 
derstand this  matter  they  will  drill  enthusiastically,  but  that  when 
they  don't  their  dissatisfaction  is  acute.    This  condition  of  mind  is  a 
prolific  cause  of  trouble  that  frequently  leads  to  desertion.    It  is 
therefore  essential  that  officers  understand   and   explain  that  the 
object  of  drill  is  not  simply  to  learn  how  to  perform  the  various 
necessary  operations,  but  to  repeat  them  so  often  and  so  continu- 
ously that  these  operations  will  eventually  be  performed  subcon- 
sciously— that  is,  without  really  thinking  about  them,  or,  as  we  some- 
times say,  by  the  marrow  of  the  backbone  instead  of  by  the  brain. 
The  following  incidents  will  illustrate  this : 

An  Indian  camp  follower  out  West  knifed  one  of  our  soldiers  in 
a  quarrel,  seized  a  rifle,  and  fled.  An  officer  and  two  old  soldiers 
pursued  him.  The  latter  had  taken  magazine  sporting  rifles  instead 
of  their  regulation  pieces.  Both  parties  took  cover  and  opened  fire. 
Each  time  a  soldier  fired  he  brought  his  rifle  to  the  prescribed  posi- 
tion of  "  load,"  carried  his  hand  to  his  waist  line  to  get  another 
cartridge,  and,  finding  none  there,  remembered  that  he  had  a  different 
rifle,  swung  the  lever  of  the  magazine  and  fired  again,  only  to  re- 
peat the  regular  drill  operations  after  each  shot.  These  men  were 
trained  to  the  subconscious  degree;  that  is,  in  using  their  regular 
weapons  they  could  be  depended  upon  to  perform  all  the  necessary 
operations  almost  automatically,  no  matter  what  the  excitement  of 
battle. 

The  operation  of  balancing  a  bicycle  is  another  subconscious  proc- 
ess, as  is  also  that  of  putting  on  the  brake.  After  riding  for  many 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  33 

years  a  bicycle  having  a  brake  lever  on  the  handle  bars  I  found  that 
it  was  two  or  three  years  after  adopting  the  hub  brake  before  I  en- 
tirely ceased,  when  surprised  at  a  street  corner,  reaching  for  the 
lever  that  was  no  longer  there.  The  subconscious  process,  or  habit, 
of  using  the  old  brake  was  so  strong  that  it  was  hard  to  get  rid  of; 
and  as  this  necessarily  delayed  putting  on  the  hub  brake,  it  was 
thus  a  real  danger.  Let  no  one  therefore  assume  that  because  he 
is  expert  in  handling  a  certain  type  of  automobile  he  will  not  be  in 
danger,  for  a  Avhile  at  least,  when  he  buys  a  new  model  that  has  9 
different  kind  of  control  gear.  I  am  sure  that  many  serious  acci- 
dents have  been  caused  by  failure  to  recognize  this  dangerous  per- 
sistence of  the  impulse  in  question,  and  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that 
the  danger  is  even  greater  in  the  case  of  experienced  drivers  who 
do  not  understand  this  matter,  and  are  therefore  overconfident, 
than  in  the  case  of  the  cautious  beginner  with  his  first  machine.  The 
manufacturer  who  makes  a  radical  change  in  the  control  gear  of  a 
new  model  thereby  accepts  a  certain  responsibility.  We  attempt  to 
standardize  the  control  gear  of  our  naval  guns,  so  that  a  pointer 
transferred  from  one  ship  to  another  will  not  have  to  be  trained  over 
again. 

Two  old  Erie  Canal  boatmen,  Jim  and  Mike,  took  a  night  off  and 
went  to  a  Bowery  theater.  When  the  highly  bedizened  heroine  ap- 
peared on  the  stage  Jim  said,  "  I  believe  that's  Sal,  who  used  to  be  on 
the  barge  PricJdyheat  with  us."  Mi ke  scouted  the  idea,  but  Jim  offered 
to  back  his  judgment  with  a  bet  and  assume  the  burden  of  proof. 
This  being  accepted,  he  waited  until  the  lady  was  engaged  in  the 
most  impassioned  scene  of  the  melodrama,  when  he  sang  out  sharply, 
"  Low  bridge !  "  and  Sal  went  flat  on  her  stomach,  thus  illustrating 
again  the  almost  irresistible  force  of  the  subconscious  impulse. 

6.  Be  sure  you  know  thoroughly  the  subject  of  all  your  instruc- 
tion.    Knowledge  of  your  job  always  commands  respect  from  those 
associated  with  you. 

Two  young  officers  who  were  sitting  in  a  deck  house  on  the  old  re- 
ceiving ship  Colorado  noticed  that  every  time  the  quartermaster,  a 
man  old  enough  to  be  their  grandfather,  came  in  he  laid  his  cap 
on  the  deck.  They  told  him  he  need  not  even  take  his  cap  off ;  that 
the  deck  house  was  the  same  as  out  of  doors.  He  replied,  "  You  young 
gentlemen  knows  so  much  more  as  what  I  do  that  I  just  feels  like 
takin'  off  me  hat." 

7.  Encourage  your  men  to  come  to  you  for  information  on  any 
subject  and  take  pains  to  look  it  up  and  supply  it.    Help  them  in 
anything  they  want  to  study. 

8.  Train  your  men  in  initiative  by  "  putting  it  up  to  them  "  on  all 
proper  occasions  and  explain  why  you  do  it. 

67325—16 3 


34  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

9.  When  you  have  inspired  loyalty  in  all  of  your  men,  more  than 
half  your  troubles  will  be  over,  for  thereafter  initiative  will  develop 
rapidly  if  you  give  it  intelligent  direction  and  adequate  opportunity. 
Thus  you  will  have  developed  a  team  in  which  the  men  will  speak 
of  the  officers  of  their  division  or  ship  as  "  we  "  instead  of  "  they." 
A  competent  clerk  who  had  just  been  dismissed  asked  his  "boss"  if 
he  would  please  tell  him  in  what  respect  he  had  been  unsatisfactory. 
The  boss  replied,'"  In  loyalty,  in  habitually  referring  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  this  company  as  ;  they  '  instead  of  '  we.' ': 

10.  Maintain  discipline  with  the  minimum  reference  to  higher  au- 
thority.   If  you  succeed  in  establishing  the  relations  indicated  by  the 
above,  you  will  hardly  ever  need  to  appeal  to  higher  authority. 

11.  Always  be  considerate  of  inexperience.    When  admonition  will 
correct  a  small  fault  it  is  almost  always  a  mistake  to  inflict  pun- 
ishment. 

12.  Be  absolutely  just  in  all  your  dealings  with  your  men.    Hardly 
anything  tends  more  strongly  toward  loyalty.     All  kinds  of  men 
respond  to  the  "  square  deal." 

13.  Avoid  harshness  in  manner  or  in  methods.    Let  admonition  or 
punishment  be  inflicted  in  sorrow,  not  in  anger.     Always  give  the 
man  the  benefit  of  any  reasonable  doubt. 

14.  Never  destroy  or  decrease  a  man's  self-respect  by  humiliating 
him  before  others.    If  his  self-respect  is  destroyed  his  usefulness  will 
be  seriously  diminished.    A  man  who  is  "  called  down  "  in  the  pres- 
ence of  others  can  hardly  help  resenting  it.     Frequent  "  sanding 
down  "  of  your  men  is  an  all  too  common  mistake  and  a  very  detri- 
mental one. 

15.  Do  not  let  the  state  of  your  liver  influence  your  attitude  toward 
your  men. 

16.  Do  not  inflict  severe  reprimands  for  minor  faults.     Consider 
each  case  on  its  merits.     Often  an  explanation  of  the  result  of  faults 
is  the  most  effective  means  of  correcting  them.     Take  pains  to  ex- 
plain to  the  men  what  the  effect  would  be  upon  the  whole  organiza- 
tion if  faults  were  not  corrected. 

17.  Remember  that  the  purpose  of  all  forms  of  punishment  is 
correction — a  correction  of  the  offending  individual  and  a  warning 
to  others  similarly  situated.     Never  let  the  spirit  of  revenge  have  any 
influence  upon  your  decision  in  disciplinary  matters. 

18.  Before  you  take  any  action  or  adopt  any  line  of  conduct  that 
concerns  one  of  your  men  (or  all  of  your  men),  consider  carefully 
its  effect  upon  the  man's  loyalty,  upon  the  development  of  his  char- 
acter, and  its  effect  upon  the  discipline  of  the  organiaztion,  whether 
a  company,  a  division,  a  regiment,  or  a  ship. 

19.  Remember  that  every  single  one  of  your  official  acts  exerts  a 
certain  influence  one  way  or  the  other. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  35 

20.  Avoid,  as  you  would  the  plague,  hostile  criticism  of  authority, 
or  even  facetious  or  thoughtless  criticism  that  has  no  hostile  intent. 
Our  naval  gunnery  instructions  state  that  "  destructive  criticism  that 
is  born  in  officers'  messes  will  soon  spread  through  the  ship  and  com- 
pletely kill  the  ship  spirit." 

Lord  Jarvis  said :  "  Discipline  begins  in  the  wardroom.  I  dread 
not  the  seamen,  it  is  the  indiscreet  conversation  of  the  officers  and 
their  presumptuous  discussions  of  the  orders  they  receive  that  pro- 
duces all  our  ills." 

Each  individual  contributes  to  or  detracts  from  the  sum  total  of 
service  character. 

Napoleon  declared  that  the  importance  of  moral  qualities  is  to 
physical  as  three  is  to  one. 

Admiral  Knight,  in  his  address  upon  the  occasion  of  the  gradua- 
tf  on  exercises  of  a  class  of  officers  last  June,  said  that  "  Our  people 
as  a  whole  do  not  realize  that  preparedness  is  primarily  a  matter 
of  character :  that  the  preparedness  of  a  nation  begins  deep  down  in 
the  individual  soul  of  the  individual  citizen;  that  it  is  essentially  a 
consecration  of  self  to  a  cause." 

To  a  certain  extent,  this  is  also  true  of  the  Navy.  Heretofore 
little  attention  has  been  given  to  this  very  important  subject.  I  do 
not  recall  that,  until  quite  recently,  I  had  ever  known  it  even  to  be 
referred  to  officially,  either  during  the  term  of  instruction  at  the 
Naval  Academy  or  in  the  service  since  that  time.  While  this  may 
be  an  extenuating  circumstance,  it  should  be  recognized  that  it  is  no 
excuse  for  those  of  us  who  have  violated  many  of  the  essential  pre- 
cepts without  realizing  the  gravity  of  our  offense ;  for  it  was  our 
business  as  military  men  to  understand  the  effect  of  our  acts  and 
conduct.  But  now  that  attention  has  been  directed  to  this  matter  by 
the  Naval  War  College,  we  may  be  sure  that  the  essentials  of  military 
character  will  hereafter  be  officially  recognized  as  an  important  ele- 
ment of  an  officer's  education. 


POLICY:  ITS  RELATION  TO  WAR  AND  TO  PREPARATION 

FOR  WAR. 


By  Capt.  A.  P.  NIBLACK,  United  States  Navy. 


In  general  terms,  policy  is  the  motive;  strategy  is  the  -general  plan; 
logistics  the  means;  tactics  the  fighting.  To  define  these  more  spe- 
cifically : 

Policy  is  the  attitude  or  course  of  action  which  influences  and  de- 
termines the  relation  and  intercourse  of  a  given  state  with  other 
states. 

War  is  the  contest  of  conflicting  policies  which  can  not  be  ad- 
justed through  diplomacy. 

Strategy  is  the  assembling,  distributing,  and  directing,  in  any- 
given  area  of  possible  or  probable  operations,  of  the  armed  strength 
and  resources'  of  a  nation  to  best  secure  the  limited  and  definite 
objects  of  policy,  or  of  war  growing  out  of  a  conflict  of  policies. 

Logistics  is  that  branch  of  the  military  art  which  embraces  the 
details  of  transport  and  supply.  It  provides  and  equips  the  forces, 
transports  them  to  the  field  of  operations,  and  maintains  them  in 
that  field. 

Tactics  is  the  best  employment  of  handling  of  forces  in  contact 
with  those  of  an  enemy  to  secure  those  definite  results  by  decisive 
battles  which  alone  end  the  war  and  establish  the  aims  of  our  policy. 

These  are  the  subjects  which  are  studied  at  the  Naval  War  College, 
and,  as  war  is  the  last  resort  in  establishing  the  aims  of  policy,  it 
is  essential  that  we  study  policy  in  its  relation  to  war. 

Policy  is  not  therefore  merely  a  word  invented  tor  purposes  of 
literary  unholstery  on  which  to  hang  pet  theories,  but  is  the  ever 
active,  ever  present,  unescapable  force  which,  in  combination  with 
natural  and  economic  forces,  determines  whether  a  state  shall  suc- 
cumb, linger  on  in  sufferance  and  parasitical  dependency,  or  tri- 
umphantly survive  in  the  eternal  struggle  for  existence.  The  ques- 
tion of  policy  is  thus  the  gravest  problem  with  which  enlightened 
statesmanship  has  to  deal — a  problem  which  in  its  solution  has 
wrecked  empires,  swallowed  up  kingdoms,  and  brought  great  democ- 
racies to  nothingness. 

37 


38  NAVAL   TKAINIXG   CRUISE   FOE   CIVILIANS. 

It  is  certainly  important,  therefore,  that  we  find  out  why  some 
states  perish  from  the  earth  and  others  survive:  also,  if  possible, 
lay  down  the  definite  rules  of  the  game. 

Does  history  teach  us  that  the  form  of  government  is  material 
or  immaterial?  Are  ideals  the  mainspring  or  formative  power  in 
the  world,  or  do  those  people  conquer  in  the  struggle  for  existence 
who  cleverly  perfect  and  selfishly,  even  ruthlessly,  use  the  means 
provided  by  a  world  of  material  force  ?  Is  there  in  the  world  a  real 
struggle  -going  on  between  idealism  and  materialism?  Is  it  because 
certain  state  policies  have  been  too  aggressive  or  too  peaceful;  or 
some  nations  have  been  too  well-prepared  for  war  or  too  illy  pre- 
pared; or  some  peoples'  ideals  too  high  or  ideals  too  low — in  one 
case  too  coarse,  in  another  too  fine?  Or  is  there  only  a  balance  of 
the  factors  ?  Is  there  a  definite  answer,  or  is  it  the  inscrutable  riddle 
of  the  Sphinx? 

Or  may  we,  as  the  doctors  have  done  with  diseases  and  plagues, 
by  scientific  research,  discover  and  isolate  the  germs  of  national 
decay,  and  immunize  the  state  against  the  sapping  of  the  national 
life? 

DIFFERENT  PHASES  OF  POLICY. 

In  the  definition  given,  policy  has  been  characterized  as,  in  part, 
an  attitude,  such  as  holding  to  a  political  ideal,  or  as  isolation,  or  as 
exclusion,  or  rivalry,  or  selfishness,  or  pride,  or  ambition,  or  as  racial 
or  religious  antipathy,  or  fear,  or  suspicion,  or  misrepresentation  in 
the  daily  press,  or  race  hatred — always  in  danger  of  degenerating 
into  secret  intrigue  and  preparation  for  war,  or  war  itself — a  people's 
war  sweeping  rulers  and  cabinets  over  the  brink  by  the  collective  will 
of  the  masses,  as  in  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13.  Thus  policy  may  be 
only  an  attitude,  and  often,  if  you  have  no  policy,  your  neighbors,  or 
geography,  may  provide  you  with  one,  as  in  the  case  of  Switzerland, 
with  a  defensive  policy  which  has  compelled  her  to  arm  all  of  her 
citizens  and  girdle  her  borders  with  forts. 

There  may  be  a  choice  of  two  policies,  involving  even  national 
existence.  Hanover,  in  1866,  favored  Austria  instead  of  Prussia,  and 
was  absorbed  by  the  latter  when  she  guessed  wrong. 

Climate  has  induced  Russia  to  seek  ice-free  outlets  to  the  sea,  and 
this  brought  her  in  conflict  in  turn  with  Japan,  Turkey,  and  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  of  Europe.  Economic  conditions  have  dictated  to  some 
nations  the  exclusion  of  Asiatic  immigrants :  or  the  restriction  of  the 
emigration  of  their  own  people ;  or  the  erection  of  economic  barriers 
or  tariff  walls.  Biological  forces,  race  affinities,  language,  and  tradi- 
tions have  drawn  the  Germanic  peoples  together:  similar  forces  are 
causing  ferment  amongst  the  Slavs;  in  fact,  have  done  so  among  peo- 
ples the  world  over,  in  all  periods  of  modern  and  ancient  history,  and 
will  continue  to  do  so. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  39 

Whether  we  consider  policy  as  an  attitude  translated  into  action, 
or  as  the  clearly  defined  ideals  of  a  nation  expressing  the  collective  will, 
or  as  seeking  the  greatest  good  of  the  people,  as  represented  by 
"national  interests,"  under  any  name  or  any  form  of  government, 
the  State  that  is  not  prepared  to  fight  for  its  existence  is  well  along 
its  way  into  ancient  history.  Every  State  must  seek  either  actively  or 
passively,  aggressively  or  defensively,  to  further  its  racial  and  politi- 
cal solidarity,  or  ultimately  lose  its  political  identity  as  an  inde- 
pendent and  self-respecting  member  of  the  community  of  nations. 
History  records  this  on  every  page,  for.  in  the  conflicting  play  of  the 
policies  of  different  States,  and  of  geographical,  natural,  and  eco- 
nomic forces,  there  is  no  such  condition  as  stable  equilibrium,  and  no 
such  thing  as  perpetual  world's  peace,  which  is  the  figurative  political 
heaven,  attained  only  through  the  death  of  those  who  realize  it.  To 
cease  struggling  is  to  cease  to  exist,  for  in  this  world  the  lion  and  the 
lamb  lie  down  together  only  when  the  lamb  is  comfortably  inside  the 
lion.  There  is  reall}T  no  such  thing  as  a  purely  peaceful  policy. 
Death  ensues  when  struggling  ceases. 

DIPLOMACY  IN  THEORY. 

"  Diplomacy  is  the  play  and  counterplay  of  apprehensions,  inter- 
pretations, and  anticipations  in  which  neither  player  is  guided  by  his 
opponent's  act.  but  only  by  his  conception  of  these  acts,  the  conception 
being  more  or  less  faulty  as  the  player  is  ill  or  well  informed."  It  is 
the  business  of  diplomacy,  by  a  combination  of  aggressiveness  and 
conciliation,  to  keep  our  policy  within  the  realms  of  diplomacy,  and 
while  furthering  it  to,  at  the  same  time,  avoid  and  prevent  war.  Or 
we  may  express  it  as  follows: 

Governments  further  policy  through  diplomacy,  and,  depending  on 
how  vital  the  purpose,  the  negotiations  must  run  their  course, 
through  conciliation,  compromise,  "  compensation,"  and  even  aban- 
donment. Diplomacy  appeals  to  reason  and  makes  use  of  arguments 
of  various  kinds,  but  if  these  fail  to  impress,  or  are  scouted  by  the 
nation  to  which  addressed,  the  office  and  work  of  diplomacy  is  for  the 
moment  ended,  and  it  means  submission  or  war.  For  this  reason, 
experienced  and  trained  diplomats  lessen  the  chances  of  war.  To 
oppose  trained  diplomacy  with  untrained  is  like,  in  war,  opposing 
trained  troops  with  untrained  ones,  and  here  we  must  realize  that 
policy  and  diplomacy  are  continuous  in  both  war  and  peace.  "  In 
fact  policy  prepares  for,  and  leads  up  to.  orders,  supports,  guides, 
and  stops  the  war,"  as  Capt.  McKean  puts  it. 

During  the  period  of  strained  relations  preceding  war,  the  gov- 
ernments, through  diplomacy,  seek  to  delay  or  accelerate  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  according  to  strategy,  or  according  as  illy  or  well  pre- 
pared for  Avar.  Diplomacy  must  conduct  our  international  relations 


40  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

in  a  manner  most  favorable,  during  war,  to  the  military  operations 
or  the  strategy  which  our  policy  demands,  and  thus  must  be  more 
actively  and  carefully  emploj^ed  than  in  time  of  peace,  which  is  an 
added  reason  why  trained  and  experienced  diplomats  are  necessary. 
Diplomacy  may  also  be  the  instrument  of  acquisition,  by  ex- 
change or  purchase,  but  the  world  has  too  long  recognized  war  as  its 
chief  method.  The  United  States  has  been  the  foremost  nation  to 
acquire  territory  by  purchase,  and  by  money  recompense  even  after 
war,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Philippines,  or  by  purchase  as  with  Louisi- 
ana, Florida,  Alaska,  and  other  foreign  possessions  thus  acquired. 

DIPLOMACY   AND    PRACTICE. 

It  is  the  custom  of  civilized  countries  to  publish,  from  time  to  time, 
the  diplomatic  correspondence  in  relation  to  specific  subject  of  diplo- 
matic interchange.  Treaties  and  agreements  are  likewise  communi- 
cated to  the  world  and  become,  in  effect,  the  public  law  governing 
the  peoples,  except  unfortunately  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,  as 
will  be  seen  later.  From  reading  such  documents  one  often  fails  to 
see  why  diplomacy  has  failed  and  war  has  ensued.  The  joker  is 
usually  to  be  found  in  secret  diplomacy,  and  in  "  secret  clauses  "  in 
agreements  "  whereby  the  happiness,  the  prosperity,  and  the  lives  of 
millions  of  men  and  women  are  often  placed  in  deadly  peril,  without 
their  knowledge  or  consent." 

The  diplomat,  as  a  trained  servant  of  the  state  and  working  only 
in  the  interest  of  the  state,  is  an  instrument  of  peace  as  long  as  he 
uses  the  well-understood  phrases  of  diplomacy,  and  in  no  way  com- 
mits the  nation  he  represents  to  conditions  not  compatible  with  the 
"avowed  policy  and  ideals  of  the  people."  He  is  an  instrument  of 
war  when  he  secretly  intrigues,  signs  secret  agreements,  or  commits 
the  nation  to  a  line  of  conduct  in  favor,  not  alone  of  private  corpora- 
tions, but  even  of  national  interests,  which  are  so  selfish  and  sinister 
as  to  be  kept  from  the  light  of  day. 

Fortunately  the  United  States  Senate  must  pass  upon  our  treaties, 
but  equally  unfortunately  our  diplomatic  corps  is  not  on  a  true  civil- 
service  basis;  the  salaries  are  so  inadequate  that  financial  qualifica- 
tions are  given  undue  weight ;  the  positions  are  not  dignified  by  Gov- 
ernment buildings  for  embassies  and  legations;  previous  experience 
seems  to  be  regarded  as  unnecessary,  and  geographical  and  party 
considerations  are  given  sufficient  weight  to  suggest  that  our  people 
believe  that  training,  personal  fitness,  and  experience  are  not  neces- 
sary. The  real  firing  line  is  diplomacy.  More  victories  are  gained 
by  it  than  by  war.  By  strategy,  in  time  of  peace,  we  may  so 
strengthen  ourselves  that  war  will  be  too  uninviting,  so  by  states- 
manship and  diplomacy,  in  the  hands  of  trained  citizens,  we  may  for- 
ward and  sustain  our  policies  without  the  danger  of  war — danger 
that  with  us  is  always  real  and  to  which  we  seem  always  blind. 


NAVAL   TKAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  41 

PREPAREDNESS,  STRATEGY,   AND   WAR. 

In  both  peace  and  war,  policy,  diplomacy,  and  strategy  should 
work  hand  in  hand,  and  should  be  consistent  with  one  another. 
This  implies  training  and  study  on  the  part  of  statesmen  and  mili- 
tary leaders,  and  a  mutual  indoctrination  in  relation  to  both  policy 
and  strategy.  At  every  turn  we  will  come  to  the  vital  necessity  of 
trained  functionaries,  or  servants  of  the  State,  as  distinguished  from 
poor  relatives  of  the  great,  or  the  payment  of  political  debts  by  ap- 
pointment to  public  office.  Success  can  only  be  predicated  on  pre- 
paredness and  trained  efficiency. 

Regarding  any  policy  as  possibly  leading  to  the  danger  of  war,, 
even  a  policy  of  abject  and  servile  cringing,  the  statesmen,  as  well  as 
the  politicians  representing  the  political  parties  necessary  to  repre- 
sentative government,  should  frame  the  policy  and  the  party  plat- 
forms to  suit  the  people,  and  then  the  military  and  naval  authorities 
should  shape  the  strategy  to  harmonize  with  it.  Given  a  policy, 
however,  it  is  the  part  of  the  statesmen  and  politicians  to  educate 
the  people  as  to  "  why,"  in  order  that  they  may  provide  the  "  where- 
with," so  that  diplomacy  and  the  militar}^  forces  may  furnish  the 
"  how."  In  international  policies,  when  the  appeal  to  force  is  made, 
then  and  then  only  do  the  military  and  naval  arts  emerge  from  a 
purely  abstract  force  to  the  solution  of  the  concrete  problem  of 
war.  This  means  that  in  time  of  peace  war  colleges,  fleets,  and 
armies  can  only  simulate  the  real  thing.  In  the  interplay  of  State 
policies  the  land  and  naval  forces  play  a  silent  part  in  the  ratio  of 
their  supposed  relative  power  and  actual  condition  of  preparedness. 
The  necessity  for  naval  and  military  preparedness  is  so  freely  con- 
ceded by  thinking  people  that  the  obvious  fact  is  often  overlooked 
that  preparation  can  not  be  postponed  until  war  threatens,  because, 
during  the  period  of  strained  relations,  preparation  will  precipitate 
the  war.  The  only  preparation  which  counts  is  that  which  only 
leaves  mobilization  as  the  remaining  step  when  the  inevitable 
happens. 

McKean  says  in  War  and  Policy : 

The  art  of  war  is  governed  by  one  great  principle — to  secure  at  the  outset 
every  possible  advantage  of  time,  place,  armament,  numbers,  and  morale.  In 
modern  war  more  depends  upon  what  has  been  accomplished  before  the  com- 
mencement of  hostilities  than  upon  what  is  done  after  the  first  shot  is  firedt 
and  this  preparation  rests  with  the  statesmen  and  not  with  the  military  leaders. 
In  these  days  that  nation  which  is  beaten  in  preparation  for  war  is  already 
half  beaten  in  war  itself. 

The  economic  struggle  for  existence  is  more  than  any  other  one 
thing  the  cause  of  diplomatic  friction,  the  failure  of  diplomacy,  and 
then  war.  In  the  rivalry  for  economic  supremacy  in  the  control  of 


42  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

the  world's  economic  resources,  and  in  the  vague  ideas  which  cluster 
around  such  diplomatic  symbols  as  "colonial  empire,"  "industrial 
supremacy,"  "the  open  door."  "spheres  of  influence,"  "balance  of 
power,"  "preferential  duties,"  etc.,  and  above  all  in  underhanded 
"secret  diplomacy,"  we  may  find  and  isolate  the  active  germ  of 
war,  which  is  human  greed,  not  animal  greediness,  but  that  active 
political  and  economic  force,  "  greed." 
But  where  can  we  find  except  in  war — 

the  ultimate  test  of  the  relative  strength  of  two  nations  in  all  the  qualities 
which  make  for  national  greatness,  physical  vigor,  order,  discipline,  personal 
courage,  patience,  farsightedness,  the  genius  of  leadership,  organizing  capacity 
and  efficiency  in  the  production  of  wealth;  and  we  must  realize  that  nations 
do  not  get  their  way  by  asking  for  it,  but  by  being  able  to  assert  it,  for  policy 
without  requisite  force  behind  it  must  be  abandoned. 

While  the  instrument  of  greed  is  also  force  it  is  more  often 
secrecy  and  cunning.  If  more  people  in  the  world  were  shocked  by 
the  sins  of  greed  in  the  diplomatic  conflicts  of  peace  there  would 
be  less  liability  of  being  shocked  by  the  horrors  of  war. 

BLUFFING    AND     PREPAREDNESS. 

The  mere  wealth  produced  by  the  economic  employment  of  the 
population  is  not  even  a  potential  asset  for  war  purposes  until 
actually  invested  in  war  material  and  in  the  means  of  producing 
supplies  of  war  material  and  until  all  the  productive  power  of  the 
country  is  scientifically  mobilized  as  a  supporting  asset  in  case  of 
war,  because  war  must  ever  be  regarded  as  the  possible  outcome  o* 
the  internation  conflict  of  our  policies  with  others.  Unless,  there- 
fore, a  reasonable  percentage  of  the  national  wealth  is  invested 
annually  in  maintaining  preparedness,  the  wealth  itself  is  only  a 
tempting  bait  for  aggression;  or.  at  any  rate,  even  escaping  war.  the 
ultimate  failure  of  polic}r  is  assured.  History  teaches  this,  if  it 
teaches  nothing  else. 

The  temporary  success  which  the  diplomacy  of  a  country  achieves 
with  ultimatums  and  the  careless  handling  of  diplomatic  language 
is  a  dangerous  policj^,  because  if  the  bluff  is  called,  exigency  must 
hastily  take  the  place  of  policy  and  guessing  of  strategy.  "  Rattling 
the  saber"  is  a  diplomatic  asset  only  when  it  is  a  real  saber. 

While  it  can  not  be  said  that  all  roads  lead  to  war,  yet  it  may  be 
said  that  because  of  the  inevitable  play  of  cross-purposes,  persist- 
ence in  fixed  policies  lead  to  war  where  skillful  and  experienced 
leadership  is  lacking.  Men,  parties,  tariffs,  national  ambitions  and 
policies  may  change,  but  the  forces  of  nature  and  human  ideals 
remain  and  persist  and  force  the  unavoidable  issues  eventually. 
Side-stepping  issues  merely  postpones  and  clouds  them. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE    FOR    CIVILIANS.  43 

RECAPITULATION. 

Foreign  polic}'.  as  well  as  domestic  policy,  in  their  ultimate  con- 
ception is  the  precaution  taken  for  continued  national  existence. 
The  instruments  of  foreign  policy  are  diplomacy  and  strategy.  The 
strength  of  diplomatic  representations  is  largely  in  direct  ratio  to 
the  forces  behind  it,  physical  and  moral.  Moral  force  is  based  on 
right,  but  among  nations  might  is  an  overwhelming  factor.  Success 
in  war  is  dependent  upon  prepared  and  sustained  land  and  sea 
forces  operating  along  sound  strategic  lines  and  upheld  by  sound 
policy.  A  nation  should  have  trained  statesmen  and  diplomats  in 
charge  of  its  affairs,  but  must  have,  at  any  rate,  the  land  and  sea 
forces  which  correspond  with  its  policy,  as  its  policy  must  stand  or 
fall  therewith.  Government  is  a  business  for  trained  men  and  quacks 
practice  at  great  danger  to  the  patient.  In  the  reconstruction  period 
w7hich  will  follow  the  war  now  going  on  in  the  world  national  effi- 
ciency will  be  the  slogan. 

It  behooves  us  therefore  to  set  our  own  house  in  order,  and  the 
first  step  is  to  realize  where  we  actually  stand. 

OUR  FORM   OF   GOVERNMENT. 

The  form  of  government  as  a  determining  factor  in  world  politics 
is  important  in  proportion  as  it  provides  for  the  state  being  con- 
tinuously and  unremittingly  "  prepared."  History  records  the  oc- 
casions when  the  military  eye  has  wandered  from  the  ball,  and  ge- 
ography records  the  results  on  the  map.  For  instance,  a  form  of 
government  which  ignores  the  military  obligation  of  the  citizen  to  the 
state  is  as  a  lion  in  the  jungle  without  claws  or  teeth.  As  Upton  says : 

It  may  be  laid  down  as  an  axiom,  based  on  historical  proof,  that  any  nation 
which  foregoes  its  rights  to  compulsory  military  service  becomes  more  and 
more  enslaved  by  depending  solely  upon  voluntary  military  service  induced 
by  gifts  of  money,  land,  and  clothing. 

The  prayer  "  Give  us  peace  in  our  time.  O  Lord "'  is  only  the  sub- 
stitute for  universal  military  service,  and  this  raises  the  specter — 
the  feared  and  hated  specter  of  "  militarism."  with  its  fearsome 
bugaboo  of  a  standing  army  of  its  own  citizens  as  distinguished  for 
a  volunteer  arnry  that  we  can  only  hope  will  stand  and  not  run. 
as  untrained  men  are  justified  in  doing,  in  order  "to  fight  another 
day.*'  Burns,  in  his  Political  Ideals,  says : 

To  the  individualist  the  less  organization  there  is  the  better,  for  the  truly 
free  man  does  not  require  to  be  forced  to  do  his  duty.  In  individualism  we 
have  the  reflection  of  the  English  tradition.  The  Socialist,  on  the  other  hand, 
desires  more  organization,  for  the  majority  of  men  depend  on  institutions  and 
not  upon  continual  personal  judgments  as  to  what  it  is  best  to  do.  In  socialism 
\v<>  have  the  reflection  of  the  German  tradition. 


44  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

There  is  growing  up  in  England  to-day  a  powerful  sentiment  or 
belief  that  after  this  war  all  civilized  countries  will  have  to  adopt 
the  German  conception  of  the  place  and  function  of  the  state,  but 
as  exaggerated  as  this  is  there  is  no  question  but  that  political  lib- 
erty and  equality  before  the  law  will  be  reaffirmed  as  never  before, 
and  it  would  be  as  reactionary  to  claim  that  German  tradition  is 
the  true  ideal  as  it  would  be  to  fail  to  see  that  the  British  tradition 
needs  intelligent  and  cool-headed  adjustment  to  rid  it  of  the  en- 
croachments of  commercialism,  imperialism,  and  selfish  and  self- 
centered  individualism. 

Individualism  seeks  to  organize  public  authority  and  public  life 
in  such  a  way  (1)  as  that  they  shall  be  distinctly  subordinate  to 
private  and  individual  independence,  and  (2)  that  the  executive 
authority  shall  owe  as  much  allegiance  to  the  people  as  the  people 
do  to  it.  Socialism  takes  the  view  of  compulsory  partnership,  in 
which  the  independence  of  each  member  is  swallowed  up  in  the 
state  authority,  or  even  in  the  head  of  the  state  itself  (autocracy). 
It  is  important  for  us  to  realize  that  pure  socialism  may  exist  under 
an  autocracy,  but  only  under  a  democracy  to  the  extent  to  which 
the  real  balance  of  rights  and  obligations  is  assured.  Governments 
are  organized  to  advance  the  interests  and  welfare  of  their  members, 
and  the  continued  existence  of  the  state  is  important  only  when  this 
obtains.  As  much  as  we  would  like  to  believe  that  government  em- 
bodies altruism  and  the  ideals  of  the  people,  enlightened  selfishness 
is  the  great  ferment  or  yeast  which  uplifts  and  makes  for  real 
progress,  but  the  danger  everywhere  in  diplomacy,  policy,  commerce, 
communities,  and  in  human  society  in  general,  as  previously  pointed 
out,  is  over  selfishness,  drifting  unchecked  into  political  graft  and 
greed.  Eternal  vigilance  being  the  price  of  liberty,  there  must  be 
a  "  check  and  balance  "  in  all  human  activities.  It  is  an  axiom  that 
you  get  out  of  life'  only  what  you  put  in  it.  You  seldom  get  some- 
thing for  nothing.  A  citizen  should  be  nble  to  get  as  much  out  of 
the  government  as  he  puts  in  it.  and  converselv  that  government 
gets  little  that  exacts  little  from  its  citizens.  It  is  the  failure  of 
the  "  check  and  balance  "  in  democracies  that  demonstrates  how  diffi- 
cult it  is  to  be  vigilant  enough.  Autocracies  are  vigilant  to  exact 
and  not  so  prone  to  give  the  rights  reposed  in  their  keeping.  Democ- 
racies are  not  vigilant  enough. 

Brooks  Adams  characterizes  the  individualism  of  the  United 
States  Government  as  "  parochial."  or  confined  to  the  "  local  issue." 
and  says,  "  This  individualism  is  a  perversion  of  and  a  falling  away 
from  the  true  democratic  ideal;  the  individual  setting  his  personal 
interest  above  the  welfare  and  security  of  the  state."  If  his  indict- 
ment is  true  the  government  fails  to  exact  from  its  citizens  what  it 
should.  In  other  words,  centralization  in  some  form  is  essential. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  45 

Surely  no  nation  can  survive  which  fails  to  recognize  as  its  primary 
standard  of  duty  the  individual's  obligation  to  the  state,  and  the 
state  and  not  the  individual  must  be  the  judge  of  the  form  this  obli- 
gation shall  take — when,  where,  and  how.  Anything  else  is  a  con- 
fusion and  really  dangerous,  as  history  and  the  map  of  the  world 
•clearly  shows. 

This  tradition  of  individual  irresponsibility  and  selfishness  we 
share  with  and  inherit  from  the  English.  Great  Britain  heretofore 
and  still  remains  intrenched  behind  its  bulwark  of  "  navalism,"  or 
commanding  sea  power.  Our  own  immunity  has  been  furnished  by 
IAVO  large  oceans  and  the  preoccupation  of  other  powers.  We  are  a 
fortunate  people  and  not  the  chosen  people,  because  history  says  the 
Jews  lost  their  nationality  through  their  own  self-centered  individ- 
ualism, and  they  turned  out  to  be  the  people  chosen  to  illustrate 
the  folly. 

This  British  or  English  tradition  is  a  real  factor  in  our  national 
life.  Our  literature,  our  language,  our  common  law,  our  sports,  our 
vices,  our  foods,  our  drinks,  our  clothes,  our  weights  and  measures, 
our  etiquette,  our,  military  and  naval  ideas,  our  theaters,  our  woman- 
suffrage  ideas,  our  scientific  methods,  our  every  word  and  thought — 
in  fact,  our  fiber — is  impregnated  with  the  English  tradition. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  Latin  America  lives  under  the  Spanish  tra- 
dition, as  influenced  by  the  steadily  growing  European  "  kultur." 
It  is  that  which  makes  the  chasm  between  us.  It  is  not  racial;  it  is 
cultural.  Even  our  business  methods  are  so  utterly  foreign  to  theirs 
that,  commercially,  we  are  absolute  outsiders  in  Latin-American 
trade,  and  are  driven  to  using  foreign  agents  to  do  our  retail  business. 
This  is  proven  by  the  fact  that  we  have  less  than  5,000  American 
citizens  in  business  below  the  Equator.  In  all  our  talk  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine  and  Pan  Americanism  we  leave  out  of  consideration  the 
cultural  antipathies.  Pan  Americanism  has  no  real  past,  a  fictitious 
present,  and  an  unpromising  future. 

We  have,  perhaps,  reason  to  be  proud  of  and  satisfied  with  our 
English  tradition,  but  we  must  actively  cast  out  its  system  of  weights 
and  measure,  its  volunteer  system  of  recruiting,  its  antequated  proto- 
col of  social  visits,  its  social-caste  system  based  on  riches,  and,  above 
all.  its  selfish  political  individualism,  if  we  expect  to  play  the  game 
in  Latin  America  according  to  the  world's  rules  and  to  their  satis- 
faction. 

As  to  our  own  political  ideals,  we  have  wisely  and  happily  chosen 
the  democratic  form  of  government,  and  are  opposed  to  bureaucratic 
domination  further  than  necessary  to  obtain  efficient  administration. 
Every  tendency  in  the  world  to-day  is  toward  democracy,  but  not 
the  corruption  of  it,  in  which  there  is  not  absolute  equality  before 
the  law.  Where  such  words  as  liberty  and  equality  are  but  the  fossil 


46  XAVAL    TBATXING    CRUISE   FOR    CIVILIANS. 

remains  of  ideas  which  in  their  realization  shook  the  foundations  of 
civilization  we  must  be  vigilant  indeed  to  avoid  class  distinctions 
and  at  the  same  time  make  all  citizens  bear  equally  the  burden  and 
responsibility  of  government.  The  French  Revolution,  by  destroy- 
ing the  exemptions  claimed  by  the  nobility  and  clergy,  established 
equality  before  the  law  as  the  real  meaning  of  equality.  It  was  not 
so  much  a  change  of  political  theory  as  of  administration  and  leaders, 
but  it  put  the  state  in  impartial  supremacy  over  all  classes.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  English  Revolution,  under  Cromwell,  reduced  the 
power  of  the  state  "  not  for  the  advantage  of  any  class  but  for  indi- 
vidual liberty  and  local  self-government."  In  the  United  States  we 
inherited,  fortunately,  both  traditions  and  embodied  them  in  our 
own  Constitution,  but  we  must  now  curb  the  pretensions  of  "  indi- 
vidual liberty  and  local  self-government "  by  reestablishing  equality 
before  the  law  through  universal  military  obligation  and  denying 
political  patronage  the  right  to  convert  problems  of  national  de- 
fense into  a  question  of  "  local  interest "  and  geographical  division 
of  the  spoils.  These  two  corruptions  of  "  liberty "  and  "  State 
rights"  are  shown  up  in  their  true  light  in  the  writings  of  Gen. 
George  Washington  and  Gen.  Emory  Upton. 

On  September  24,  1776,  Washington  wrote  to  the  President  of 
Congress : 

A  soldier  reasoned  with  upon  the  goodness  of  the  cause  he  is  engaged  in  and 
the  inestimable  rights  he  is  contending  for  hears  you  with  patience  and  ac- 
knowledges the  truth  of  your  observations,  but  adds  that  it  is  of  no  more 
importance  to  him  than  to  others.  The  officer  makes  you  the  same  reply,  with 
the  further  remarks  that  his  pay  will  not  support  him,  and  he  can  ruin 
himself  and  family  to  save  his  country  where  every  member  of  the  community 
is  equally  interested  and  benefited  by  his  labors.  The  few,  therefore,  who  act 
upon  principles  of  disinterestedness,  comparatively  speaking,  are  no  more  than 
a  drop  in  the  ocean. 

"  Individual  liberty  "  would  not,  from  this,  be  held  to  include  the 
right  to  shirk  the  obligations  of  citizenship,  and  "  equality  "  would 
seem  to  imply  equality  of  obligation  to  bear  arms  in  the  national 
defense. 

It  took  the  Civil  War  to  open  the  eyes  of  the  Southern  States  to 
the  meaning  of  "State  rights,"  not  through  defeat  but  through 
experience.  Upton,  in  his  Military  Policy,  says  that  in  1861— 

The  Government  sought  to  save  the  Union  by  fighting  as  a  confederacy ;  the 
Confederates  sought  to  destroy  it  by  fighting  as  a  nation.  The  Government 
recognized  the  States,  appealed  to  them  for  troops,  adhered  to  voluntary  enlist- 
ments, gave  the  governors  power  to  appoint  all  commissioned  officers,  and  en- 
couraged them  to  organize  new  regiments.  The  Confederates  abandoned  State 
sovereignty,  appealed  directly  to  the  people,  took  away  from  them  the  power 
to  appoint  commissioned  officers,  vested  their  appointments  in  the  Confederate 
President,  refused  to  organize  war  regiments,  abandoned  voluntary  enlistments. 


XAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  47 

and,  adopting  the  republican  principle  that  every  citizen  owes  his  country  mili- 
tary service,  called  into  the  army  every  white  man  between  the  ages  of  18 
and  35. 

Thus  do  political  ideals  yield  to  expediency  and  show  their  incon- 
sistency under  the  test  of  war. 

We  need  not  therefore  find  any  fault  necessarily  with  our  form  of 
government,  but  we  may  certainly  question  its  efficient  administration 
through  the  crude  workings  of  "check  and  balance"  between  the 
executive  and  legislative  powers  of  the  Government.  If  it  is  assumed 
that  reform  of  defects  in  governmental  administrative  efficiency  and 
coordination  will  take  place  in  Great  Britain  as  a  result  of  this  war 
now7  going  on.  how  much  the  more  must  the  United  States  overhaul 
its  machinery,  since  it  has  escaped  the  test  of  modern  war.  Many 
British  writers  say  that  German  industrial  and  military  efficiency  is 
gained  by  the  substitution  of  discipline  for  individual  liberty,  and 
others  say  it  is  worth  the  price,  because  the  individual  German  gets 
out  of  the  State  what  he  puts  into  it,  and  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  are  both  ultimately  going  to  pay  the  price  for  all  that 
its  citizens  fail  to  put  into  the  Government  of  their  own  countries. 
In  this  view  the  German  army  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  Ger- 
man people. 

THE  POLICIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

It  is  a  relief  to  pass  from  theories  to  facts.  The  instant  we  enumer- 
ate our  own  policies,  we  realize  that  nearly  every  one  of  them  carries 
with  it  the  ultimate  danger  of  war. 

Policy  No.  1,  "No  entangling  alliances."  This  was  given  to  us  by  the 
"Father  of  Our  Country."  Aside  from  the  fact  that  we  won  our 
independence  by  an  alliance  with  France,  and  that  the  Monroe  doc- 
trine is  a  one-sided  Pan  American  alliance  which  we  have  thrust  on 
unresponsive  people  thus  obligating  us  to  do  all  the  work,  it  is  a 
curious  fact  that  this  accepted  national  policy  commits  us  to  isolation, 
whereas  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  we  may  some  time  have  to  fight 
an  alliance  against  us,  in  which  it  would  be  very  much  like  fighting 
with  one  arm  tied  behind  the  back.  However,  this  policy  calls  for 
unusual  preparedness,  on  this  account,  and  most  skillful  diplomacy 
to  avoid  offending  more  than  one  country  at  a  time. 

Policy  No.  2,  the  "Monroe  doctrine."  This  dates  from  1823,  but 
various  Presidents  have  subsequently  read  into  the  original  Monroe 
doctrine  meanings  which  have  broadened  its  scope,  and  increased  its 
ambiguities,  such  as  antecolonization,  and  anteacquisition  of  any  ter- 
ritory in  this  hemisphere  by  any  European,  or  other  power,  and  the 
Lodge  resolution  as  to  foreign  corporations.  The  latest  enunciation 
as  to  foreign  concessions  has,  for  instance,  been  misunderstood  by  an 


48  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

English  writer,  H.  N.  Brailsford,  in  his  book  The  War  of  Steel  and 
Gold,  who  says : 

An  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  put  forward  by  President  Wilson 
seems  to  mean  that  no  European  capitalists  may  henceforth  obtain  concession  in 
the  American  continent  without  encountering  American  opposition.  If  it  is  to 
be  strictly  enforced,  it  would  mean  that  the  United  States  claims  the  whole  of 
Latin  America  as  its  exclusive  sphere  of  economic  penetration.  In  that  doc- 
trine Europe  is  not  likely  to  acquiesce,  and  America  may  soon  be  the  field  of  a 
conflict  as  acute  as  any  that  Turkey  and  China  have  witnessed. 

Prof.  A.  B.  Hart  says: 

The  United  States  can  not  have  its  Monroe  doctrine  in  the  future  without 
paying  for  it.  We  have  had  it  on  free  terms  for  over  a  century,  but  the  time  of 
free  lunches  in  international  affairs  has  gone.  If  we  really  want  security  it 
behooves  our  country  to  place  itself  in  a  condition  of  military,  naval,  and  com- 
mercial preparedness,  and  more  important  still,  in  governmental  efficiency. 

Policy  No.  3,  "Asiatic  exclusion."  This  is  a  politically  and 
economically  sound  policy,  but  ethically  and  socially  unsound.  That 
this  and  the  nonnaturalization  of  Asiatics  is  fraught  with  future 
complications  is  automatic. 

Policy  No.  4,  "  Open  door  in  China."  The  requisition  of  "  colonial 
empires  "  has  paid  little  heed  to  the  formality  of  the  consent  of  the 
tenants  of  the  soil.  Opportunities  to  create  commerce  and  national 
wealth  through  the  mineral,  oil,  and  agricultural  resources  of  areas 
occupied  by  backward  peoples  is  the  modern  lure  of  colonization, 
through  "  economic  penetration,"  which  includes  lending  money.  The 
Monroe  doctrine  is  opposed  to  "  special  spheres  of  influence  "  in  this 
hemisphere,  believing  that  segregation  in  the  exploitation  of  un- 
developed countries  is  one  of  the  most  fruitful  sources  of  war.  The 
open  door  makes  for  universal  peace,  and  limits  wars  to  countries 
which  are  unprepared  and  unimportant,  but  which  forcibly  resist  ex- 
ploitation. What  the  future  of  this  policy  is  to  be  depends  solely  on 
how  far  we  may  be  willing  to  go  in  support  of  it. 

Policy  No.  5,  "Independence  of  the  Philippines."  This  is  our 
avowed  policy.  How  far  we  may  be  permitted  to  realize  it  depends 
not  only  on  the  Filipinos  themselves  but  on  the  international  politi- 
cal opinion.  Prof.  Hart  says  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  defensive:  the 
Open  Door  in  China  is  commercial;  the  Exclusion  of  Asiatics  is 
racial;  the  Integrity  of  the  Philippines  is  moral. 

Policy  No.  6-,  "Defense  of  the  Panama  Canal."  The  ratification 
of  the  treaty  with  Nicaragua  and  the  concessions  in  Great  and  Little 
Corn  Island  in  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  in  the  Pacific 
are  steps  in  securing  the  control  of  interoceanic  canal  routes,  present 
or  projected.  With  Chiriqui  Lagoon  and  Almirante  Bay  in  the 
benevolent  hands  of  Panama,  we  can  turn  our  attention  elsewhere. 
"The  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal"  not  only  means  its  actual 
physical  defenses  but  includes  geographical  changes  in  the  Caribbean 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE    FOR   CIVILIANS.  49 

Sea  as  well.  This  makes  the  purchase  of  St.  Thomas  a  purely  de- 
fensive measure.  For  the  price  of  these  islands  we  could  fortify 
Culebra,  and  make  their  possession  by  any  other  power  a  mere  form. 
There  are  other  islands  and  other  foreign  possessions  in  this  region 
which  make  the  problem  of  the  defense  of  the  canal  a  very  inter- 
esting one.  The  whole  question  of  the  Caribbean  is  a  powder  maga- 
zine which  a  spark  may  start  off,  and,  therefore,  an  efficient  national 
"lire"  department  is  the  only  guaranty. 

Policy  No.  7,  "  Freedom  of  the  sea."  Historically  we  have  always 
stood  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  (1)  "Free  ships,  free  goods"; 
(2)  ''exemption  of  private  property  from  capture  at  sea";  (3) 
"safety  of  noncombatants  and  neutrals  on  the  high  seas";  and 
(4)  opposition  to  any  claim  of  belligerents  to  in  any  way  control 
waters  beyond  the  3-rnile  limit.  The  United  States  has  always  stood 
for  the  free  use  by  all  mankind  equally  and  irrespectively  of  the 
highways  of  commerce  and  international  communication,  and  this 
world  war  has  kept  us  on  the  edge  of  war  trying  to  keep  the  observ- 
ance of  international  law  in  favor  of  neutrals.  Diplomacy  has  been 
the  instrument,  and  meaning  it  the  leverage  which  has  pried  com- 
pliance out  of  reluctant  self-interests. 

Policy  Xo.  8,  "Apology  of  limited  sovereignty."  As  the  treaty- 
making  power  is  shared  by  the  Executive  with  the  Senate,  and  as  our 
Government  has  always  admitted  its  inability  to  compel  any  indi- 
vidual State  to  abide  by  any  treaty,  it  results  that  a  treaty  "  as  the 
law  of  the  land  "  is  actually  set  aside  by  any  State  at  will.  We  may 
make  a  treaty  guaranteeing  rights  to  foreign  citizens  which  any 
State  may  deny.  If  foreign  citizens  are  murdered,  through  the 
powerlessness  of  local  governments,  the  General  Government  must 
pay  the  damages  and  do  all  the  apologizing.  We  are  thus  automati- 
cally reduced  to  a  continual  attitude  of  apology.  Some  day  some 
country  may  refuse  to  accept  this  apology,  or  we  may  get  tired  of 
doing  it  ourselves,  or  we  may  trim  down  the  assertiveness  of  "  local 
interests." 

Policy  Xo.  9,  "  Our  supremacy  in  the  Pacific."  No  one  will  admit 
for  a  moment  that  we  have  any  such  foolish  policy ;  but  we  overlook 
the  fact  that  even  our  "  attitude  "  may  constitute  a  policy.  It  may 
be,  however,  asserted  that  our  policy  in  the  Pacific  is  negative ;  that 
we  have  never  asserted  any  rights  or  intentions  in  the  Pacific;  that 
we  have  even  talked  of  withdrawing  from  the  Philippines.  And 
yet  our  insular  possessions  in  the  Pacific  impose  on  us  the  same 
policy  as  if  they  were  actually  in  the  hands  of  an  enemy  or  rival, 
because  if  anyone  takes  them  we  must  take  them  back.  Moreover, 
they  exist :  they  can  not  be  sunk;  and  if  we  fail  to  make  use  of  them, 
geography  will  turn  them  against  us  just  as  it  turned  them  away  from 

67325—16 4 


50  NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

others  to  us — because  we  are  naturally  acquisitive  and  because  others 
failed  to  adequately  defend  them. 

It  would  seem  that  there  is  enough  trouble  brewing  from  the  nine 
policies  enumerated  to  discourage  us  from  looking  around  for  any 
more,  but  troubles  disappear  not  by  ignoring  them,  but  by  boldly 
facing  them. 

You,  gentlemen,  as  patriotic  loyal  citizens,  are  subscribing  to  your 
belief  that  it  is  time  we  should  all  wake  up  and  face  our  responsi- 
bilities. In  your  association  with  the  Navy  you  will  find  that  our 
slogan  is  efficiency.  The  Government  requires  it  of  us  as  it  does  of 
almost  no  other  of  its  public  servants,  namely  by  laws  and  regulations 
meant  to  be  very  searching  as  to  our  qualifications  for  the  great 
trust  it  imposes  upon  us.  If  I  therefore  attach  too  much  importance 
to  efficiency  in  diplomacy,  in  policy,  in  our  strategy,  and  in  our 
preparation  for  war,  I  can  only  claim  that  our  ideals  are  necessarily 
high  and  the  people,  through  Congress  and  the  Government,  have  set 
one  standard  for  us  and  another  for  others. 


NAVAL  TACTICS. 


By  Commander  C.  T.  VOGELGESANG,  United  States  Navy. 


Tactics  brings  us  into  the  domain  of  actual  combat.  Briefly  and 
concisely,  tactics  is  the  employment  of  forces  in  contact  with  oppos- 
ing forces ;  the  aim  being  victory  in  battle. 

The  restricted  meaning  often  given  to  tactics  is  very  misleading, 
and  has  given  rise  to  much  unsound  reasoning  and  faulty  deduction. 

In  the  minds  of  many,  tactics  is  fully  comprehended  in  the  fours 
right  and  fours  left  of  the  drill  hall  and  barrack  yard  or  parade 
ground.  Or  in  the  fleet  one  may  be  called  a  good  or  a  bad  tactician, 
depending  upon  whether  or  not  he  has  the  position  pennant  hoisted 
on  him.  Essential  as  precision  of  movement  is  in  fleet  evolutions, 
and  desirable  as  a  training  in  elementary  coordination,  it  is  nothing 
more  than  the  mere  rudiments  in  tactics.  It  is  often  taken  for  the 
end  in  tactics  when  in  reality  it  is  only  a  very  small  beginning. 

Tactics  operates  within  a  narrower  field  than  does  strategy,  but 
it  operates  under  precisely  the  same  principles  that  govern  in 
strategy. 

Strategy  aims  to  conduct  the  forces  to  the  point  of  contact;  once 
within  that  area  tactics  assumes  control  and  disposes  and  maneuvers 
the  forces  in  combat. 

The  aim  of  tactics  is  to  utilize  the  power  of  all  your  assembled 
forces  to  the  best  purpose,  to  place  them  in  a  desired  position  of 
advantage  where  the  principal  weapons  of  offense  employed  can  be 
most  effectively  used  against  the  enemy  and  least  effectively  resisted 
by  him. 

The  general  and  underlying  principle  that  governs  in  tactics  as 
well  as  in  strategy  is  that  embodied  in  the  word  "  concentration." 
Aim  to  be  stronger  at  the  point  of  contact  than  your  enemy. 

The  earliest  known  attempt  to  formulate  in  naval  warfare  a  definite 
fighting  formation  and  doctrine  of  naval  battle  is  that  set  forth  in 
an  unpublished  treatise  on  naval  warfare,  written  about  1530  by  a 
Spaniard,  Alonzo  de  Chavez,  one  of  a  -group  of  naval  writers  and 
experts  who  flourished  at  the  court  of  the  Emperor  Charles  V  in  the 
first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century. 

51 


52  NAVAL    TRAINING   CRUISE    FOR    CIVILIANS. 

This  treatise  was  discovered  by  Capt.  Fernandez  Duroz,  a  well- 
known  historian  of  the  Spanish  Navy,  amongst  the  manuscripts  in 
the  library  of  the  Academy  of  History  at  Madrid. 

The  following  extracts  from  this  treatise  are  exceedingly  interest- 
ing, as  showing  how  little  principles  have  changed  and  how  the 
application  of  principles  have  been  affected  by  the  instruments  of 
naval  warfare. 

When  the  time  for  battle  is  at  hand  the  captain  general  should  order  the 
whole  fleet  to  come  together,  that  he  may  set  them  in  order,  since  a  regular 
order  is  no  less  necessary  in  a  fleet  of  ships  for  giving  battle  to  another  fleet 
than  it  is  in  an  army  of  soldiers  for  giving  battle  to  another  army. 

In  that  paragraph  we  find  a  definite  expression  of  the  principle 
of  concentration — of  the  drawing  together  of  the  forces  and  their 
disposition  in  order  of  battle. 

The  extract  continues: 

In  a  fleet  the  captain  general  ought  to  order  the  strongest  and  largest  ships 
to  form  in  one  quarter,  to  attack,  grapple,  board,  and  break  up  the  enemy,  and 
the  lesser  and  weaker  ships  in  another  quarter  apart,  with  their  artillery  and 
ammunitions  to  harass,  pursue,  and  give  chnse  to  the  enemy  if  he  flies,  and 
to  come  to  the  rescue  wherever  there  is  most  need. 

In  that  paragraph  we  see  exemplified  the  principle  of  disposition 
of  forces  with  a  view  to  their  proper  employment  in  an  action,  and 
it  is  easily  translated  to-day  into  a  proper  disposition  of  battle- 
ships, destroyers,  and  scouts. 

The  extract  continues: 

Having  directed  and  set  in  order  all  the  aforesaid  matters,  the  captain  gen- 
eral should  then  marshal  the  fleet  in  the  following  manner : 

He  should  then  consider  his  position  and  the  direction  of  the  wind  and  how 
to  get  advantage  of  it  with  'his  fleet.  Then  he  should  consider  the  order  in 
which  the  enemy  is  formed,  whether  they  come  in  a  close  body  or  in  line  ahead, 
whether  the  great  ships  are  in  the  center  or  on  the  flanks,  and  in  what  station 
is  the  flagship;  and  all  the  other  considerations  which  are  essential  to  the 
case  he  should  take  in  hand. 

By  all  means  he  should  do  his  best  that  his  fleet  shall  have  the  weather 
gauge;  for  if  there  were  no  other  advantage,  he  will  always  keep  free  from 
being  blinded  by  the  smoke  of  the  guns,  so  as  to  be  able  to  see  one  to  another: 
and  for  the  enemy  it  will  be  the  contrary,  because  the  smoke  and  lire  of  our 
fleet  and  of  their  own  will  keep  driving  upon  them  and  blinding  them  in  such 
manner  that  they  will  not  be  able  to  see  one  another,  and  they  will  fight  among 
themselves  from  not  being  able  to  recognize  each  other. 

The  advantages  to  be  sought  for  in  the  approach  to  battle  could 
scarcely  be  more  fully  expressed  than  in  the  paragraphs  just  read. 

The  extract  continues: 

The  captain  general  having  now  arrayed  his  whole  fleet  in  one  of  the  afore- 
said orders,  according  as  it  seems  best  to  him  for  giving  battle,  and  every- 
thing being  ready  for  battle,  all  shall  bear  in  mind  the  signals  he  shall  have 
appointed  with  flag  or  shot  or  topsail  that  all  may  know  at  what  time  to  attack 
oi1  board,  or  come  to  rescue,  or  retreat,  or  give  chase.  The  which  signals  all 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  53 

must  'understand  and  ivniember^  what  they  are  to  do  when  such  signals  are 
made,  and  likewise  the  armed  boats  shall  take  the  same  care  and  remember 
what  they  ought  to  do  and  perform  their  duty. 

In  that  paragraph  we  have  very  clearly  expressed  the  principles  of 
indoctrination  and  coordination,  two  major  principles  of  tactics 
second  in  importance  only  to  the  one  general  principle  of  concentra- 
tion. 

As  you  will .  observe,  Chavez  proposed  in  this  regulation  that  all 
the  forces  were  to  act  together  and  in  mutual  support,  which  is 
coordination  pure  and  simple ;  that  by  a  simple  signal  they  were  to 
do  a  certain  thing  in  a  manner  in  which  no  doubt  they  were  trained, 
for  he  says  they  are  to  remember  what  they  are  to  do  when  such 
signals  are  made  and  they  are  to  perform  their  duty.  The  inference 
is  very  strong  that  the  principle  of  indoctrination  as  we  express  it 
to-day  was  well  understood — a  principle  that  implies  that  all  units 
of  a  force  will  play  the  game  according  to  rules  tested  by  experience 
and  accepted  and  understood  alike. 

The  chapter  dealing  with  battle  itself  is  not  so  fruitful  of  anal- 
ogies, but  it  is  very  interesting  as  a  picture  of  a  naval  combat  in  the 
days  of  sails.  The  instructions  are  in  some  respects  very  naive  and 
in  other  respects  quite  amusing  to  us  noAv,  in  the  light  of  swift  ves- 
sels of  steam,  precision  of  movement,  and  weapons  of  long  range. 

I  will  quote  a  part  of  the  chapter  on  battle : 

As  they  [the  vessels]  come  into  range  they  shall  commence  to  play  their  most 
powerful  artillery,  taking  care  that  the  first  shots  do  not  miss,  for,  as  I  have 
said,  when  the  first  shots  hit,  fnasmuch  as  they  are  the  largest,  they  strike  great 
dread  and  terror  into  the  enemy;  for,  seeing  how  great  they  suffer,  they  think 
how  much  greater  it  will  be  at  close  range,  and  so  mayhap  they  will  not  want  to 
fight  but  strike  and  surrender  or  fly,  so  as  not  to  come  to  close  quarters. 

In  that  paragraph  the  principle  of  getting  in  the  first  blow,  or,  as 
we  express  it  in  naval  tactics,  the  priority  of  fire  effect,  is  clearty  ex- 
pressed, although  we  would  hardly  go  so  far  as  to  make  the  claim 
that  he  does  of  the  advantage  to  be  derived  from  it. 

To  continue  the  extract: 

Having  so  begun  firing,  they  shall  always  first  play  the  largest  guns  which  are 
on  the  side  or  board  toward  the  enemy,  and  likewise  they  shall  move  over  from 
the  other  side  those  guns  that  have  wheeled  carriages  to  run  on  the  upper  part 
of  the  deck  and  poop.  And  then  when  nearer  they  should  use  the  smaller  ones, 
and  by  no  means  should  they  fire  them  at  first,  for  afar  off  they  will  do  no  hurt, 
and  besides  the  enemy  will  know  there  is  dearth  of  good  artillery  and  will  take 
better  heart  to  make  or  abide  an  attack.  And  after  having  come  to  close  quar- 
ters then  they  ought  to  play  the  light  artillery.  And  so  soon  as  they  come  to 
board  or  grapple  all  the  other  kinds  of  arms  shall  be  used  *  *  *  first,  mis- 
siles such  as  harpoons  and  stones,  handguns  and  crossbows,  and  then  the  fire 
balls,  as  well  from  the  tops  as  from  the  castle,  and  at  the  same  time  the  caltrops, 
linstocks,  stinkballs,  grenades,  and  the  scorpions  for  the  sail  and  rigging. 

At  this  moment  they  should  sound  all  the  trumpets,  and  with  a  lusty  cheer 
from  every  ship  at  once,  they  should  grapple  and  fight  with  every  kind  of 


54  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

weapon,  those  with  staffed  scythes  or  shear  hooks  cutting  the  enemy's  rigging 
and  the  others  with  the  fire  instruments  raining  fire  down  on  the  enemy's  rig- 
ging and  crew.  The  captain  general  should  encourage  all  in  the  battle,  and 
because  he  can  not  be  heard  with  his  voice,  he  should  bid  the  signal  for  action  to 
be  made  with  his  trumpet  or  flag  or  with  his  topsail. 

The  flagship  should  take  great  care  not  to  grapple  another,  for  then  he  could 
not  see  what  is  passing  in  the  battle  nor  control  it.  And  besides,  his  own  side  in 
coming  to  help  and  support  him  might  find  themselves  out  of  action;  or,  per- 
adventure,  if  any  accident  befell  him,  the  rest  of  the  fleet  would  be  left  without 
guidance  and  would  not  have  care  to  succor  one  another,  but  so  far  as  they  were 
able  would  fly  or  take  their  own  course.  Accordingly,  the  captain  general  should 
never  be  of  the  first  who  are  to  grapple  nor  should  he  enter  into  the  press,  so 
that  he  may  watch  the  fighting  and  bring  succor  where  it  is  most  needed.  *  *  * 

The  boats  in  like  manner  should  not  close  in  till  they  see  the  ships  grappled, 
and  then  they  should  come  up  on  the  opposite  side  in  the  manner  stated  above 
and  carry  out  their  special  duties  as  occasion  arises  either  with  their  bases 
(breech-loading  boat  guns)  of  which  each  shall  carry  its  own,  and  with  their 
harquebuses,  or  else  by  getting  close  in  and  wedging  up  the  rudders,  or  cutting 
them  and  their  gear  away,  or  by  leaping  in  upon  the  enemy,  if  they  can  climb 
in  without  being  seen,  or  from  outside  by  setting  fire  to  them  or  scuttling  them 
with  augers. 

This  curious  duty  of  the  armed  boats  has  been  more  fully  explained 
by  Chavez  in  the  section  of  the  treatise  on  single  ship  actions,  as 
follows : 

The  ships  being  grappled,  the  boat  ready  equipped  should  put  off  to  the  ene- 
my's ship  under  her  poop,  and  get  fast  hold  of  her,  and  first  cut  away  her  rudder, 
or  at  least  jamb  it  with  a  half  a  dozen  wedges  in  such  wise  that  it  can  not 
steer  or  move,  and  if  there  is  a  chance  for  more,  without  being  seen,  bore  half  a 
dozen  auger  holes  below  the  water  line,  so  that  the  ship  founders. 

There  does  not  seem  to  be  anything  they  did  not  think  of  in  those 
days. 

For  instance,  to  most  of  us  the  idea  of  using  a  smoke  screen  seems 
novel  and  comparatively  new.  But  there  is  the  best  of  evidence  that 
the  use  of  a  smoke  screen  was  well  understood  even  in  the  days  of 
sailing  ship  combat. 

In  the  fleet  instructions  drawn  up  by  Thomas  Audley  by  order  of 
Henry  VIII  we  find  the  following : 

If  he  [the  admiral]  see  a  hard  match  with  the  enemy  and  be  too  leeward, 
then  to  gather  his  fleet  together  and  seem  to  flee,  and  flee  indeed  for  this  pur- 
pose till  the  enemy  draw  within  gunshot.  And  when  the  enemy  doth  shoot, 
then  he  [the  admiral]  shall  shoot  again,  and  make  all  the  smoke  he  can  to  the 
intent  the  enemy  shall  not  see  the  ships,  and  then  suddenly  hale  up  his  tackle 
aboard  (hard  aboard  his  tacks)  and  have  the  wind  of  the  enemy.  And  by  this 
policy  it  is  possible  to  win  the  weather  gauge  of  the  enemy,  and  then  he"  hath  a 
great  advantage,  and  this  may  well  be  done  if  it  be  well  foreseen  beforehand, 
and  every  captain  and  master  made  privy  to  it  beforehand  at  whatsoever  time 
such  disadvantage  shall  happen. 

That  concentration  of  force  was  fully  understood  as  a  fundamental 
principle  of  tactics  in  the  earliest  days  of  the  area  of  sails  is  clearly 


NAVAL   TEAINING   CEUISE   FOE   CIVILIANS.  55 

evidenced  in  the  writings  of  Morogue,  a  famous  French  writer  on 
tactics,  in  the  year  1763.  He  settled  the  question  of  large  versus 
small  ships  by  saying  that  since  large  ships  carried  more  and  heavier 
guns  a  fleet  composed  of  these  is  better  than  a  larger  number  of  small 
ones,  because  it  is  able  to  deliver  a  heavier  fire  than  the  enemy  within 
the  same  space. 

For  instance,  if  you  are  able  to  carry  in  8  ships  the  same  battery 
power  that  your  enemy  has  distributed  in  12  or  16  ships  you  have  a 
very  manifest  natural  advantage,  because  you  are  able  to  direct  a 
very  superior  gun  fire  against  a  portion  of  the  enemy  line  with  the 
probability  of  throwing  a  part  of  his  line  out  of  action  by  reason  of 
being  out  of  range  of  your  line.  In  any  event  your  average  mean 
range  would  be  much  shorter  than  his,  which  would  give  you  great 
advantage. 

The  movements  of  ships  and  of  fleets  are  no  longer  dependent  upon 
winds  and  tides.  A  modern  ship  goes  where  she  will  and  when  she 
will  in  waters  that  will  carry  her  with  mathematical  precision  and 
at  relatively  high  speed.  The  ranges  of  the  gun  and  the  torpedo  have 
increased  so  that  to-day,  instead  of  the  action  beginning  at  ranges 
within  1,000  yards  and  seeking  a  decision  by  grappling  and  boarding, 
we  find  the  action  beginning  with  opposing  vessels  barely  outlined 
above  the  horizon  to  each  other  and  the  decision  possible  while  still 
separated  by  thousands  of  yards. 

The  fundamental  principles  governing  tactical  action  remain  the 
same  as  they  have  always  been.  Those  principles  are  simple  and 
easily  understood.  But  changes  in  weapons,  greater  capabilities  in 
the  use  of  them,  and  competition  sharpened  to  keenness  by  the  dis- 
turbed condition  of  the  political  world,  and  the  necessity  of  safe- 
guarding national  interests  have  produced  a  great  intensity  of  naval 
tactical  study  and  thought  in  the  past  15  years.  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that,  owing  to  this  intensive  study,  tactical  ideas  have  under- 
gone a  development  since  the  beginning  of  this  twentieth  century 
greater  than  that  for  all  the  centuries  back  to  the  beginning  of  the 
sail  era.  The  instruments  of  naval  combat  are  being  constantly 
developed  and  improved,  both  in  respect  to  types  of  ships  and  the 
weapons  that  they  use. 

It  becomes  then  the  primary  duty  of  the  naval  tactician  to  study 
the  capabilities  of  the  types  individually  and  collectively.  He  must 
know  not  only  how  to  get  the  most  possible  out  of  any  single  unit,  he 
must  know  how  to  group  and  handle  those  units  to  get  the  most  out 
of  them  collectively. 

Having  gained  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  capabilities  of  types, 
the  naval  tactician's  next  duty  is  to  study  the  employment  of  the 
various  types  in  order  that  he  may  bring  into  play  in  the  combat 
the  most  efficient  use  of  the  principal  arm  represented  in  the  type. 


56  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE    FOR   CIVILIANS. 

In  a  tactical  encounter  between  forces  on  each  side  consisting 
of  battleships,  battle  cruisers,  scouts,  and  torpedo  vessels,  the  greatest 
assurance  of  success  will  lie  with  that  side  which  employs  the  various 
elements  under  command  to  the  fullest  extent  of  their  capabilities 
in  concerted  and  simultaneous  attack.  You  must  know  what  func- 
tions your  scouts  should  fulfill,  train  them  to  a  knowledge  of  their 
tactical  functions  and  you  will  have  a  right  to  expect  a  fulfillment  on 
the  day  of  battle. 

You  must  know  what  functions  your  destroyers  are  capable  of 
fulfilling,  train  them  to  it,  and  demand  a  fulfillment  of  it  on  the 
day  of  battle.  They  will  meet  the  demand. 

So  with  all  the  types  in  the  formation.  Nothing  must  be  neglected ; 
everything  must  be  coordinated ;  and  the  instruments  placed  in  your 
hands  will  serve  their  highest  purpose  and,  other  things  being  equal. 
will  gain  for  you  the  victory. 

On  the  general  principle  that  one  can  never  be  too  strong  in  a 
tactical  field,  it  is  a  violation  of  a  sound  tactical  principle  to  fight 
without  bringing  into  action  every  effective  element  of  your  strength. 
If  you  do  not  do  this — if  you  have,  for  example,  destroyers  within 
the  tactical  field  that  you  wish  to  save  for  some  possible  action  after 
the  main  action  is  decided — the  possibility  is  that  you  will  never  have 
a  chance  so  to  employ  them  if  the  enemy,  having  destroyers  nlso. 
throws  them  into  the  fight  to  assist  in  bringing  about  the  main  de- 
cision in  his  favor. 

In  battle,  ulterior  projects  are  dangerous  and  most  often  fatal. 
The  only  thing  that  counts  is  victory  in  the  battle.  Other  things 
being  equal,  the  man  who  enters  battle  with  an  ulterior  purpose  in 
view,  other  than  to  gain  the  decision  on  the  spot,  will  be  defeated 
both  in  the  battle  and  in  the  attainment  of  his  ulterior  purpose. 

No  precept  of  war  has  more  force  than  that  which  demands  that 
"  exclusiveness  of  purpose "  should  characterize  the  action  of  the 
leaders.  Exclusiveness  of  purpose  means  simply  one  thing  at  a 
time,  and  that  the  main  thing. 

It  is  a  characteristic  of  all  great  leaders.  Grant  displayed  that 
attribute  to  a  marked  degree. 

Gen.  Wilson,  in  his  book  Under  the  Old  Flag,  tells  an  amusing 
story  that  illustrates  this  characteristic  of  Grant's.  He  says : 

Sherman  commented  freely  on  the  strong  as  well  as  the  weak  points  of 
Grant's  character,  and  in  the  midst  of  the  conversation  looked  up  suddenly, 
with  the  glow  of  the  camp  fire  on  his  deeply  marked  features,  and  exclaimed, 
"  Wilson,  I  am  a  damned  sight  smarter  man  that  Grant.  I  know  a  great  deal 
more  about  war,  military  history,  strategy,  and  grand  tactics  than  he  does ; 
I  know  more  about  organization,  supply,  and  administration,  and  about  every- 
thing else  than  he  does,  but  I'll  tell  you  where  he  beats  me  and  where  he  beats 
the  world.  He  don't  care  a  damn  for  what  the  enemy  does -out  of  his  sight, 
but  it  scares  me  like  hell.  I  am  more  nervous  than  he  is.  I  am  more  likely 


NAVAL    TRAIXING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  57 


to  change  my  orders  or  to  countermarch  my  command  than  luj  is.  He  uses 
such  information  as  he  lias  according  to  his  best  judgment ;  he  issues  his 
orders  and  does  his  level  best  to  carry  them  out  without  much  reference  to 
what  is  going  on  about  him.  and  so  far  experience  seems  to  have  fully  justified 
him." 

There  is  no  greater  force  in  tactics  than  that  which  embodies  the 
spirit  of  the  offensive.  The  history  of  warfare  unfailingly  supports 
that  assertion. 

Battle  is  where  the  contests  of  two  opposing  wills  comes  to  the 
point  of  decision.  In  every  case  it  is  our  will  in  conflict  with  the 
enemy's  will.  Every  element  therefore  that  can  contribute  toward  a 
favorable  decision  for  us  is  of  tremendous  value. 

We  know  that  we  can  limit  the  free  exercise  of  the  enemy's  will  if 
we  are, ready  for  and  are  resolved  to  take  the  offensive.  He  may  be 
equally  so  resolved,  in  which  case  the  issue  will  depend  upon  other 
considerations;  but  if  he  be  not  so  resolved,  our  battle  is  already 
partly  won  because  AVC  have  forced  his  will  into  partial  submission 
to  our  own. 

In  the  spirit  of  the  offensive  all  the  lofty  attributes  of  military 
character  find  their  fullest  freedom;  initiative,  resolution,  resource- 
fulness, courage,  dash,  and  intrepidity,  combined  with  loyalty  on  the 
part  of  every  subordinate,  reach  their  highest  expression,  get  their 
fullest  play,  and  are  in  themselves  inspirations  to  victory. 

Naval  tactics  is  not  an  expression  of  the  art  of  maneuver  on  the 
sea ;  it  is  an  expression  of  the  art  of  fighting  on  the  sea.  Maneuvering 
is  a  means  to  the  end  and  is  essential  to  give  full  play  to  your  tacti- 
cal conceptions,  to  secure  position  of  advantage  in  the  approach  to 
combat,  and  to  take  advantage  quickly  and  properly  of  openings  in 
the  attack  of  the  adversary,  and  to  reach  a  favorable  decision  as  soon 
as  possible. 

Surprise  is  a  strong  element  in  naval  tactics.  If  in  an  action  you 
have  something  up  your  sleeve  that  you  can  put  over  on  your  enemy, 
something  that  he  is  not  prepared  to  counter  successfully,  you  may 
turn  the  tide  of  a  doubtful  battle  definitely  in  your  favor.  If,  for 
example,  you  have  destroyers  trained  in  the  tactics  of  daylight  at- 
tack on  capital  ships  and  with  their  leaders  imbued  with  the  offensive 
spirit,  a  vigorous  attack  upon  the  enemy  column  in  the  early  stage 
of  an  action,  supported  by  the  gun  -fire  of  your  own  heavy  units, 
would  be  bound  to  give  you  a  decisive  advantage  if  the  enemy,  for 
instance,  did  not  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  daylight  torpedo  attack 
and  was  unprepared  to  counter  it. 

The  greatest  and  perhaps  the  all-embodying  principle  in  naval 
tactics  is  comprised  in  the  one  word  "  concentration." 

Concentration  tactically  means  this:  A  superior  force  brought  to 
bear  with  full  effect  and  with  dispatch  upon  a  portion  of  the  enemy 


58  NAVAL  TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

force  which  is  unable  for  the  time  being  to  be  effectively  supported 
by  the  remainder  of  his  force. 

The  principle  is  simple  enough,  but  in  its  execution  lies  the 
•difficulty. 

Its  successful  execution  involves  close  and  constant  coordination 
•of  effort  and  of  purpose  of  every  unit  engaged. 

Coordination  means  simply  teamwork.  Every  element  of  the 
force  must  know  just  what  it  and  all  other  elements  are  to  do  in  the 
•game  and  just  how  to  do  it.  This  means  training  of  the  most  in- 
tensive kind.  It  implies  full  knowledge  of  and  unyielding  loyalty 
to  the  plan  of  the  commander  in  chief  and  to  his  ideas  of  the  method 
of  executing  his  plan.  When  all  the  units  of  a  force  are  so  trained 
they  are  said  to  be  indoctrinated. 

Indoctrination  presupposes  not  only  a  knowledge  of  the  capabili- 
ties of  types  and  their  best  tactical  employment,  as  for  instance  the 
capabilities  and  best  tactical  use  to  be  made  in  action  of  destroyers, 
of  submarines,  of  scouts,  of  fast  wings,  of  battleships,  but  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  use  of  the  various  types  in  combination  with  each  other. 

Such  mutual  understanding  diffused  throughout  any  command 
makes  for  loyal  and  effective  cooperation,  insures  effective  coordina- 
tion, reduces  what  is  called  the  friction  of  war,  and  is  a  forecast  of 
victory  in  battle. 

We  have  then  in  the  field  of  naval  tactics  three  mutually  dependent 
elements  which,  rightly  understood  and  rightly  applied,  go  far 
toward  insuring  success  in  battle. 

Indoctrination  makes  effective  coordination  possible. 

Effective  coordination  makes  concentration  possible. 

Effective  concentration,  combined  with  the  spirit  of  the  offensive, 
makes  victory  probable. 

Nothing  is  certain  in  war  or  in  battle,  chance  plays  an  important 
part.  But  we  will  have  reduced  the  opportunity  for  that  chance, 
which  is  commonly  known  as  fate,  to  operate  against  us  in  our  strug- 
gle for  victory  if  we  have  secured  in  our  favor  those  other  elements 
•that  constitute  in  the  aggregate  the  most  powerful  force  in  tactics. 


NAVAL  STRATEGY. 


By  Commander  C.  T.  YOGELGESANG,  United  States  Navy. 


National  policy  is  the  breeding  ground  of  war.  National  policy  is 
in  every  country  on  the  globe  within  the  keeping  of  the  monarch  or 
-executive  and  of  the  statesman  that  represent  and  control  the  gov- 
ernment. They,  and  they  alone,  are  the  arbiters  of  peace  and  war. 
When  diplomacy  fails  and  national  policy  is  thwarted  in  its  aims  by 
the  national  policy  of  another  power;  the  natural  and  inevitable  result 
can  be  but  one  of  two  things — either  a  sacrifice  of  national  interests 
by  the  reshaping  of  national  policy  to  adjust  it  to  the  pressure  that 
comes  from  the  national  policy  of  a  rival  nation  or  a  resort  to  armed 
force  to  secure  national  interests. 

The  determination  once  made  to  employ  armed  force  to  attain  the 
«nd  in  view,  strategy  steps  into  the  foreground  and  becomes  the  in- 
strument for  the  execution  of  the  national  will. 

Manifestly,  then  strategy  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  policy,  and 
no  nation  can  endure,  however  altruistic  its  motives,  however  right- 
eous its  aims,  that  does  not  provide  a  coequal  development  of  its 
strategy  and  policy. 

Since  the  beginning  of  time  war  has  been  the  final  arbiter  in  the 
conflicting  claims  of  national  interests. 

If  the  history  of  our  time  could  show  that  this  method  of  arbitra- 
ment were  on  the  wane,  that  wars  were  increasingly  less  frequent, 
that  clashes  between  vital  national  interests  were  being  peacefully 
settled,  we  might  be  justified  in  assuming  that  there  is  a  tendency 
toward  the  settlement  of  international  disputes  by  some  means  short 
of  war. 

But  far  from  that  being  the  case,  the  evidences  in  our  own  time 
proclaim  loudly  that  not  only  has  war  not  become  less  frequent  as  a 
means  of  settling  vital  international  controversies,  but  it  has  become 
increasingly  violent  and  intense. 

In  the  history  of  our  own  country,  war  has  been  the  instrument  of 
our  policy  in  every  generation.  Never  more  than  30  years  has  elapsed 
from  the  close  of  one  war  to  the  beginning  of  another. 

It  is  true  that  all  of  these  wars  were  not  foreign  wars,  some  of 
them  were  Indian  wars  and  one  was  the  great  Civil  War.  They  were 
nevertheless  wars  waged  in  furtherance  of  policy  and  it  is  submitted 
that  if  domestic  policies  need  the  resort  to  arms  for  their  final  settle- 

59 


60  NAVAL    TRAINING    CRUISE    FOR    CIVILIANS. 

ment  it  is  idle  to  claim  that  foreign  policies  will  submit  to  any 
gentler  treatment. 

When,  therefore,  the  statesmen  fail  in  their  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem through  the  medium  of  diplomacy,  they  must  perforce  call  upon 
their  admirals  and  generals  for  their  solution  of  the  problem  through 
the  medium  of  strategy. 

Now  what  is  strategy?  What  is  this  mysterious  power  vested  in 
the  student  and  practitioner  of  war  that  is  capable  of  solving  the 
problems  of  policy  when  all  else  fails? 

Strategy  is  the  application  of  common  sense  to  the  preparation 
and  to  the  conduct  of  war. 

That  seems  to  be  a  very  simple  statement,  hardly  worthy  of  ac- 
ceptance as  a  definition  of  strategy :  but  it  is  nevertheless  the  whole 
tiling  in  a  nutshell. 

But  when  we  define  it  thus  simply,  as  we  have  defined  it  here,  we 
have  by  no  means  made  simpler  its  execution. 

The  difficulty  in  strategy  lies  in  its  execution',  in  the  means  and 
methods  that  we  employ  to  apply  common-sense  principles  to  the 
conduct  of  war. 

It  is  in  the  application  of  accepted  common-sense  principles  in 
war  that  complexities  assail  us.  for  we  are  confronted  then  by  an 
infinite  number  of  troublesome  factors  like  the  will  of  the  enemy, 
the  wind  and  weather,  fog.  insufficient  or  inefficient  preparation, 
bad  communications  or  false  reports — all  these  things,  in  short, 
which  go  to  make  up  friction  in  war. 

Now.  if  friction  in  war  were  a  known  or  calculable  quantity  we 
should  have  no  great  difficulty  in  evaluating  it,  and  strategy  might 
then  become  a  pure  science.  But  in  war  we  are  always  dealing  with 
variables  and  with  unknown  quantities,  and  the  art  of  the  leader, 
which  we  express  by  strategy,  is  measured  by  the  skill  with  which 
he  bends  the  variables  and  the  unknown  quantities  in  his  problem 
to  the  attainment  of  the  end  in  view — the  end  in  view  being  success 
in  war.  which  means  the  triumph  of  national  will — the  attainment 
of  the  aims  of  our  policy. 

While  strategy  would  seem  to  be  essentially  a  function  of  war.  it 
must  not  be  overlooked  that  it  has  a  very  vital  and  important  peace- 
time function. 

And  it  is  that  peace-time  function  that  wTe  in  our  country  are 
most  prone  to  minimize  or  neglect  or  altogether  overlook. 

Strategy,  like  anything  else,  is  inoperative  without  means.  It  is 
fti  times  of  peace  that  the  means  should  be  provided  to  give  effect  to 
the  operations  of  strategy. 

The  first  military  task  of  strategy  is  the  preparation  of  Avar  power 
and  the  disposition  of  forces  with  a  view  to  their  proper  concentra- 
tion when  trouble  is  threatening. 


XAVAI.    Ti;.\IXIX(i    CRUISE    FOR    CIVILIANS.  61 

In  the  preparation  of  war  power,  if  we  revert  to  our  original  defi- 
nition of  strategy,  we  must  use  common  sense.  Xow,  what  is  the 
common-sense  view  of  it? 

To  begin  with,  we  must  recognize  things  as  they  are  in  interna- 
tional relationship  and  not  disguise  them  into  a  semblance  of  things 
that  we  might  wish  them  to  be.  It  is  not  difficult  to  discover  ques- 
tions at  issue  between  us  and  other  nations.  Where  causes  of  fric- 
tion exist  we  should  study  the  military  power  of  the  other  nation 
concerned,  its  developed  and  latent  resources  for  war,  its  credit, 
the  temper  of  its  people,  the  character  of  its  civil  and  military  lead- 
ership, and  we  should  make  certain  that  our  resources  for  war  are 
developed  to  a  degree  that  will  give  us  the  necessary  preponderance 
to  insure  our  success,  other  things  being  equal. 

Have  we  done  this  in  the  past  so  that  we  may  now  say  that  if  a 
question  at  issue  leads  to  war.  strategy  will  have  a  free  rein  and 
not  be  charged  Avith  an  overload  that  virtually  hobbles  it?  Assur- 
edly not. 

In  our  national  actions  in  the  past — not  always  in  harmony  with 
national  character — Ave  find  the  insidious  doctrine  of  improvisation 
substituted  for  the  doctrine  of  preparedness.  We  have  therefore 
been  unready  in  a  military  sense  for  every  crisis,  and  the  result  has 
been  a  tremendous  wastage  of  life  and  wealth  in  the  war  that  ensued, 
because  in  all  the  years  of  peace  we  neglected  our  strategy,  we  failed 
to  apply  common  sense  to  the  preparation  for  war. 

We  have  been  banking  upon  the  comparative  isolation  of  our  posi- 
tion.  upon  nature,  upon  the  perils  of  the  deep,  upon  moral  force,  and 
upon  trust  in  God,  and  we  have  failed  to  perceive  how  utterly  im- 
•ical  and  shallow  is  that  faith  as  compared  with  a  faith  founded 
equally  strongly  upon  moral  force  and  upon  a  trust  in  God,  but. 
above  all.  founded  upon  knowledge  that  Providence  operates  on  the 
side  of  preparedness. 

Xaval  strategy  in  respect  to  its  peace-time  function  dictates  and 
demands  certain  things  that  can  not  be  disregarded  without  peril 
to  the  Xation. 

Xaval  strateg}^  demands  a  continued  and  progressive  upbuilding 
of  the  Xavy.  We  know  what  naval  forces  in  respect  to  numbers  and 
types  our  possible  opponents  have.  There  can  be  no  real  secret  about 
that.  We  must  have  a  naval  force  at  least  equal  in  numbers  and  types 
to  that  possessed  by  the  nation  having  the  strongest  naval  force  or 
we  shall  not  have  satisfied  the  reasonable  demands  of  strategy. 

We  are  prone  to  estimate  naval  strength  on  the  basis  of  numbers 
alone  of  combatant  units.  The  public  is  gratified  and  satisfied  if  for 
instance  they  are  told  that  we  have  50  battleships,  10  battle  cruisers. 
and  a  due  proportion  of  scouts,  destroyers,  and  submarines. 


62  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

What  the  public  does  not  know  or  realize  is  that  those  units  of 
force  are  not  operative  strategically  beyond  a  short  distance  from 
their  coast  in  time  of  war  unless  provision  can  be  made  for  the 
replenishment  of  their  consumable  stores — notably  fuel  and  ammu- 
nition. 

Therefore  strategy  demands  a  fleet  of  auxiliaries — fuel,  repair, 
ammunition,  supply,  and  hospital  ships. 

More  than  all  this  strategy  demands  both  for  its  offensive  and  its 
defensive  operations  bases  within  our  continental  limits  and  in 
outlying  possessions. 

This  is  another  of  the  functions  of  strategy  that  belongs  to  peace- 
time preparation. 

All  of  this  matter  of  bases,  their  local  defense,  their  equipment 
with  dry  docks  and  machine  shops  and  stores  for  the  docking,  repair, 
and  refit  of  vessels  is  a  part  of  the  preparation  of  war  power  which 
is  a  function  of  strategy. 

It  is  in  the  preparation  of  war  power  that  strategy  comes  into 
intimate  relationship  with  another  element  of  war,  which  we  give 
the  name  of  logistics.  Strategy  surveys  and  studies  the  situation, 
selects  the  position,  decides  upon  the  strength  and  resources  to  be 
supplied,  and  allots  to  logistics  the  task  of  executing  the  necessary 
details.  Logistics  is  the  science  of  preparedness,  the  handmaiden  of 
strategy,  in  whose  keeping  alone  are  entrusted  the  secrets  of  the  art 
of  preparing  for  and  conducting  war. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  you  gentlemen  should  endeavor  to  penetrate 
the  mists  and  surprise  the  secrets  of  strategy.  That  would  be  futile, 
as  you  have  not  the  time  nor  the  necessary  training.  You  have  no 
doubt,  I  affirm  without  fear  of  denial,  a  full  fund  of  common  sense 
trained  particularly  along  the  lines  of  your  business  and  your  pro- 
fessions, but  you  can  not  be  presumed  to  have  necessarily  a  trained 
common  sense  along  lines  of  naval  strategy.  Sufficient  it  will  be  for 
you  to  realize  and  to  carry  back  with  you  to  the  people  that  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  naval  strategy,  to  have  an  idea  what  it  means,  how 
intimately  it  is  concerned  with  our  national  life  and  welfare,  that  it 
is  the  profession  of  the  naval  officer,  and  that  it  should  have  a  seat 
in  the  high  councils  of  state  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war.  With  your 
influence  upon  the  public  mind  directed  toward  the  recognition  of 
these  facts,  you  will  go  a  long  way  toward  bringing  into  clearer  light 
the  necessities  of  our  national  defense. 

The  next  task  of  strategy,  its  Avar-time  function,  is  the  proper 
employment  of  the  means  provided  to  attain  the  end  in  view — to 
achieve  success  in  war.  Here  is  where  our  will  soon  meets  with  the 
independent  will  of  the  enemy,  and  new  and  greater  complexities 
enter  into  the  solution  of  a  problem. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  6£ 

In  dealing  with  this  phase  of  strategy  we  must  invoke  again  our 
original  definition  that  strategy  is  the  application  of  common  sense 
to  the  conduct  of  war.  We  will  be  able  to  prove  easily  that  strategy 
is  good  or  bad  depending  whether  common  sense  is  used  or  violated. 

We  have  many  expressions  in  strategy  that  belong  to  the  technique 
of  the  subject,  such  as  interior  lines,  concentration  of  force,  concen- 
tration of  effort,  exclusiveness  of  purpose,  and  many  others,  but  they 
all  mean  about  the  same  thing,  as  is  conveyed  in  the  remark  credited, 
to  an  unlettered  Confederate  cavalry  leader  in  the  Civil  War — 
t;  gettin'  thar  fastest  with  the  mostest  men." 

To  illustrate  what  is  meant  by  the  employment  of  common  sense 
in  the  conduct  of  Avar  and  the  grievous  consequences  of  its  lack,  no- 
more  fruitful  example  is  afforded  in  my  estimation  than  that  con- 
tained in  the  military  operations  in^the  Virginia  campaigns  in  our 
Civil  War  from  1861  to  1863. 

The  northern  Army,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  at  all  times 
in  that  theater  of  war  in  overwhelming  superiority  in  numbers,  ap- 
proximately 2^  to  1;  in  contrast  to  its  adversary,  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  is  was  well  supplied  with  every  means  to  carry 
on  successful  war,  and  no  one  can  deny  that  in  courage,  steadiness, 
and  discipline  it  was  in  every  respect  the  equal,  man  for  man,  with 
the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Yet  during  those  days  on  the  peninsula,  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley., 
and  on  the  fields  east  of  the  mountains  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
suffered  defeat  after  defeat  and  the  days  were  dark  indeed  for  the 
Union  cause. 

What  was  the  cause?  It  was  nothing  more  or  less  than  a  lack  of" 
common  sense  in  planning  for  and  carrying  on  the  operations. 
History  tells  us  plainly  that  it  was  due  to  a  blindness  to  the  main 
essential.  Pitted  against  the  Union  generals  were  two  who  may  be 
said,  without  fear  of  contradiction,  to  have  had  a  far  deeper  knowl- 
edge of  the  art  of  war,  a  much  clearer  conception  of  strategy  than 
was  possessed  by  any  of  their  opponents  up  to  that  time. 

In  no  campaigns  of  our  history  is  the  contrast  more  marked  be- 
tween good  military  judgment  and  its  lack;  between  common  sense 
and  its  absence. 

The  northern  Army  had  for  its  mission,  assigned  to  it  by  admin- 
istrative authority  in  Washington,  acquiesced  in  by  the  several  com- 
manders in  chief  of  greater  political  than  strategical  insight,  and 
demand  by  popular  clamor  the  slogan  "  On  to  Richmond." 

The  Confederate  Army  intervening  was  a  mere  incident.  The 
Union  generals  hoped  by  outmaneuvering  their  enemy  to  gain  their 
objective. 

The  Confederate  generals,  Lee  and  Jackson,  knew  that  it  devolved 
upon  them  to  safeguard  Richmond,  which  was  at  the  same  time  the- 


64  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

capital  of  their  Government  and  the  base  of  supplies  for  their  armies. 
They  interpreted  their  mission  to  be  the  defeat  and  the  destruction 
of  the  overwhelming  forces  that  confronted  them. 

That  was  their  exclusive  purpose  for  the  time  being;  and  imtram- 
meled  by  any  fixed  geographic  objective  as  the  ultimate  aim  of  any 
operation  they  Avere  able  to  and  did  make  the  Union  armies  their 
objective. 

Had  the  Xorth  displayed  an  equal  amount  of  common  sense  and 
had  they  realized  that  their  shortest  road  to  Richmond  lay  through 
the  ranks  of  the  Confederates,  which  were  bound  to  interpose  between 
them  and  Richmond,  and  in  comparison  to  which  their  own  forces 
were  in  overwhelming  superiority,  the  Avar  should  have  terminated 
in  half  the  time  and  with'  incalculably  less  loss  in  life  and  in  wealth. 

It  took  more  than  two  years  of  time  and  tremendous  sacrifices 
of  life  before  the  North  awakened  to  the  fact  that  its  lack  of  common 
sense,  its  unreasoned  obsession,  had  blinded  it  to  the  demands  of  the 
situation  and  had  cast  for  its  forces  a  mission  projected  so  far  into 
the  uncertainties  of  the  future,  with  an  unbeaten  foe  on  its  tracks, 
that  in  seeking  to  accomplish  it,  its  cause  was,  to  say  the  least,  twice 
hanging  in  the  balance,  notwithstanding  all  its  tremendous  superior- 
ity in  wealth,  resources,  and  men. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  strategical  blunders  on  the 
part  of  the  North  were  not  errors  in  the  application  of  common  sense. 
They  were  errors  in  common  sense  strategical  conception.  We  may 
expect  to  encounter  frequent  errors  in  the  application  of  common- 
sense  principles,  for  generals  and  admirals  are  fallible  creatures  and 
the  friction  of  war  will  always  turn  the  advantage  to  one  side  or  the 
other,  dependent  upon  the  skill  with  which  opposing  leaders  may 
be  able  to  resolve  the  friction  in  their  favor. 

But  there  is  no  excuse  for  errors  in  strategical  conceptions.  They 
are  fundamentally  sound  or  unsound,  and  it  is  usually  hopeless  to 
expect  successful  results  from  unsound  premises. 

In  naval  history  of  more  recent  date,  of  a  time  that  is  well  within 
the  knowledge  and  experience  of  us  all,  we  find  another  illustration 
of  the  lack  of  common  sense  in  strategical  operations  that  led  to  a 
final  defeat  in  war  for  the  power  whose  strategical  conceptions  was 
fundamentally  unsound.  This  was  in  the  battle  of  August  10,  1904, 
between  the  Japanese  fleet  and  the  Russian  Port  Arthur  fleet. 

Early  in  August,  1904.  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  owing  to 
the  pressure  of  the  Japanese  land  forces  under  Gen.  Nogi  besieging 
Port  Arthur,  the  Russian  fleet  in  the  harbor  of  Port  Arthur  was 
forced  out,  The  Japanese  siege  guns  were  within  range  of  the 
anchorage  of  the  Russian  fleet,  and  their  position  was  clearly  an 
untenable  one. 


NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE  FOR  CIVILIANS.  65 

This  fleet  consisted  of  6  battleships  and  5  large  cruisers,  with  about 
15  destroyers. 

Outside  of  Port  Arthur,  based  on  the  Elliot  Islands,  about  60 
miles  to  the  eastward,  was  the  main  Japanese  fleet,  consisting  of 
6  battleships  and  about  12  cruisers,  large  and  small,  18  destroyers, 
and  30  torpedo  boats. 

The  question  for  the  Russians  was  what  to  do  with  their  naval 
force  under  the  circumstances. 

While  considerably  outnumbered  in  cruisers  and  torpedo  craft, 
the  two  forces  were  equal  in  number,  and  practically  in  strength,  in 
main  fighting  units — battleships. 

Vladivostock,  another  Russian  base,  was  distant  about  1,100  miles 
from  Port  Arthur,  through  waters  practically  controlled  by  the 
Japanese  fleet  lying  off  Port  Arthur. 

It  appears  from  the  records  that  -  the  Russian  admiral,  Vitgeft, 
after  more  than  one  council  of  war,  held  that  he  could  not  hope  to 
reach  Vladivostock  without  fighting  an  action  with  the  Japanese 
fleet,  which  he  felt  he  could  not  win,  and  that  the  best  use  of  his 
fleet  would  be  to  remain  in  Port  Arthur  and  assist  in  its  defense  to 
the  last. 

The  Viceroy  Alexieff  held  differently  and  directed  the  admiral 
to  proceed  to  Vladivostock. 

Both  conceptions  were  fundamentally  wrong.  The  one  thing 
that  made  the  Japanese  land  operations  possible  at  all  in  Manchuria 
was  the  local  command  of  the  sea  enjoyed  by  them  by  virtue  of  the 
ineptitude  of  the  Russian  naval  commanders. 

It  took  the  plainest  kind  of  common  sense  to  see  that,  yet  no 
serious  effort  was  made  at  any  time  by  the  Russians,  with  forces 
only  slightly  inferior,  to  dispute  that  command.  Russia  had  another 
fleet  in  the  Baltic ;  Japan  had  none  but  what  she  employed  in  the 
Yellow  Sea  and  Japan  Sea.  If  Alexieff  and  Admiral  Vitgeft  had 
taken  the  common-sense  view  of  the  situation  they  would  have 
reached  a  common  conclusion  something  like  this:  The  fleet  can 
not  remain  at  Port  Arthur.  Outside  is  an  enemy  barring  its  escape 
to  Vladivostock,  our  only  other  port  in  the  Pacific.  It  is  assumed 
that  the  enemy  will  fight  to  prevent  our  escape.  Well  and  good,  we 
will  leave  Port  Arthur,  and  with  a  force  of  capital  ships  nearly  equal 
to  the  enemy  we  will  fight  him  to  a  frazzle.  We  shall  probably  not 
escape  destruction,  but  we  will  see  to  it  that  there  will  be  so  little 
left  of  the  enemy  fleet  that  with  the  advent  of  our  Baltic  squadron 
the  control  of  the  sea  will  reside  with  us  and  the  war  will  terminate 
in  our  favor. 

Had  any  admiral  a  better  chance  to  end  a  career  in  glory  and  to 
leave  to  his  service  a  heritage  of  fame  than  had  Admiral  Vitgeft  I 
67325—16— — 5 


66  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

As  it  happened,  Vitgeft  was  killed  early  in  the  action  that  was 
forced  upon  him.  He  had  tried  evasion,  obsessed  with  the  idea  that 
he  should  get  to  Vladivostock. 

It  seemed  never  to  have  occurred  to  him  to  make  of  the  action  one 
of  his  own  choosing. 

Togo  realized  his  danger  and  failed  to  press  home  his  attack  for 
fear  of  losses  he  could  ill  afford  in  face  of  the  balance  of  power  that 
would  reside  with  the  Baltic  fleet  when  it  should  arrive. 

The  result  of  the  engagement  of  August  10  was  that  the  fighting 
power  of  the  Japanese  fleet  was  in  no  way  impaired,  whereas  the 
[Russian  fleet  scattered  to  the  four  winds,  part  reaching  neutral 
ports,  where  they  were  interned  for  the  period  of  the  war,  and  the 
rest  returning  to  Port  Arthur,  where  they  were  ultimately  destroyed 
either  by  the  gunfire  of  the  Japanese  land  forces  or  by  the  Kussians 
themselves. 

Naval  and  military  histories  are  full  of  such  evidences  of  disasters 
that  were  the  fruits  of  an  unintelligent  grasp  of  simple  principles 
of  strategy. 

I  have  already  pointed  out  to  you  as  civilians  your  line  of  duty  in 
respect  to  educating  the  public  with  which  you  are  in  close  contact 
to  the  point  of  recognition  that  the  Nation  has  a  body  of  servants 
whose  function  it  is  to  advise  and  to  act  intelligently  in  matters  con- 
cerning strategy. 

To  us  as  naval  'officers  it  must  also  be  urged  that  we  be  at  pains  to 
study  and  to  master  the  elements  of  strategy,  that  we  may  be  in  the 
fullest  sense  worthy  of  the  trust  and  confidence  reposed  in  us. 


NAVAL  DISTRICTS. 


By  Capt.  GEORGE  R.  MARVELL. 


I. 

In  pursuance  of  its  policy  to  have  lectures  on  naval  subjects  de- 
livered to  the  men  participating  in  this  training  cruise  for  civilians, 
the  Navy  Department  has  ordered  me  to  give  to  you  a  short  talk  on 
the  subject  of  "  Naval  districts." 

During  the  War  with  Spain  in  1898,  in  order  that  the  earliest 
information  could  be  obtained  regarding  the  movements  of  the 
numerous  Spanish  vessels  reported  as  infesting  the  Atlantic  coast  of 
the  United  States,  the  Navy  Department  established  signal  stations 
at  various  points  along  the  coast  to  which  information  could  be  sig- 
naled from  our  vessels  at  sea  and  then  could  be  sent  by  telephone  or 
telegraph  to  the  Navy  Department.  In  the  reverse  way  information 
and  orders  could  be  given  to  the  ships. 

The  Navy  Department  also  sent  to  ports  along  the  coast  fighting 
ships  for  the  purpose  of  providing  protection  to  the  many  unfortified 
and  fortified  coast  towns.  Also  a  coast-defense  squadron  was  organ- 
ized which  had  the  same, object  in  view.  This  squadron  was  made 
up  of  real  fighting  ships  and  had  a  distinct  fighting  value. 

It  became  evident  that  it  was  impossible  for  these  various  units 
to  efficiently  communicate  directly  with  the  Navy  Department,  and 
so  an  intermediate  office  was  established. 

The  vessels  had  to  have  certain  areas  to  look  out  for,  .and  so  the 
commandants  of  navy  yards  and  specially  detailed  officers  were 
given  authority  over  these  lookout  and  signal  stations  and  the 
patrolling  ships.  The  naval  district  thus  came  into  existence. 

After  the  War  with  Spain  the  naval  districts  have  been  slowly 
developed,  rules  and  regulations  written  and  approved  by  the  joint 
board  and  Secretaries  of  the  Navy  and  of  War,  a  great  deal  of  data 
obtained,  and  an  organization  mapped  out  and  now  being  carried 
into  effect. 

• 


68  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

II. 

A  naval  district  is  a  part  of  the  coast  of  the  United  States  between 
certain  definitely  located  points  on  the  coast  and  of  such  portions  of 
States,  counties,  cities,  etc.,  as  may  be  assigned  by  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment. The  district  consists  also  of  all  navigable  waters  and  of  that 
portion  of  the  sea  between  limits  drawn  perpendicular  to  the  gen- 
eral direction  of  the  coast  at  the  division  point. 

The  coasts  of  the  United  States  are  divided  into  13  districts,  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  making  the  fourteenth.  The  following  are  the 
limits  of  the  districts : 

First.  From  Eastport,  Me.,  to  and  including  Chatham,  Mass. 

Second.  From  Chatham  to  and  including  New  London. 

Third.  From  New  London  to  and  including  Barnegat  and  Porto  Rico. 

Fourth.  From  Barnegat  to  and  including  Assateague. 

Fifth.  From  Assateague  to  and  including  New  River  Inlet. 

Sixth.  From  New  River  Inlet  to  and  including  St.  Johns  River. 

Seventh.  From  St.  Johns  River  to  and  including  Tarupa. 

Eighth.  From  Tampa  to  the  Rio  Grande. 

Ninth.  Lake  Michigan. 

Tenth.  Lakes  Erie  and  Ontario. 

Eleventh.  Lakes  Huron  and  Superior. 

Twelfth.  From  southern  boundary  California  to  42°  north  latitude. 

Thirteenth.  From  42°  north  latitude  to  northern  boundary. 

Fourteenth.  Hawaii  and  islands  of  Pacific  station. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  limits  of  the  districts  are  defined  by 
points  on  the  coast  and  that  there  are  no  interior  geographic  limits. 
The  Navy  Department  has,  however,  designated  certain  places  to  be 
in  certain  districts.  For  instance,  Worcester  is  in  the  first,  Pitts- 
burgh in  the  third,  Denver  in  the  twelfth.  The  Navy  has  navy  yards 
and  stations  in  a  number  of  coast  towns,  and  these  are  in  the  districts 
on  the  coast  of  which  they  are  situated. 

There  are  various  naval  activities  in  many  cities  away  from  the 
seaboard,  and  wherever  these  activities  exist  the  officers  or  men  per- 
forming duty  there  are  under  the  military  control  of  the  commandant 
of  some  district. 

Navigable  waters  opening  from  or  entering  the  sea  within  the  coast 
limits  of  a  district  are  considered  in  that  district.  Thus  Chesapeake 
Bay  is  included  in  the  fifth,  which  has  for  its  coast  limits  Assateague 
and  New  River  Inlet. 

The  waters  of  the  high  seas  are  divided  by  the  imaginary  lines 
stated  in  the  definition.  But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  these  limits 
are  rigid  and  unchangeable.  They  are  merely  guides  to  show  where 
the  work  of  a  district  must  be  done,  so  that  one  district  will  not 
duplicate  the  work  of  the  next. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  69 

III. 

The  coasts  of  the  United  States  are  long  and  are  exposed  to  attack 
by  any  nation  having  a  navy.  Whether  the  command  of  the  sea  is 
in  our  hands  or  not,  the  other  belligerent,  if  possessed  of  a  navy, 
could  make  a  descent ;  if  the  navy  was  powerful,  this  attack  might 
be  in  force ;  if  weak,  by  a  raiding  vessel  probably  having  great  speed. 

There  are  many  towns,  cities,  and  villages  on  the  coast;  few  of 
these  are  fortified.  There  are  many  summer  homes  not  in  villages 
or  towns,  but  scattered  along  the  shore  line,  where  scenery  or  sport 
has  caused  them  to  be  built. 

Each  and  every  one  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  places  would  be,  as 
was  shown  in  the  war  with  Spain,  alarmed  for  the  safety  of  his  or  their 
possessions  and  would  immediately  upon  the  breaking  out  of  war  call 
upon  the  Congressmen  of  the  districts  to  exercise  their  influence  with 
the  Navy  Department  to  get  a  battleship  ordered  to  guard  that  par- 
ticular place.  Now,  really,  they  do  not  care  for  a  battleship,  because 
all  know  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  supply  battleships  to  every 
hamlet  on  the  coast ;  but  they  all  want  some  outward  manifestation 
of  the  naval  power  of  the  United  States,  no  matter  how  small,  and 
if  they  see  patroling  vessels  and  know  that  they  are  being  kept  in 
mind  and  that  some  power  or  force  stationed  in  the  neighborhood 
will  oppose  the  enemy,  they  are  more  or  less  satisfied. 

One  of  the  reasons,  then,  for  the  naval  district  is  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  such  a  force — a  force  that  will  allay  the  alarm  felt  when  no 
protecting  hand  is  visible. 

It  can  be  easily  seen  that  if  we  divide  up  the  Navy  to  provide  for 
this  call  for  vessels  our  first  line  of  defense,  the  fleet,  will  seriously 
suffer.  If,  however,  such  units  of  the  naval  force,  that  are  of  no 
value  in  the  fleet,  be  used  in  the  naval  districts  we  will  have  given 
freedom  to  the  fighting  force  of  the  Navy.  Now,  if  in  addition  to  this 
it  is  realized  that  the  fleet  is  not  for  the  local  defense  of  any  small 
portion  of  the  coast,  but  is  for  the  defense  of  the  Nation,  and  that 
its  movements  must  not  be  controlled  by  the  hysterical  calls  for 
protection  from  imaginary  enemies,  but  by  the  strategic  plans  made 
up  before  war  breaks  out,  by  the  planning  section  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment and  by  the  "  great  general  staff  "  of  the  Navy  and  Army, 
then  the  people  will  understand  the  impracticability  of  detailing 
fighting  ships  for  local  defense  and  will  be  content  with  the  knowl- 
edge that  the  Navy  is  performing  its  proper  work  in  accordance  with 
proper  plans. 

Complete  freedom  of  movement  of  the  fleet  is  necessary  for  the 
proper  development  of  the  country's  offensive  or  defensive  war 
plans ;  and  the  naval  districts  have  for  a  second  reason  for  their  ex- 


70  NAVAL   TRAINING   CEUISE    FOR   CIVILIANS. 

istence  the  taking  over  of  local  defense  in  order  to  give  the  fleet 
mobility. 

In  the  successful  development  of  the  war  plans  it  is  necessary 
that  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  fleet  should  have  complete  in- 
formation of  all  the  movements  of  the  enemy  forces.  It  can  be  seen 
that  with  his  scouts,  the  eyes  of  the  fleet,  he  can  obtain  news  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  vessels  within  the  range  of  vision  of  the 
scouts.  It  is,  however,  impossible  for  the  fleet  scouts  to  cover  all  the 
sea.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  fleet  may  be  in  the  Caribbean  expect- 
ing, from  the  information  in  its  possession,  that  the  enemy  intends 
an  attack  in  that  area,  whereas  the  real  attack  comes  to  the  north- 
ward. If  there  was  no  organization  in  the  naval  district  the  infor- 
mation of  the  sighting  of  the  enemy  might  and  probably  would  not 
be  transmitted  promptly  to  the  Navy  Department,  and  from  there  to 
the  fleet.  With  an  organized  and  efficient  body  of  scouts  patrolling 
off  the  coast  this  news  would  be  sent  and  received  promptly. 

This  is  one  form  of  information  that  can  be  obtained  by  the  naval 
district,  but  this  is  not  the  only  one. 

Then,  again,  there  should  be  in  possession  of  the  Navy  Department 
information  regarding  the  stores  and  provisions,  coal  and  oil,  docks 
and  dry  docks,  medical  men  (also  doctors) ,  and  hospitals,  pilots,  tow- 
boats,  harbors,  channels,  and  many  other  things  that  can  only  be 
obtained  by  observation  before  war  comes. 

It  is  manifestly  impossible  for  the  office  of  naval  districts  to  have 
an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  minutiae  of  all  this,  but  it  is  possible 
for  the  commandant  to  know  the  information  obtained  in  his  district. 

Thus  the  obtaining  of  information  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  the 
existence  of  a  naval  district. 

Information  obtained  but  not  told  anyone  would  be  wasted.  It 
must,  therefore,  be  transmitted  to  some  one  who  can  again  transmit 
or  use  it.  In  order  to  transmit  information  an  organization  must 
be  effected  before  war  comes,  and  this  organization  makes  necessary 
subdivisions  or  districts,  and  is  thus  another  reason  for  the  existence 
of  the  naval  district. 

It  would  be  possible  to  control  the  movements  of  vessels  stationed 
permanently  during  war  in  certain  harbors  from  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment. Also  the  Navy  Department  could  have  mines,  booms,  and 
obstructions  placed  by  direct  order,  and  could  control  the  vessels 
guarding  these  immobile  defenses.  But  does  anyone  think  that 
this  could  be  done  in  such  a  manner  as  to  obtain  the  best  results? 
Just  think  for  a  moment  of  the  immense  mass  of  detail,  that  would 
be  handled  in  an  office  thousands  of  miles  away  from  many  of  the 
places.  It  is  ridiculous  to  think  it  could  be  done  efficiently. 

The  Navy  Department  can  supply  the  personnel  and  material, 
and  can  originate  general  plans,  but  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CEUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS.  71 

the  personnel  on  the  spot  develop  the  details  of  defense,  of  the  use 
of  tools  given  to  them,  and  oversee  the  execution  and  development  of 
the  details  of  the  general  plan. 

It  would  be  possible  to  assign  men  and  vessels  to  every  port  and 
make  each  local  port  responsible,  but  it  has  been  considered  wise 
to  divide  the  coast  so  that  the  naval  forces  may  be  assigned  in  num- 
bers, and  the  coast  line  not  too  great  for  one  man  to  handle  efficiently. 
With  the  naval  material  and  such  as  may  belong  within  the  district, 
the  commandant  is  required  to  furnish  local  defense. 

The  defense  of  the  United  States  ashore  is  one  of  the  duties  of  the 
Army,  assisted  in  emergency  by  the  Navy  afloat.  The  actual  physical 
defense  of  any  portion  of  the  coasts  of  the  United  States  must  be 
done  by  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  each  in  its  own  sphere.  The  com- 
mon mission  is  the  defense  of  the  country,  and  each  branch  of  the 
fighting  forces  must  aid  and  assist"  each  other  to  achieve  the  end 
to  be  obtained — that  is,  the  defeat  of  the  enemy. 

When  the  activities  are  entirely  on  the  water  the  Navy  alone  has 
the  responsibility.  When  the  activities  are  within  the  boundaries, 
but  away  from  the  sea,  the  Army  has  full  sway.  But  there  is  an 
area  of  land  and  sea  where  both  branches  must  operate,  and  the 
activities  of  one  overlap  those  of  the  other.  This  area  may  be 
briefly  described  as  that  area,  both  on  land  and  sea,  that  comes  with 
the  range  of  the  guns  both  of  the  Navy  and  Army.  Within  this 
area  both  services  have  duties  to  perform,  and  it  is  necessary  for  each 
to  cooperate  with  the  other  in  order  to  obtain  results  favorable  to 
the  full  development  of  the  strategic  plans  of  the  "  great  general 
staff." 

The  commanders  of  the  naval  district  must  assist  the  Army  in 
every  way,  and  reversely  the  Army  may  be  expected  to  do  the  same 
for  the  Navy. 

In  order  that  the  Navy  Department  should  have  full  knowledge 
at  all  times  of  the  commercial  marine  affairs,  it  is  necessary  to  have 
officers  acquainted  with  the  various  steamboat  and  marine  activities 
of  the  country.  By  dividing  the  coast  into  districts  and  ordering  the 
officers  in  each  to  perform  this  duty  in  time  of  peace,  when  war  comes 
the  information  will  be  in  the  hands  of  the  department  officials  and 
available  for  use.  The  greater  the  subdivision,  the  more  detail  knowl- 
edge will  be  obtained,  but  the  area  to  be  covered  should  not  be  too 
great  for  one  man  to  properly  control.  Each  port  should  have  an 
observer  to  obtain  the  data,  transmit  it  to  the  commandant  of  the 
district,  who,  when  the  information  from  various  sources  has  been 
put  in  proper  form,  should  transmit  it  to  the  office  of  naval  districts. 
Then  in  time  of  peace  or  war  the  movements  of  all  vessels  may  be 
known.  In  England,  the  official  having  cognizance  of  movements  of 
merchant  vessels  is  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  trades  division  of  the 


72  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS. 

admiralty.    He  has  nothing  to  do  with  calling  vessels  into  service. — 
O.  N.  I. 

As  mentioned  before,  the  office  of  naval  districts  being  so  far  away 
from  a  greater  part  of  the  coast  line,  and  the  United  States  being  so 
large,  makes  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  for  it  to  directly  move  all 
the  pawns  in  the  game.  It  can  only  lay  down  the  mission  and  the 
general  rules  for  its  accomplishment.  This  makes  it  evident  that 
there  must  be  organizations  to  carry  out  these  rules.  After  taking 
into  consideration  the  factors,  it  is  plain  that  each  organisation  must 
have  many  smaller  units  organized  to  properly  perform  the  work. 
The  entire  coast  of  the  United  States  must  therefore  be  organized  so 
as  to  obtain  and  transmit  information,  furnish  local  naval  protection, 
and  advance  the  interests  of  the  country  in  every  way. 

IV. 

In  what  has  gone  before  an  endeavor  has  been  made  to  show  some 
of  the  tasks  that  must  be  undertaken  by  the  commandant  of  a  itsival 
district,  and  it  is  from  a  consideration  of  these  tasks  that  the  mission 
of  a  naval  district  can  be  deduced. 

"In  any  given  situation,"  to  quote  from  a  distinguished  lecturer  at 
the  Naval  War  College,  "the  mission  is  the  object  which  lies  before 
us  for  ultimate  accomplishment." 

What  is  to  be  accomplished  by  the  organization  of  a  naval  district  ? 

It  has  been  seen  that  it  is  necessary  that  public  alarm  must  be 
allayed  in  order  to  prevent  the  fleet  from  being  diverted  from  its 
mission  by  the  clamors  for  apparent  protection  of  a  small  part  of 
the  population  of  the  country.  This,  however,  would  not  be  listened 
to  by  the  governing  officials  if  they  were  strong  and  wise  enough 
politically,  and  to  grasp  the  mission  of  the  fleet.  And  so  this  can  be 
hardly  called  part  of  the  mission,  a  minor  part  perhaps,  but  not  Inrpre 
enough  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  for  it  is  possible  fcr  a  nation  to 
be  so  well  indoctrinated  that  such  calls  would  not  be  made.  As  an 
example  of  such  a  nation,  Germany  may  be  named. 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  gathering  and  transmitting  of  informa- 
tion are  a  necessity  for  the  development  and  accomplishment  of  the 
war  plans,  and  that  the  naval  districts  organization  must  form  part 
of  the  greater  organization  built  up  for  these  purposes.  These  duties, 
then,  must  be  part  of  the  mission. 

The  Army  is  the  main  shore  defense,  but  the  coast  is  the  locality 
where  both  services  must  act  together,  each  within  its  own  limits 
assisting  each  other.  Certain  naval  methods  of  offense  and  defense 
must  be  employed,  and  thus  it  can  be  seen  that  the  mission  must  take 
cognizance  of  defense  and  offense  and  military  operations  resulting 
therefrom. 


NAVAL  TRAINING  CRUISE  FOB  CIVILIANS.  73 

The  mission  of  the  naval  district  therefore  is  first  to  obtain  and 
transmit  information ;  second,  to  provide  local  defense ;  third,  to  assist 
in  advancing  military  operations. 

V. 

It  is  impossible  in  a  lecture,  general  in  type  as  this  must  be,  to  prop- 
erly analyze  the  probable  movements  of  the  naval  forces  of  the  vari- 
ous nations  of  the  world  if,  unhappily,  the  United  States  should  be 
at  war  with  any  one  or  two  of  them. 

But  for  the  sake  of  illustration  let'  it  be  assumed  that  we  are  at 
war  with  a  country  which  has  no  base  near  our  coasts,  and  whose 
naval  forces  are  equal  to  our  own.  In  such  a  case  the  command  of 
the  sea  is  in  the  balance.  Roughly  speaking,  at  the  outbreak  of  such 
a  war  each  within  its  own  waters  would  have  command.  However, 
in  both  countries  the  mission  of  the  naval  commander  is  "  to  obtain 
command  of  the  sea,"  This  can  only  be  done  by  destroying,  captur- 
ing, or  driving  into  port  the  naval  forces  of  the  other  belligerent. 
Prior  to  any  general  naval  battle  between  the  main  bodies  of  the  two 
nations  it  may  be  expected  that  commerce  destroying,  raiding,  and 
other  forms  of  annoyance  will  be  inaugurated.  For  the  purpose  of 
showing  what  can  be  expected  it  will  be  assumed  that  the  United 
States  is  standing  pat  and  making  no  offensive  move.  The  enemy, 
emboldened  by  lack  of  action  on  our  part,  may  send  out  fast  vessels 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information  and  to  destroy  commerce. 
Such  ships  might  appear  off  our  coast  at  any  place,  and  having  speed 
and  endurance  may  run  in  and  fire  on  our  towns.  To  prevent  this 
it  would  be  necessary  to  have  vessels  of  equal  speed  and  power  lo- 
cated so  as  to  drive  off  such  craft.  But  such  vessels,  having  a  dis- 
tinct fighting  value,  would  be  with  the  fleet,  and  unless  the  raider 
happened  to  appear  in  the  fleet's  immediate  neighborhood  there 
would  be  nothing  to  oppose  him.  The  relative  amount  of  damage 
such  a  vessel  could  do  would  be  slight,  and  would  not  warrant  weak- 
ening the  fleet  to  drive  off  such  a  possible  enemy.  Such  an  attack 
on  the  coast  would  not  last  long,  for  with  torpedo  boats  and  subma- 
rines in  a  district  a  concentration  would  take  place  in  a  very  short 
time,  and  fortified  places  would  not  be  attacked.  With  a  proper 
system  of  off-shore  scouting  the  presence  of  the  raider  would  be 
promptly  reported  and  defensive  moves  made  before  its  appearance 
off  the  shore. 

The  enemy,  having  decided  to  take  the  offensive,  must  establish  a 
base  nearer  to  the  coasts  of  the  United  States  than  are  the  shores  of 
its  own  country.  It  will  be  assumed  that  this  has  been  done,  and  it 
is  known  that  active  preparations  are  being  made  for  a  descent  on 
our  coast.  The  enemy  now  has  at  his  base  all  the  ships  necessary  to 


74  NAVAL  TRAINING   CKUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

wage  warfare  in  all  its  modern  variations — battleships,  battle  cruisers, 
scouts,  mine  layers,  mine  sweepers,  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  subma- 
rines, and  aircraft  of  all  kinds.  He  is  close  enough  to  our  coast  to 
permit  these  to  be  used. 

What  should  the  naval  districts  expect  to  encounter  now  ? 

Those  far  away  from  the  base  would  expect  raiding  ships  only,  for 
the  base  has  of  course  been  established  as  near  as  possible  to  the  point 
of  attack.  It  is  evident  that  the  enemy  having  failed  to  encounter 
our  fleet  and  being  firmly  based  near  our  coast  has  an  addition  to 
his  mission  "to  obtain  command  of  the  sea."  He  has  now  as  an 
immediate  mission  "  to  force  a  fight  by  a  descent  upon  the  coast." 

But  first  there  will  come  fast  cruisers ;  and  mine  planters  blocking 
channels,  planting  fields  of  mines  in  areas  that  will  not  be  gone  over 
by  their  own  ships;  submarines  may  appear,  submarines  fitted  for 
torpedo  attack  or  submarines  fitted  for  mine  planting.  Then,  as  the 
enemy  plans  are  successful,  will  come  the  landing  parties,  small  forces 
at  out  of  the  way  localities,  gradually  increasing  in  boldness  as  no 
opposition  is  encountered  or  resistance  is  worn  down.  Then  at  last, 
when  it  is  seen  that  the  United  States  does  not  or  can  not  offer  resist- 
ance, some  point  on  the  cost  will  be  seized  and  an  opening  made  for 
a  land  campaign. 

All  these  activities  depend  upon  which  nation  has  command  of  the 
sea,  and  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  other  nation  has  obtained  it 
either  because  of  superior  forces  or  strategy,  or  because  we  have  di- 
vided our  forces  in  the  districts  and  have  been  deficient  in  strategy. 

But  the  enemy  is  not  the  only  difficulty  the  naval  district  has  to 
contend  with.  What  has  been  said  regarding  the  pressure  that  would 
be  exerted  upon  the  administration  will  be  exerted  on  the  district 
commandant,  only  in  a  less  degree. 

Also  in  preparing  plans  for  the  organization  many  difficulties  will 
be  encountered,  because  of  apathy  due  to  lack  of  knowledge  of  the 
necessity  of  preparedness  in  time  of  peace. 

VI. 

The  material  that  will  be  necessary  to  have  in  order  to  fulfill  the 
mission  consists  of  naval  material  supplied  by  the  Navy,  and  local 
material  supplied  by  the  district. 

Taking  the  parts  of  the  mission  in  order,  we  will  first  examine 
what  will  be  necessary  to  obtain  and  transmit  information. 

In  time  of  peace  none  will  be  necessary,  for  the  personnel  can 
gather  the  information  and  forward  it  to  the  Navy  Department. 

In  time  of  war  it  is  different;  there  must  be  vessels  to  carry  the 
observers  away  from  the  coast  line  in  order  to  get  the  earliest  infor- 
mation of  the  enemy.  This  news  must  be  communicated,  and  we 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS.  75 

must  have  radio  plants  on  board  these  vessels.  The  use  of  radio 
telegraphy  has  increased  the  distance  the  scouts  can  be  stationed  off 
the  coast,  for  before  its  development  and  adoption  the  only  means  of 
communication  with  vessels  at  sea  was  by  visual  signals. 

There  must  be  an  inner  line  of  vessels.  These  may  have  radio  sets, 
but  all  must  have  visual  signals. 

Thus  the  material  necessary  to  gather  and  transmit  information 
from  the  sea,  consists  of  vessels,  radio  outfits,  and  visual  signal  sets. 

The  material  necessary  ashore  must  be  means  of  communication 
both  with  vessels  on  the  sea  and  with  higher  authority  ashore. 

These  will  consist  of  radio  outfits  and  visual  signal  outfits,  and  the 
telephone  and  telegraph  lines. 

Second,  to  provide  local  defense.  We  come  now  to  the  question  of 
cooperation  of  Navy  and  Army.  Which  branch  of  the  service  should 
provide  the  material  necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of  this  part 
of  the  mission? 

As  usual  in  all  such  cases  a  compromise  has  to  be  made,  with  the 
proviso  that  each  shall  assist  the  other  in  the  common  defense. 

There  will  be  needed:  Vessels,  surface  and  subsurface;  aircraft, 
hydro-aeroplanes,  aeroplanes,  dirigibles,  balloons;  mines  (controlled 
and  uncontrolled)  ;  mine-sweeping  outfits;  submarine  nets,  trap,, 
drifting  and  towing;  obstructions  of  various  kinds;  torpedo  tubes 
and  nets;  guns  of  all  types,  and  fortifications. 

Of  these,  the  Army  supplies  fortifications,  guns  on  shore,  some 
vessels,  controlled  mines,  aeroplanes,  and  some  obstructions. 

The  Navy  supplies  the  rest — that  is,  vessels,  aircraft,  uncontrolled 
mines,  submarine  nets,  obstructions,  torpedo  tubes  and  nets,  and  guns 
mounted  on  ships. 

Now,  taking  up  the  personnel  to  use  this  material,  it  is  evident  that 
men,  and  yet  more  men,  are  necessary.  Where  will  these  come 
from?  The  Navy  will  supply  some,  the  Coast  Guard,  Lighthouse 
Establishment,  and  other  Government  departments  a  few.  The 
Naval  Militia  and  the  Naval  Eeserve  force  will  be  the  first  called 
upon  to  serve ;  then  volunteers  must  be  called. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  Naval  Reserve  force  authorized  in  the  present 
appropriation  bill  will  provide  the  necessary  number  of  men  to  man 
the  naval  vessels  of  the  fleet  and  of  the  naval  districts,  but  time  only 
will  tell  what  will  come  from  this. 

VIII. 

The  very  brief  outline  of  the  reasons  for  having  a  naval  district, 
its  mission,  and  the  materiel  and  personnel  needed  to  accomplish  the 
mission,  has  brought  us  to  a  point  when  it  is  necessary  to  organize 
the  personnel  in  such  a  manner  that  the  best  results  may  be  obtained.. 


76  NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR  CIVILIANS. 

The  head  of  the  organization  is  the  director  of  naval  districts. 
This  officer  must  be  by  regulation  of  or  above  the  grade  of  captain 
in  the  Navy  and  his  office  is  in  Washington.  He  is  an  assistant  on 
the  staff  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  and  is  responsible  to  him 
for  the  operation  of  the  naval  districts. 

In  each  district  and  in  command  of  all  naval  activities  an  officer  of 
or  above  the  grade  of  captain  is  stationed.  The  title  of  this  officer  is 
"  commandant  of  the  [number]  naval  district."  Up  to  date,  with  one 
-exception,  the  commandant  has  been  the  commandant  of  the  most 
important  navy  yard  in  the  district.  Whether  during  war  it  would 
be  possible  for  the  commandant  of  a  busy  navy  yard  to  attend  to  dis- 
trict duties  is  very  much  doubted.  The  present  plan  is  to  retain  him. 

The  regulations  next  provide  for  an  officer  of  or  above  the  rank  of 
commander  to  be  assistant  commandant,  who  has  no  other  duties  ex- 
cept those  pertaining  to  the  naval  district.  This  officer  acts  as  chief 
of  staff  to  the  commandant  and  is  to  be  in  direct  charge  of  all  activi- 
ties ashore. 

The  organization  next  calls  for  an  officer  to  command  everything 
afloat.  He  is  known  as  the  "  commander  of  the  naval  forces,  [num- 
ber] naval  district,"  and  under  the  commandant  is  responsible  for  all 
naval  activities  upon  the  water. 

The  commandant  has  a  staff  consisting  of  the  aids  for  information 
and  communication,  censor,  secretary,  and  Army  aid;  also  pay- 
masters for  accounts  and  supplies,  and  a  medical  officer. 

It  is  not  contemplated  that  each  of  these  duties  shall  be  performed 
by  different  officers  except  when  the  size  and  importance  of  the  dis- 
trict demand  it. 

Under  the  commander  of  the  naval  force  are  the  commanders  of 
the  coast-defense  division,  district  scouts,  submarine  division,  mining 
division,  and  section  patrol  division. 

These  division  commanders  have  under  them  other  group  com- 
manders, such  as  in  the  section  patrol  division:  The  commander  of 
ihe  harbor  entrance  patrol  and  the  commander  of  the  section  patrol. 

That  part  of  the  organization  which  is  of  interest  to  you  is  prob- 
ably the  section  patrol  division,  and  a  brief  outline  of  this  division 
will  be  given  a  little  later  in  this  paper. 

Ashore,  under  the  assistant  commandant,  come  the  section  com- 
manders, the  naval  battalion  commanders,  and  the  staff. 

Under  the  section  commanders'  control  are  the  men  in  charge  of 
naval  patrol  stations  and  the  commanders  of  the  section  patrol 
divisions,  the  section  submarines,  and  section  air  craft. 

The  defensive  sea  areas  are  portions  of  the  sea  outside  of  a  port 
through  which  a  vessel  passes  at  its  peril,  for  it  includes  the  mined 
and  obstructed  area. 


NAVAL   TRAINING   CRUISE   FOR   CIVILIANS.  77 

The  outer  patrol  has  on  one  of  its  vessels  the  pilots  necessary  to- 
conduct  the  incoming  vessel  safely  through  the  defensive  sea  area. 
The  inner  patrol  receives  incoming  pilots  and  supplies  outgoing. 

IX. 

A  brief  paper  like  this  can  not  go  into  the  subject  of  naval  dis- 
tricts as  fully  as  is  needed  to  get  a  complete  knowledge  of  what  they 
are  and  what  is  accomplished  by  them,  but  if  the  mission  is  thor- 
oughly understood,  then  you  will  realize  the  necessity  of  the  naval 
district. 

I  will  repeat:  The  mission  of  the  naval  district  is,  first,  to  obtain 
and  transmit  information;  second,  to  provide  local  defense;  third, 
to  assist  in  advancing  military  operations. 

Keep  this  in.  your  minds  and  remember,  that  when  war  breaks  out, 
the  first  line  of  defense  is  the  fleet;  that  nothing  must  interfere 
with  its  movements;  that  the  naval  district  must  do  its  part  by 
utilizing  its  own  resources  for  its  own  defense  and  not  call  upon  the 
active  fighting  force  to  protect  its  local  ports ;  that  information  must 
be  promptly  obtained  and  promptly  transmitted;  and,  above  all, 
remember  that  a  united  fleet  means  victory  and  a  divided  fleet 
defeat. 

o 


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